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## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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4 December 1990

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## BALTICS

### Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister Interviewed

91UF0132A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Enn Liymets, new deputy foreign minister of the Republic of Estonia, by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA observer Valeriy Merkin; place and date not given: "The Ministry Emerges From the Shadows"]

[Text] [Merkin] Enn, we are old acquaintances, and I will first of all permit myself to congratulate you on your return home and your appointment to so responsible an office. How long were you away, incidentally, and how did your career take shape in the USSR Foreign Ministry?

[Liymets] Thank you for your kind words. Indeed, my time away from home was 11 years, including three years of training in the diplomatic academy in Moscow. This was a very complex period in my life. Switching to problems with which I had not hitherto dealt did not come easily. The training was in the period which it is today customary to call "stagnant," but I would mention right away that these years in the academy did a lot for me. Despite the fact that studying alongside me were the little boys and grandsons of party bosses, there were among the lecturers intelligent, critical people who encouraged a free exchange of opinions and nontraditional approaches. We had, for example, the special course "Reasons for the Collapse of the Soviet Economy," yet the calendar showed 1982.

Following graduation, I worked for five years in Cracow—a major industrial and cultural center of Poland. My activity as consul was connected with study of the situation in culture, science, and the mass media and the corresponding establishment of cooperation with Soviet institutions in this field.

[Merkin] And how did you get on with the Polish language?

[Liymets] I always said as a joke that if God wanted to offend an Estonian, all he would have to do would be to force him to learn Polish. It has so many sibilants....

It was difficult enough. The Polish intelligentsia's attitude toward the Soviet Union at the start of the 1980's was guarded, to put it mildly. Many people understood that the introduction of martial law in the country was directly connected with the pressure from a powerful neighbor which was doing everything to ensure that the "Polish contagion" did not cross the border.

There was a cardinal change in the conditions of our work after 1985. The policy of perestroika proclaimed by M. Gorbachev was instantly reflected in the mood in East Europe. The democratization, glasnost, and pluralism in Soviet society were entirely out of the ordinary for the Polish intelligentsia. It had been accustomed to

seeing the USSR as the principal obstacle to the implementation of progressive reforms, but here was something inexplicable.

I worked subsequently, from 1987 through 1989, in the embassy in Warsaw and was cultural attache, but was already sensing a need to return home, where remarkable events were taking place. I worked for a year more in the USSR Foreign Ministry, in the European Socialist Countries Administration. It now seems strange that the diplomatic subdivision with such a name outlived by a year what no longer existed—socialism in Europe. Only now has it been renamed the Third European Administration.

[Merkin] There is probably no person in Estonia currently more informed about Poland's problems. What is your view of the development of events in this country?

[Liymets] A short preamble is, nonetheless, necessary. It is an indisputable fact that there is no country in Europe in which the crisis has lasted as long as in Poland. It began back in 1980, and only now can we speak of some glimmers of a solution. After all, the 1979 level of production has not yet been reached. This was the first total crisis of the socialist system in one individual state.

[Merkin] A specific question: Who will emerge the winner in the struggle for the presidency—L. Walesa or T. Mazowiecki?

[Liymets] L. Walesa, most likely. The point being that this year has been one of shock therapy in Polish society. We have already said that it is the 10th year of the crisis, and the present year of 1990 has been the most crisis-ridden of them all. The Mazowiecki government has adopted extremely unpopular measures in the economy, and the credit of trust in it has manifestly disappeared. With his typical flexibility Walesa is taking advantage of this fact, putting forward populist slogans and promising and promising and... his popularity is still on the rise.

[Merkin] Yet what is interesting is that both Walesa and Mazowiecki are from Solidarity, that is, are members of the same team.

[Liymets] Yes, Walesa is the spiritual father of Solidarity, and Mazowiecki was the expert of this organization. Now, however, it seems that Walesa greatly desires to become father of the nation.

[Merkin] Poland reflects merely a part of the process occurring in East Europe. How do you view the unification of the two German states? In my view, a kind of euphoria reigns in this connection, but there has, after all, been to a certain extent some disturbance of the balance in both the political and military structures on the European continent.

[Liymets] I agree. Europe today looks quite different, and we could speak of an imbalance even. I believe, therefore, that the main thing at the upcoming meeting in Paris will be the restoration of balance. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is now taking place before



our eyes. This was a mechanism not only of military and political cooperation but also a mechanism of control and ideological influence on its allies on the part of the USSR. Lowering the level of the ceilings of the Soviet Union's military presence in East Europe should inevitably bring about a reaction from the West, primarily from the United States, in response. And we are already seeing this.

[Merkin] Now is the time to recall the Baltic question also. It is a question of integration in the fabric of big politics of the three Baltic republics. What do you think, what is the condition of this problem following the formation of a single German state? The more so in that the meeting in Paris lies ahead, and Helsinki-2 is not that far off.

[Liymets] Following Germany's unification, we can and need to put on a broader plane the question of the integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in Europe, from which they were artificially torn. The time of more practicable possibilities has come, and those who are today maintaining that behind the signatures of Genscher and Shevardnadze on the document of German reunification is a sentence passed on other countries are wrong. After all, the second clause of the 1990 document is in fact identical to the same clause of the treaty signed in Moscow in 1970 by W. Brandt. I would recall that this mentioned a conclusive solution to the problems of postwar Europe. And what are we seeing today?

[Merkin] The negotiations of the head of the Republic of Estonia in Washington, which has just ended, also indicate that it is still too early to dot the "i's."

[Liymets] Precisely so! A new twist of the spiral of political activity in this undoubtedly complex process may be expected in the very near future.

[Merkin] At present the foreign policy of the Republic of Estonia would seem, if you will, somewhat vague and abstract. Literally at the doors of the Foreign Ministry, from the side of the park adjoining Toompea, I witnessed the following dialogue between an elderly Estonian and a young man of manifestly provincial appearance. Nodding at the bust of Y. Lauristin, the elderly person asked: "And why is this still here?" The young man, somewhat embarrassed, replied: "Because, most likely, it is history, after all!" Which was followed by: "It is no longer our history!" So, does some continuity in the plane of formulation of the directions of pursuit of the foreign policy line persist? How could the foreign policy doctrine of the E. Savisaar government be described?

[Liymets] If there is any talk of continuity in the sphere of international relations, it can only be from the viewpoint of the period when Estonia was an independent state. After all, there was simply no foreign policy as such in subsequent decades, since Estonia itself was not in the true sense a subject of international politics. The corresponding provisions of the Estonian SSR Constitution were on the one hand ignored and, on the other, not implemented. Today's government is a government of a

transitional period. This is where the main aim comes from: creating the prerequisites in order to be ready to join in extensive international relations under the new conditions.

[Merkin] You will agree, Enn, that at present there is no uniform approach in determining the priorities of Estonia's foreign policy in the platforms of the main social and political movements. If memory serves, neither the Supreme Soviet Presidium nor the Estonian Parliament itself have yet once examined questions of foreign policy content in pure form. Where are the points of contact or some common denominator in approaches and evaluations and in, finally, the determination of a common concept? The words of L. Meri, head of Estonia's diplomatic department, are well known: "Granted a multi-party system, a single foreign policy is needed!" But what does this look like in practice?

[Liymets] All political forces, from the furthest left through the extreme right, consider the acquisition of genuine sovereignty most fundamental. In other words, there is complete consensus here. There are differences in the details, components, and dynamics of this process. The issue is one of pace of realization. Independence could be declared today even, but this would be shamanism. Repeating dozens of times "we are independent" does not alter reality. We do not have full control over our own territory even, and it is my opinion that we do, indeed, need a single policy. We must create the prerequisites, uniting efforts to achieve under the present conditions the maximum recognition and understanding of our problems. And on this path, if we compare Copenhagen, Vienna, and now Washington also, many countries, following the removal of the German question, are expressing a readiness to support us in our endeavors. One notes the fact that this breakthrough has been accomplished in a comparatively short space of time.

[Merkin] A few words, please, about the structure of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia and about the role and place of the Russian-speaking population in public diplomacy.

[Liymets] The activity of the Foreign Ministry remained in the shadows for many years. Some people did not even know that such a department existed in Estonia. But according to the constitution of the Estonian SSR, we even had a Defense Ministry. In fact the Foreign Ministry performed merely protocol and consular functions. We are experiencing difficulties here today. Other ministries had their own subject of activity and are dealing with these same problems today. At the present time the staff of the Foreign Ministry numbers 49. Seven subdivisions are operating. They include a political department. This is made up of advisers and experts for particular groups of countries. Traditional relations with the Scandinavian states, for example. Or specialists for coordinating the foreign policy of the Baltic republics. The Baltic Council existed earlier also, back in the 1930s, but was not, let us speak plainly, very effective. If,

however, we intend to create a Baltic market, this will mean a great deal of work for diplomats also.

How do I see the people's extensive participation in foreign policy? It may be effective only when the whole people understands this policy and supports it. A large Russian community lives in Estonia. Some have lived here for decades, others came here recently, but how this group understands the aims of Estonia's international policy is extremely important for us. In my view, we are paying the Russian community insufficient attention as yet. If there is independence, it will be necessary to firmly guarantee this group of the population all rights. Such guarantees will be accorded, I personally have no doubt about this, for there can be no democratic state if the rights of the minority are infringed.

[Merkin] Are there representatives of the Russian-speaking population among the 49 Foreign Ministry employees?

[Liymets] As yet, no, but we are very interested in there being such. An obligatory condition of work in our department, incidentally, is knowledge of Russian.

[Merkin] Our readers frequently inquire: Have not too many overseas trips been made on diplomatic passports lately? After all, this means foreign currency, which is so much needed, given our present poverty.

[Liymets] We are aware that this opinion exists. As far as the employees of the Foreign Ministry themselves are concerned, I cannot agree here. Our minister, L. Meri, does, indeed, spend much time abroad. To be frank, he should be spending even more time abroad. After all, we do not yet have overseas representation, and much is decided by personal meetings and contacts. But in the six weeks that I have been working here Foreign Ministry employees have been on overseas assignments quite infrequently.

[Merkin] And members of the Supreme Soviet? Leaders of movements and parties? It is becoming quite amusing: Parliament sometimes lacks a quorum for the adoption of important decisions—the deputies are traveling.

[Liymets] I would not like to act the part of judge. The Supreme Soviet must look into it itself. I would like merely to note the usefulness of business meetings with overseas partners for explaining the situation in Estonia.

[Merkin] Thank you for the interview. I hope that our paper's contacts with the Republic of Estonia's diplomatic department will continue.

[Liymets] Newspapers published in Russian should also familiarize their readers more with the problems of the foreign policy of our common home. This is necessary if only to be able to express one's views cogently in the event of a disagreement with some aspect of Foreign Ministry activity.

### Committee Head on Estonian Foreign Policy

91UF0092A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
31 Aug 90 p 3

Interview with Indrek Toome by Madis Hint: "Foreign Policy of the Republic of Estonia—Indrek Toome's Vision"]

[Excerpts] Indrek Toome is chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Foreign Relations. This position calls for great responsibility and competence. So that the readers could arrive at their own conclusions about Indrek Toome's qualifications, the correspondent of PAEVALEHT started the interview by asking about the principles underlying his current activity in the area of foreign relations.

Until Estonia's statehood and actual independence have been achieved, it should not be of primary significance for us to try to get *de jure* and *de facto* recognition for the present Republic of Estonia, because that would be an unreal political objective. Instead, we should be striving for *de facto* recognition of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Republic of Estonia in their roles as political structures entrusted to carry out the people's commitment to independence. For that we have to secure Moscow's tacit or declared acceptance.

All delays of our own making, in carrying out truly meaningful negotiations with Moscow, are ultimately injurious to the process of moving toward independence. It should be understood that we are the party seeking these negotiations, not the central power. We cannot make a prerequisite out of something that is to be the subject of these negotiations [Passage omitted].

Estonia's global policy of elucidating problems connected with Estonia on the global scale is of extreme importance. The so-called international public will have to be prepared for the rebirth of the state of Estonia. [Passage omitted].

Our foreign policy will have to be positive: we will have to seek and maintain economic and cultural cooperation. This is to include our neighbors to the East. [Passage omitted].

[Hint] What should be the foundations of our hitherto non-existent policy of foreign economic relations? [Passage omitted].

[Toome] Our initiative in foreign economic relations should be geared to the prospect of being the gateway to the Eastern market. It would be important, nevertheless, to maintain good economic relations with the Soviet Union especially since, right now, the Soviet Union could get along without the production potential of Estonia, but not the other way around.

In our relations with the Western states, we cannot expect any economic assistance, our orientation will have to be toward mutually beneficial cooperation. [Passage omitted].

Cooperation between the three Baltic states has a very important place in both the economic and political forms of the struggle. This does not mean, however, that some 3 + 1 principle should be followed to the point where it will start interfering with our sovereignty.

[Hint] Some time ago, at a press conference of the Estonian Committee's executive board, an accusation was levelled against all institutions participating in Estonia's foreign policy maintaining that all of them are acting on their own, without any coordination with the rest. [Passage omitted].

[Toome] This criticism is fully justified. By the way, I remember having voiced the same concern myself not too long ago. Whatever else happens in other areas of politics, in foreign relations, at least, a common principle should be found for all the Estonian-minded forces. [Passage omitted].

[Hint] What are the relations between the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Commission and the Foreign Ministry headed by Lennart Meri? [Passage omitted].

[Toome] We have found a common language with the Foreign Task Force of the Estonian Committee. We also met with Lennart Meri and proposed a joint discussion of the foreign policy doctrine of his ministry. Unfortunately, the meeting left us with a great number of question marks. [Passage omitted].

[Hint] In this case we can say that Estonia's different political institutions are still practicing foreign relations by talking past each other?

[Toome] Unfortunately, yes. And I think it's not only causing confusion here at home, but also abroad. Due to inaccuracy or lack of information, it is often hard to understand who is doing what, or who is representing whom. These things should be established with more accuracy. The mandates of the Supreme Soviet or the government cannot be transferred to the Estonian Committee. The Estonian Committee can represent itself abroad, but not the Republic of Estonia. Similarly, the other organs, too, have their assigned missions. Because of this lack of correctness in our doctrine of foreign relations, even republics of the Soviet don't always understand what kind of relations we are seeking with them.

[Hint] The distribution of information about events taking place in our country is of utmost importance to Estonia. In this regard, too, the latest developments are rather confusing. For example, the People's Front been soliciting funds from major American philanthropic foundations to create its own information center in Brussels. The same city has also been picked by the Estonian Committee for its projected news agency. [Passage omitted].

[Toome] This question was discussed at the joint session of the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Commission and the Estonian Committee's Foreign Task Force, with Marju

Lauristin among its participants. An agreement was reached there—and, hope to God it will stay that way—that until we have full freedom of state-level activity in the West, all organizations who have the opportunity to disseminate information about events in Estonia, do so honestly and objectively, independent of their factional interests.

## CENTRAL ASIA

### Kazakh 'Greens' Leader Criticizes Political Leadership

91US0085A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
31 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Mels Khamzayevich Yeleusizov, by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent V. Yelufimov, Alma-Ata, under rubric: "At a Political Crossroads:" "Reconciliation: A Leader of an Informal Movement and a Frenzied Orator at Rallies, He Came to the SELSKAYA ZHIZN Correspondents' Center With an Unusual Proposal"]

[Text] Mels Khamzayevich Yeleusizov is the leader of an informal movement of "Greens" in Kazakhstan, and the chairman of the Tabigat (Nature) ecological union. He is well known in the republic for his sensational statements on problems involving Lake Sorbulak, the Aral Sea, the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Grounds, and industrial regions, and for his scathing attacks on the "partocracy" and his implacable position with respect to the actions of the KaSSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management, within the system of which he received a salary for four years. He was fired from his last position—deputy director of the Kazgiprovodkhoz Construction-Design Institute. At a party meeting in the institute, he was evicted from the CPSU ranks. The following remarks appear in his performance appraisal: "unbalanced, difficult to get along with, sharply opinionated, inclined to incite conflicts, enjoys authority in an environment that takes an attitude against authority."

Suddenly that person came to the SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondents' center and stated, "At the present time all of us—Reds and Greens, rightists and leftists, party members and nonparty members—need peace and agreement more than ever before." Surprised by that unexpected statement, I had this unplanned interview with him.

[V. Yelufimov] Aren't you the person who, at rallies, aroused crowds of people with loud appeals such as "Down with the party bureaucracy! Kick the party functionaries out of the soviets! Down with the antipopulist election law!" And now you are planning to fraternize with your political opponents?

[M. Yeleusizov] Don't misunderstand me. I am not planning to fraternize with any political opponents. I also do not believe in the ability of the present party leadership to change anything. How many times during

recent years, for example, has the apparatus of the Kazakh CP Central Committee been shaken up, and the Secretariat, as usual, represented by those who, although in other positions, had "successfully" lorded it over us during the years of stagnation?

Do you really think that it is possible to fraternize with those who ruined the Aral Sea, who are attempting to get rich on the misfortunes of a Lake Sorbulak that has been completely filled with runoff water, or who are poisoning the people of East Kazakhstan with beryllium? We have to keep fighting...

[V. Yelufimov] ...by "concluding peace and agreement"?

[M. Yeleusizov] There is no need for you to talk ironically about this. There is no contradiction here. We can achieve what we are seeking at round-table negotiations, in discussion clubs, and through the soviets, the courts, and the mass media, rather than by the method of ultimatums or the exertion of pressure through rallies and strikes. In a civilized society we must act in a civilized manner. Otherwise we cannot be allowed to live in it.

The situation in the country is extremely heated. Waves of violence and hatred have swept over the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia, and have rolled up to the borderland rayons of Kazakhstan. Both areas have been the scene of outbursts of interethnic conflicts. For the time being, they have been local ones, without the scope of those in Osh and Fergana. The Kazakh nation has had enough wisdom to stop before going too far. But will common sense take the upper hand tomorrow? I am very afraid that the well-rehearsed play can never be stopped in the first act—then the reckless hatred, vicious suspiciousness, and petty claims will divide our people for a long time.

A rather large amount of combustible materials has been accumulated in our society: we are exasperated by the empty shelves, the brazen speculation, the unrestrained rise in prices, and the government's empty promises and the deputies' loquacity; we are becoming brutalized by the waiting lines, the indefinite future, people's boorishness, and, as we look around, we seek out our enemies, in our readiness to tear them to pieces. It is extremely dangerous to play with matches in this kind of situation, especially in regions with mixed population, where social discontent, as has happened before on many occasions, can easily take on the nature of interethnic conflicts.

[V. Yelufimov] But Kazakhstan, against the background of the cataclysms that have been occurring in the country, looks like an island of stability and calm. Social tension has not reached the dangerous level...

[N. Yeleusizov] Nevertheless the events are developing in specifically this direction, and it is necessary to stop them right now, rather than at the brink of the precipice. Blood has already been spilled in Alma-Ata and in Novyy Uzen. Interethnic skirmishes are heating up

Dzhambul'skiy Rayon in Alma-Ata Oblast. But what alarms me most of all is not even these events, but the resistance that has already been organizationally formed on a nationality basis. The Azat movement, under the slogan of the struggle for the republic's sovereignty, has united, with rare exceptions, the Kazakhs, and Yedinstvo [Unity], which has proclaimed as its basic goal the protection of the social and political rights of all the citizens in the republic, has also gathered under its roof, also with rare exceptions—whether or not its organizers wanted this—people of the Slavic nationalities. For the time being, grave verbal battles have been carried out between these movements, but who will give the guarantee that the adherents of Azat and Yedinstvo won't go at one another hot and heavy tomorrow? Sooner or later, the logic of confrontation can lead to this.

It would seem that both sides are aware of this danger. It was apparently for that reason that I managed to persuade the leaders of both movements to sit down at the negotiations table, and to prepare a joint statement that would put an end to their confrontation. Unfortunately, at the last minute, because of the personal pride of the co-chairman of Azat and Yedinstvo, the important document was not signed.

[V. Yelufimov] If the two movements cannot come to that agreement, how is it possible to reconcile the interests of the four dozen public organizations, the range of whose differences is even much greater?

[M. Yeleusizov] It is very complicated to do this. But we are doomed to live in peace, inasmuch as the path of confrontation will inevitably lead to the precipice. Consequently, it is necessary to discard all personal pride and to negotiate. The first steps toward this have been taken: a civic agreement council has been formed in Alma-Ata from among the representatives of all movements...

[V. Yelufimov] ...a council that wits have already christened "the civic disagreement headquarters."

[M. Yeleusizov] Also not without justification. The political sophistication of many of the representatives of public movements who have been nominated as members leaves much to be desired. At times the council sessions resemble the dialogue between deafened loudmouths: each of them wants, at all costs, to force his point of view, and does not listen to other people's opinions. Nevertheless the negotiations are under way. With regard to individual questions, a rapprochement has been noted. Most of the representatives of the movements stated that they are in favor of establishing a one-year moratorium on the holding of rallies, demonstrations, and other outdoor mass measures.

[V. Yelufimov] But then the informal organizations will be deprived on an effective means of exerting influence on the authority and on the formation of public opinion.

[M. Yeleusizov] We are ready to take this step for the sake of lowering the level of confrontation, for the sake

of assuring that no one will quietly light the fuse under the powder keg on which we are all sitting, or that this is done, as has been noted in our already rich practical experience, specifically during outdoor measures. In addition, we are declaring a moratorium on what is not the best form of manifestation of democracy. I am firmly convinced that it is impossible in the public squares, by means of an electrified crowd of people, to resolve any important questions.

[V. Yelufimov] Quite recently you adhered to a different point of view. Apparently not a single mass outdoor measure would have occurred in Alma-Ata without your active participation. And, while I was present at them, the things I heard from you were not only peace-loving appeals...

[M. Yeleusizov] Rally euphoria is something that a person has to recover from, in order to develop an immunity to it. The opinion that public opinion can be formed in the public squares is illusory. One and the same people go to them, but the bulk of the population, who are tired of hearing politicized speeches, is disinclined to take part in any kind of outdoor measures. But they can destabilize the already shaky situation. For the sake of what? For the sake of taking the power away from the party apparatus? But by whom? There is no such force in Kazakhstan.

According to the results of a sociological study, the republic's Communist Party, among public organizations, is the most authoritative and influential one, and at the present time Kazakhstan has the most stable political and economic situation. But wherever the democratic forces have crowded out the party members, chaos prevails, as well as an unprecedented outburst of speculation. I am very afraid that under these conditions a monetary Mafia will seize the power, or the force that will put an end to the chaos, and will do so without discussion by the nation, is the army, which many democrats are currently berating in a shortsighted manner everywhere and from all rostrums. This is something that everyone should think a bit about, including those who operate according to the principle of "the worse, the better."

[V. Yelufimov] Nevertheless one cannot deny the effectiveness of rallies. On public squares right now, people are deciding the fate of party raykom and obkom secretaries and the administrators of enterprises and agencies of justice.

[M. Yeleusizov] And are we really to think that this is democratic? We are running away from the power of the partocracy to the power of the crowd. But that is much more dangerous! In the final analysis, decisions must be made by competent individuals, rather than by the know-it-all habitués of public squares, where the discussion can usually be summarized as one of the two extremes: either complete denial or complete approval. The crowd requires simple evaluations, primitive decisions, but life is much more complicated. A rally, I have

been convinced, is not a place for ascertaining the truth. It is only a method of exerting mass pressure, and if the tone at that rally is set by extremists, then it is also a catalyst for inciting hatred and interethnic enmity.

It does not take a big mind to electrify a crowd. All one has to do is to convince it that it can do everything, and to point out its enemies. And there is no need to have any proof. A person in a roaring crowd loses his ability to think. He accepts on faith the most absurd fabrications and, as he moves along, he casts aside the most intelligent reasons if they run counter to the prevailing mood of the masses.

I remember how an aroused crowd drowned out with their shouts the statements being made by the republic administrators during the well-known events in Alma-Ata, how party workers were chased off the rostrum in Novyy Uzen, and how the microphone was snatched out of the hands of people who possessed objective information in the village of Uzunagach. But something that is more dangerous than anything else is that a person in a frenzied crowd will cease to be aware of his own actions—and then one can expect practically anything of him.

Although in individual situations when, for example, the authorities are crudely violating legality and are failing to react to other forms of appeal, it is completely justified to exert forceful pressure. That has happened in my own practical life. And, incidentally, we achieved what we were seeking. But if the authorities are ready to discuss at the questions at a round table, one must use that constructive opportunity. The party and soviet agencies in Kazakhstan are currently open for a completely equal dialogue. Consequently, there is no need to resort to diktat, against which we ourselves protest.

But it seems that it is easier to negotiate with party apparatchiks than with our friends in the informal organizations: many of them have not yet recovered from rally euphoria and, unfortunately, are not aware of where the ascertaining of relations on the public squares can lead. At the present time, during the period of transition to the market, it is necessary for us to channel all our efforts into the creation of the optimal state, economic, and political structures. Without reconciliation and agreement among the various public movements, it is complicated, and perhaps even impossible, to do this.

### **Birlik Leaders Interviewed, Party Role Discussed**

*90US1280A Tashkent OZBEKISTON ADABIYOTI VA SANATI in Uzbek 1 Jun 90 p 5*

[Text] On 26-27 May the third congress of the "Birlik" people's movement was held in Tashkent. Close to 600 members of the movement from all provinces of the republic took part in it. The report of the movement's central council and the new version of the movement's program were discussed at the congress. Academician B. Toshmukhamedov and scholars A. Polatov and Sh. Ismatullayev were elected as co-leaders of "Birlik." Our

correspondent spoke with A. Polatov, one of the leaders of the movement, and with B. Norboyev, a board member of its central council.

[Correspondent] What do you think are basically the tangible accomplishments of the "Birlik" people's movement since it came into existence?

[A. Polatov] As written in the movement's program its basic goal was to actively influence the process of perestroika by awakening the people from their social dormancy and increasing their political consciousness. With this in mind we began our basic work by initiating direct talks with the broad masses through the movement's local organizations and support groups. We tried to instill in the people's consciousness the ideas of "Birlik." In general we achieved this goal. This is evident in the increased number of our supporters and sympathizers. Provisional congresses were held in six provinces and in dozens of regions. Hundreds of support groups are in operation.

"Birlik" worked diligently to rally the people's thoughts on behalf of granting the Uzbek language state status and to put them into contact with the government leaders and governing bodies that would adopt the law. "Birlik" collected signatures and organized rallies. Subsequently, the first draft was published. "Birlik" prepared a counterdraft and presented it to the majority through its newsletter. A draft radically different than the original one, but one which met the demands of the writers, scholars, linguists, and Uzbek press, as well as members of "Birlik," was produced. In brief, the thoughts expressed in the press and at rallies regarding these drafts were taken into consideration in the "Law on the State Language of the Uzbek SSR" which was adopted in October of last year.

[B. Norboyev] Another of our tangible achievements was to draw the attention of the leaders of the community and the republic to the fate of Uzbek youths serving in the ranks of the army. Due to the efforts of our fellow members certain steps were taken to solve this problem. Proof of our claim lies in the fact that the problem was placed on the agenda of the first session of the republic's Supreme Council and subsequently included among the government's decisions. It is impossible not to mention the self-sacrifices in this area of the "Tomaris" members within "Birlik." As members of government commissions they are touring dozens of units where our soldiers serve and becoming familiar with the mood, outlook, and health of our young men, as well as with the situation and conditions at those places. They are securing the return to our republic of those who have contracted disease or who were conscripted illegally, as well as obtaining medical treatment for them in hospitals and transfers to different units. The placement in a Tashkent hospital of more than 20 of our young men obliged to return from Georgia just yesterday is clear proof of this solicitude.

[Polatov] The trouble which recently took place in Andizhan was prevented from intensifying due to the decisive efforts of the "Birlik" activists there...

[Correspondent] The movement could have helped in the concrete execution of the Law on Language and in providing rural workers with private plots at the level stipulated in the government's decision...

[Norboyev] True. We were reproached for not being able to help. But it was as though certain officials invited us to play buzkashi without giving us horses. "Birlik" support groups have participated in this work to a certain degree. But in many cases we encountered situations that tied our hands. If the movement were registered officially, without any doubt we could have carried out ten times more work for the benefit of the people than we have so far. In fact, despite the stipulations of this decision, very few private plots have been allotted in densely populated places. Local administrators have taken the path of following their own policy. They begrudge the people their own land so as not to be removed from their positions of leadership. Even though it was stipulated in the decision, we have not heard about the liquidation of a single collective or state farm for the sake of providing the people with private plots at the level required.

[Polatov] Yes, we cannot say that we have fully carried out the works we planned because the "Birlik" leadership has not been able to place its organizational affairs on a better footing; because of the negative attitude toward our movement of certain leaders who continue to work in the spirit of administrative bureaucracy; because the official press continuously places our association in a bad light; and because we are unable to publish our newsletters (BIRLIK in Uzbek and Russian, TOMARIS, ERKIN SOZ in Uzbek) regularly or in issues of many thousands.

[Correspondent] How does the new version of the movement's program that was accepted at the congress differ from the earlier version? In general, what path will "Birlik" follow henceforth?

[Polatov] "Birlik" has a single path. And this is the path of justice and truth! We felt the need to revise our action program in view of the socioeconomic changes which have occurred recently in the world, in the union, and in our republic. Whereas at first the awakening of the social consciousness of the people and the raising of its political activism was seen as a basic goal, now the problems of the struggle to establish a democratic regime in the republic and of the transformation of Uzbekistan into a completely independent state have come to the fore. Apart from this, clarifications were included in the program regarding the issues of relations with other sociopolitical organizations, attitudes toward religion, development of a national-cultural consciousness, ecology, justice, and human rights. In addition, talks with higher agencies of the government on a footing of mutually equal rights are envisioned.

Moreover, the socioeconomic crisis and increasing tension in the situation which are expected in connection with the passage to a market economy require that we work in cooperation with all the healthy forces in our republic. Now is not the time to allow mutual misunderstandings or to deepen oppositions. Because no single force will be able to solve by itself all the problems of today's situation. This is apparent in the speech delivered by our republic's president I. Karimov at the expanded council held at the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

[Norboyev] We agree with the views that in order to pass to a market economy it is necessary first to provide the population with incomes and food at the union level and that for this we must receive 15-17 billion rubles from the Center. But why has this demand of our republic's government still not been acknowledged by the Center? Do all the good intentions and plans just exist on paper? These questions alarm "Birlik" members along with many others. We are demanding the execution of these measures. So that this affair does not end with empty demands we are making our own contribution to the realization of that program out of a sense of responsibility for the complexity and tension of the situation. If our share of the practical benefits is acceptable, we are ready for serious cooperation in this.

[Correspondent] "Erk" has proclaimed itself a party. Is it possible that "Birlik" will become a party too?

[Polatov] "Birlik" is a people's movement. It exists as a movement that embraces the broad masses and many of its social layers. Politically mature layers within the movement have reached the level of becoming a modern political party. On 4 April of this year they proclaimed their intention to form a political party. On 22 April an organizational forum was held, and an organizational committee for a political organization to be named provisionally the Democratic Party of Uzbekistan was formed. To it was assigned the preparation of the drafts of a general program and manifesto. It is envisioned that a provisional congress of this party will be held soon. Otherwise, the "Birlik" people's movement can include parties, associations, and clubs whose views differ but are not far from one another.

[Correspondent] At the recently held congress of the movement, besides the expressions of serious and practical views and proposals regarding the current alarming conditions in our land, there were pronouncements consisting of a certain amount of nonsense. It is difficult to understand those aspects of such pronouncements which contain more harm than benefit for our common aspirations under present conditions. Do your fellow members realize that this kind of thing alarms quite a few people who, even though they are not members of "Birlik," view it with sympathy?

[Polatov] True. The still uncompleted formation of our movement and the political immaturity which is natural in the first steps of several of our members may be

reflected in various pronouncements. But, we have a critical attitude toward such cases. We are trying to set our members on the correct path. However, we should not close our eyes to the fact that in a certain sense their political consciousness is proportional to the current level of the people. Nor should we construe such cases as extremist in nature.

It is impossible not to point out that several forces that are unsympathetic to our people's movement take advantage of such errors by exaggerating carelessly spoken words and trying to stamp the whole of "Birlik" with them. In this area it would be good if the public press were to take an objective approach both to our good works and to our errors and shortcomings. This would definitely contribute to the smoother formation, broader activism, and true tempering of the movement. We rely on such help from the community and the press.

### **Uzbekistan Stability, Nationality Issues Raised**

91US0097A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 46, 14 Nov 90 p 2

[Article under the "Opinions" rubric by the newspaper's special correspondent A. Kruzhilin: "Price of Stability"]

[Text] The session of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR has decreed to abolish the republic's Council of Ministers and to turn it into a cabinet of ministers under the President of the Uzbek SSR.

The former Chairman of the Council of Ministers Shukrulla Mirsaidov has been elected vice-president. As a result, President I. Karimov, who is also the leader of the republic's ruling Communist Party, has concentrated considerable state, political, and administrative-economic power in his hands. Strictly speaking, only judicial organs remain out of President's control.

Informal democratic organizations of diverse persuasions are not even trying to conceal their disappointment over this; in the community of writers they occasionally talk not only about domination by the party apparatus and a return to stagnation, but also about "neo-Stalinism" Tashkent style. This is understandable, since our people, who had learned from their more than sad historical experience, are scared to see any concentration of power in one person's hands.

Nevertheless, I would refrain from applying mechanically the well-known dictum about a cautious administration of power in this particular case. Facts are compelling, and they are as follows.

Uzbekistan is probably the most politically stable region in the country; it has neither strikes, nor endless rallies, nor hunger strikes demanding a government's resignation. Nor has it experienced any.

Uzbekistan has managed to uncover resources and to double cotton purchasing prices, the republic's boon which until recently used to be its bale. The dekhans



[local villagers] have succeeded in making a nice living harvesting cotton, for the first time in the past 73 years. I would like to emphasize that it were not the informals, but the authorities who helped them do this.

Uzbekistan is far from being the most placid place in the world, but they do fight crime there. One can walk out into the streets in Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, or Termez after midnight so far, without a fear of getting a bullet in the back of one's head. I cannot make the same claim regarding a number of other places in the USSR which I happened to visit recently. They did not engage in endless and humiliating negotiations with the repeat offenders who had seized prison hostages (in Tashkent, on October 29), but, unlike the majority of similar cases, administered a swift and well-aimed punishment to the bandits. This also spells authority.

Uzbekistan proclaimed its sovereignty earlier than many others, but separatist sentiments are almost nonexistent here. The republican leadership is well aware of the danger posed to the state by yet another seat of tension. Common sense prevails, and nobody is abrogating the union treaty...

The republic may appear dull amid all the endless debates, rallies, meetings and the like which have engulfed the country. But Uzbekistan shows consistency, firmness, and stability - the qualities which the center seems to be lacking so much. Not being afraid to be regarded as a conservative, I would say that I have very little concern as a citizen over the type of political structures through which government is exercised. What is gratifying is that it is being exercised. Although, too rigidly sometimes, as many people point out.

The nationalities issue is the main and probably the only source of upheavals in Uzbekistan. But look at how it is being dealt with. The government has realized that nothing can be more horrible than an ethnic bloodshed. So, the long-running flywheel of ethnic enmity and resentment, the most awful for the republic, has been slowed down considerably, if not stopped, in the very last days of October - and again through the government's strong-handed methods.

First of all, the press has passed an open and principled judgment - and quite a stern one again - of all types of nationalists (Unfortunately, we have plenty of them both in the Uzbek and the Russian versions). The discriminatory bill was scrapped then. Explanations for the "Law On Language" are being formulated; there is hope that numerous unjustified acts passed during its promulgation are going to be reversed. Addressing the session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on October 31, President Islam Karimov gave assurances that Uzbekistan would not follow the path of discriminating against the population along ethnic, language, or religious lines.

Amazingly, life seems to have brightened up in no time in big cities, ethnically most diverse, after this short

15-minute speech. The degree of -should I say "apprehension" - has dropped dramatically. To all intents and purposes, the words spoken by the republic's first person can create a serious obstacle against emigration sentiments.

Uzbekistan's population is inclined to trust the authorities. I think there are two reasons for this: first, the authorities demonstrate firmness and consistency, which contrast favorably with other regions; second, they have never deceived the people even once. Virtually all credits of confidence have been paid: participants in, and invalids of, World War II received free apartments for their personal use; schoolchildren get free breakfasts; cotton purchase prices have been increased by 200-300 percent; students and schoolchildren were not drawn into harvesting cotton; militia is being beefed up; and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officials will have their salaries increased significantly as of January.

But there are no free hamburgers [no free lunch], as you know. What is the price that the Uzbekistan residents have to pay for stability in the republic? First of all, that of the absence of countless "parties and platforms." Let me tell you outright that I do not find this price exorbitant, considering the ambiguous role played by the Tashkent informals in various bloody atrocities over the recent years, and keeping in mind their quite active resentment of the government which enjoys confidence. And I am probably not the only person [who feels that way]: people are in no particular haste to join "Birlik," "Intersoyuz," or "Erk"... The CPSU still remains the most broad-based social and political organization in the republic, since it symbolizes real power in an indirect way, through the President's apparatus, and now through the cabinet of ministers under the President. I am not saying whether this is good or bad. I am just stating the fact.

I might be wrong, but it appears that Uzbekistan was one of first in the Union to have realized that freedom and the absence of authority are two very different things, Uzbekistan which saw itself covered with the blood of absolutely innocent people three times in the past two years.

This is today's perspective, of course, and no one can say what is going to happen to what now looks like a boon.

Each period of time and each region produce their own leaders. The idea is that they should provide the best possible fit during a particular stretch of history under the conditions of evolving democracy. I believe that they are the best fit. Some people go on numerous foreign jaunts in order to get foreign currency, mostly on a reciprocal basis. Using this currency, they try to stabilize the market and the situation later on. This is the north-western way of doing things, as I see it - in the Baltic republics, Leningrad, and Moscow. But some people act differently by deepening regional centralization and tapping reserves. This appears to be a southeastern way.

What is going to happen tomorrow?



# Nationality Composition of Urban Population by Republics [Text]

91UN0153A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian  
No 34, Aug 90 pp 7-8

[Table: "Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population"]

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data)								
Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UKSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Abazins	13,805	13,336	96	65	49	61	78	34
Abkhazians	50,609	6,112	883	125	104	268	42,616	141
Avars	186,134	175,884	2,131	225	665	1,608	558	3,802
Austrians	425	249	58	2	29	34	15	1
Aguls	6,344	5,741	69	17	44	200	23	117
Adygeys	52,610	50,976	607	99	113	239	235	98
Azerbaijanis	3,390,427	237,333	29,237	3,792	33,344	39,304	75,615	2,919,061
Albanians	1,629	248	1,095	10	14	51	8	6
Aleutians	267	234	13	2	5	3	—	—
Altays	13,630	12,591	110	21	169	499	20	10
Americans	225	172	8	2	3	7	16	2
English	301	204	43	8	5	10	5	1
Arabs	5,445	2,572	1,222	100	912	50	71	249
Armenians	3,229,925	376,648	46,856	4,036	48,964	14,953	260,516	296,148
Assyrians	21,600	8,710	2,706	160	176	399	5,151	637
Afghans	4,124	799	331	14	1,280	178	27	95
Balkars	49,929	46,930	185	32	251	1,329	169	122
Bashkirs	741,302	662,456	6,261	1,019	28,916	26,970	317	461
Belorussians	6,536,460	964,053	349,079	4,866,251	25,090	112,445	6,562	6,745
Beluchi	2,305	221	35	10	17	59	18	2
Bulgarians	180,471	26,852	99,739	700	1,796	7,164	599	263
Buryats	178,337	175,206	726	138	412	987	61	98
Hungarians	68,831	4,055	62,912	169	193	421	215	80
Veps	6,165	5,884	135	16	8	32	21	1
Vietnamese	3,365	2,122	471	53	229	83	46	325
Gagauz	80,744	7,266	8,774	148	152	604	156	97
Dutch	622	348	42	5	19	106	19	—
Greeks	239,291	60,950	68,401	544	9,733	33,044	59,340	546
Georgians	2,178,140	110,549	21,182	2,466	3,770	7,291	2,021,420	4,346
Dargins	111,394	103,153	1,201	126	1,829	1,213	209	719
Dolgans	1,572	1,284	172	12	22	33	2	—
Dungans	17,407	529	67	17	833	4,543	8	7
Jews	1,361,721	528,182	482,246	110,738	64,777	17,841	10,202	25,134
Highland Jews	17,682	10,656	131	67	589	330	54	5,400
Georgian Jews	15,771	984	48	4	195	182	14,259	29
Central Asian Jews	35,857	1,327	109	15	28,256	753	40	55

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UkSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Izhors	517	212	8	—	28	4	2	2
Ingush	97,617	80,893	310	74	413	14,758	141	91
Spaniards	3,023	1,968	688	51	54	28	89	32
Italians	1,190	591	270	32	70	121	24	4
Itelmens	956	922	1	3	10	11	2	1
Kabardinians	174,381	170,882	845	146	353	856	238	355
Kazakhs	3,150,586	235,409	8,748	1,664	320,360	2,506,306	1,800	1,221
Kalmyks	85,843	82,486	502	73	384	849	88	43
Karaites	2,460	661	1,342	16	42	30	21	7
Karakalpaks	228,297	4,536	212	121	220,903	936	65	92
Karachays	51,254	48,950	270	51	275	810	23	37
Karelians	81,417	76,505	1,934	671	149	555	41	45
Kets	219	193	8	3	5	8	1	—
Kirghiz	560,222	34,477	2,073	515	21,021	7,788	158	201
Chinese	8,961	4,177	597	69	695	2,725	96	17
Komis	170,244	163,823	3,173	629	357	913	79	68
Komi-Peremyaks	61,442	58,656	1,276	181	145	782	41	12
Koreans	361,346	90,799	6,653	569	146,077	86,977	192	92
Koryaks	2,778	2,564	40	12	89	29	9	2
Crimeans	1,258	305	619	2	115	53	74	30
Cubans	2,667	1,512	477	55	230	76	16	221
Kumyks	129,224	125,696	584	129	508	1,266	122	290
Kurds	60,276	1,757	179	55	577	4,538	32,815	1,720
Laks	77,884	67,354	950	100	2,450	1,096	375	1,533
Latvians	885,926	35,127	6,148	2,025	976	2,554	435	310
Lezghins	223,480	113,294	4,233	534	2,732	13,163	533	77,383
Livs	151	54	5	1	1	6	—	—
Lithuanians	1,997,361	51,106	9,656	4,303	1,404	7,847	785	403
Mansi	3,934	3,779	33	24	18	24	—	5
Maris	279,436	261,921	4,999	658	2,448	6,378	355	227
Moldavians	1,206,239	122,848	108,056	3,459	3,649	19,675	2,387	1,603
Mordovians	623,744	560,054	14,851	2,071	10,958	20,915	338	704
Nanaians	4,783	4,663	34	13	11	29	3	3
Peoples of India and Pakistan	1,671	507	165	10	752	22	92	37
Nganasans	360	347	—	1	2	6	—	—
Negidals	250	225	9	2	9	5	—	—
Germans	1,075,412	450,826	26,846	2,414	35,004	469,803	1,274	694
Nentsy	6,193	5,840	170	42	35	53	4	1
Nivkhi	2,383	2,350	10	3	4	11	—	1
Nogays	14,419	13,277	186	30	74	493	42	68
Oroki	159	152	2	—	—	3	1	—
Orochi	444	414	19	—	1	7	1	—

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UKSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Osetians	392,273	266,289	5,695	710	5,353	3,697	96,973	1,670
Persians	25,661	1,886	196	122	17,851	1,291	95	447
Poles	661,900	76,700	148,168	200,635	2,810	27,113	1,879	692
Romanians	42,149	3,815	35,104	106	138	541	49	50
Russians	113,486,085	91,948,001	9,943,509	1,164,421	1,567,630	4,823,238	294,475	372,501
Rutuls	6,418	5,753	71	7	45	220	74	196
Lapps	754	717	16	4	3	9	2	—
Selkups	934	900	8	3	2	11	7	—
Serbs	2,045	1,133	558	65	22	108	45	6
Slovaks	7,697	603	6,805	29	25	75	28	2
Tabasarans	35,956	32,861	645	77	339	1,017	48	530
Tajiks	1,193,069	31,421	3,598	755	301,315	6,164	992	640
Talysh	2,514	175	11	12	7	32	10	2,224
Tatars	4,590,528	3,632,984	75,512	10,618	411,954	252,944	3,427	27,448
Crimean Tatars	187,301	11,075	15,632	101	149,010	829	464	521
Tats	28,825	18,846	238	50	201	135	34	9,106
Tofalars	104	97	3	—	2	—	—	—
Tuvins	65,983	65,611	89	25	61	90	19	9
Turks	47,505	2,710	229	36	31,924	8,133	521	924
Turkmen	911,441	22,649	2,894	658	22,194	2,843	288	268
Udins	2,544	840	93	10	27	347	23	1,103
Udmurts	364,437	344,158	6,105	847	2,053	8,241	170	155
Udegeys	775	715	22	2	14	16	4	—
Uzbeks	5,169,761	103,961	16,851	2,918	4,320,026	123,745	1,114	1,144
Uighurs	104,450	2,102	170	36	17,862	63,407	19	2
Ukrainians	27,690,907	3,402,165	22,573,225	234,059	138,346	584,824	44,716	29,566
Ulchis	923	877	12	2	10	6	1	1
Finns	47,971	33,864	903	244	141	725	58	22
French	651	330	158	9	9	28	41	9
Khakass	34,736	33,324	231	59	242	432	18	24
Khalkha- Mongolians	2,814	2,059	303	32	115	271	18	2
Khanty	6,828	6,636	75	10	33	38	—	—
Croats	607	371	123	8	14	35	7	6
Tsakhurs	4,253	1,485	46	11	22	25	2	2,639
Tsygans	168,508	89,172	33,918	8,378	11,930	5,496	1,184	139
Circassians	19,695	18,340	398	40	173	232	166	70
Czechs	10,907	3,390	5,763	180	87	692	99	14
Chechens	267,604	240,596	1,354	232	842	21,075	503	438
Chuvans	834	736	30	11	7	14	3	8
Chuvash	936,547	883,587	15,825	2,586	8,823	15,366	399	452
Chukchi	2,176	2,109	20	1	3	21	8	4
Shors	12,293	11,572	58	11	250	288	3	1
Evenkis	6,272	6,088	91	17	19	28	7	1

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UkSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Evens	4,369	4,258	20	18	25	23	3	1
Entsy	90	81	—	4	1	2	—	—
Eskimos	399	388	2	1	2	4	—	—
Estonians	616,400	31,177	3,452	685	757	2,383	1,186	286
Yukagirs	437	414	3	3	4	6	1	1
Yakuts	106,727	105,331	518	113	145	257	14	12
Japanese	530	460	23	4	5	14	13	—
Other nationalities	9,522	2,548	3,744	329	1,524	167	516	83
Nationality not indicated	16,346	14,714	152	64	215	81	128	81
Total	187,745,728	107,959,002	34,297,231	6,641,377	8,040,963	9,402,582	2,991,352	3,805,885

[Table: "Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population"] (Continued Text)

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data)

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Abazins	6	9	11	3	29	3	19	6
Abkhazians	25	44	72	40	31	78	46	24
Avars	55	92	94	262	143	73	479	63
Austrians	2	10	4	5	2	8	1	5
Aguls	—	14	3	7	20	14	75	—
Adygeys	18	35	32	45	28	25	45	15
Azerbaijanis	1,161	1,897	2,390	4,902	3,118	7,139	31,023	1,111
Albanians	2	169	4	3	9	5	4	1
Aleutians	—	—	—	4	2	1	3	—
Altays	19	15	10	77	53	1	22	13
Americans	1	6	—	1	3	—	—	4
English	7	7	4	1	1	2	—	3
Arabs	7	20	22	52	97	55	5	11
Armenians	1,525	2,434	2,863	2,358	5,145	2,134,780	31,127	1,572
Assyrians	3	8	20	17	27	3,543	37	6
Afghans	—	16	9	50	979	8	338	—
Balkars	9	23	19	541	24	246	41	8
Bashkirs	392	490	526	3,112	5,912	121	4,017	332
Belorussians	53,843	15,443	89,499	7,245	5,645	891	8,228	25,441
Beluchi	—	22	1	2	12	2	1,904	—
Bulgarians	213	40,208	373	389	979	72	881	243
Buryats	40	83	108	165	117	69	82	45
Hungarians	71	204	195	50	19	33	33	181
Veps	6	6	5	4	4	1	8	34
Vietnamese	—	20	7	1	3	3	—	2
Gagauz	32	63,057	105	25	32	9	223	64
Dutch	—	4	10	47	5	6	1	10
Greeks	158	527	299	886	555	3,699	443	166

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Georgians	584	946	1,218	756	917	1,229	905	561
Dargins	27	18	49	784	302	238	1,484	42
Dolgans	—	8	4	4	23	2	6	—
Dungans	1	3	3	11,360	19	13	4	—
Jews	12,210	65,240	22,552	5,454	9,644	661	2,294	4,546
Highland Jews	64	75	2	46	164	22	71	11
Georgian Jews	1	23	—	6	22	5	10	3
Central Asian Jews	6	4	—	345	4,868	15	61	3
Izhors	—	—	4	—	7	4	—	246
Ingush	34	29	25	454	81	29	267	18
Spaniards	15	19	42	9	3	11	4	10
Italians	10	7	9	8	22	19	—	3
Itelmens	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	3
Kabardinians	42	39	62	119	148	66	187	43
Kazakhs	592	663	895	16,492	4,849	319	50,822	386
Kalmyks	40	34	33	1,075	95	21	94	26
Karaites	278	28	13	8	5	3	1	5
Karakalpaks	40	24	6	103	120	39	1,096	4
Karachays	14	53	19	649	43	7	27	21
Karelians	135	145	355	51	26	4	42	759
Kets	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Kirghiz	114	176	158	485,191	7,668	115	496	71
Chinese	11	22	6	450	56	6	26	8
Komis	110	170	328	196	128	15	84	171
Komi-Pere-myaks	29	56	31	96	51	6	44	36
Koreans	115	227	216	14,268	12,455	27	2,497	182
Koryaks	—	5	2	15	3	—	8	—
Crimeans	2	21	4	3	22	6	1	1
Cubans	—	20	9	36	10	2	—	3
Kumyks	35	45	44	75	92	40	272	26
Kurds	3	7	9	3,174	52	12,973	2,404	13
Laks	19	30	30	240	1,310	20	2,337	40
Latvians	3,050	392	831,223	295	260	114	431	2,586
Lezghins	100	165	245	397	253	88	10,194	166
Livs	—	—	77	—	3	3	—	1
Lithuanians	1,899,162	627	18,479	395	474	214	329	2,177
Mansi	—	1	3	1	7	35	3	1
Maris	208	306	383	324	484	31	399	315
Moldavians	1,134	935,947	2,071	1,201	784	473	1,888	1,064
Mordovians	440	876	883	2,732	5,119	451	2,487	865
Nanaians	—	4	2	2	3	1	9	6

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Peoples of India and Pakistan	—	9	—	10	12	43	10	2
Nganasans	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	1
Negidals	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germans	1,482	4,509	2,668	42,642	30,514	224	3,985	2,527
Nentsy	2	1	6	4	18	—	10	7
Nivkhi	—	1	—	2	—	—	1	—
Nogays	5	33	9	23	19	9	141	10
Oroki	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Orochi	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Osetians	255	365	453	594	7,528	309	2,199	183
Persians	5	22	7	130	356	7	3,241	5
Poles	148,945	3,757	46,159	939	667	206	600	2,630
Romanians	42	1,891	192	31	31	26	60	73
Russians	309,116	483,742	769,525	641,049	364,747	43,943	323,480	436,708
Rutuls	—	3	6	3	3	3	33	1
Lapps	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	1
Selkups	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1
Serbs	12	44	18	7	3	8	4	12
Slovaks	10	18	26	60	3	1	9	3
Tabasarans	8	11	20	15	41	28	307	9
Tajiks	511	411	283	8,430	836,331	164	1,959	95
Talysh	1	—	4	20	3	11	4	—
Tatars	4,187	2,947	4,252	58,078	65,710	416	36,302	3,749
Crimean Tatars	42	56	47	2,766	6,697	34	15	12
Tats	6	82	20	2	46	17	23	19
Tofalars	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Tuvins	1	9	11	26	11	4	13	4
Turks	6	12	9	2,728	67	10	176	20
Turkmens	186	226	189	589	1,930	61	856,393	73
Udins	—	7	15	1	29	17	32	—
Udmurts	202	492	365	399	548	29	300	373
Udegeys	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—
Uzbeks	1,405	1,041	787	206,512	225,843	214	163,724	476
Uighurs	11	38	17	19,114	489	—	1,171	12
Ukrainians	40,217	379,024	76,272	68,778	36,217	7,604	33,569	42,325
Ulchis	1	5	—	2	4	1	1	—
Finns	143	72	374	87	70	12	23	11,233
French	26	5	12	4	—	4	7	9
Khakass	9	38	22	207	75	6	36	13
Khalkha-Mongolians	1	—	1	5	3	—	3	1
Khanty	1	7	7	7	7	—	3	4
Croats	5	18	6	3	1	4	3	3

Peoples of the USSR: Urban Population (According to 1989 Census Data) (Continued)

Nationality	LISSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Tsakhurs	—	1	—	1	1	3	17	—
Tsygans	2,448	7,947	5,691	626	850	40	115	574
Circassians	11	14	25	40	77	12	77	20
Czechs	64	332	91	97	29	15	25	29
Chechens	65	130	125	1,439	106	185	482	32
Chuvans	—	1	—	3	10	1	10	—
Chuvash	595	964	1,252	1,432	2,125	109	2,015	1,017
Chukchi	1	—	3	3	3	—	—	—
Shors	—	8	4	46	36	—	13	3
Evenkis	—	4	8	5	3	1	—	—
Evens	1	—	3	2	4	4	3	4
Entsy	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
Eskimos	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Estonians	547	235	2,507	300	135	71	132	572,547
Yukagirs	—	3	—	—	—	—	2	—
Yakuts	11	49	112	60	53	—	20	32
Japanese	1	4	3	—	2	—	1	—
Other nationalities	24	84	57	73	17	167	4	185
Nationality not indicated	—	126	682	27	41	3	25	7
Total	2,486,832	2,020,120	1,888,526	1,624,535	1,655,105	2,222,241	1,591,148	1,118,829

## Nationality Composition By Union Republics

[Text]

91UN0153B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian

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[Table: "There Are 285,761,976 of Us, and We All Live in One Country"]

Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UkSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Abazins	33,613	32,983	113	79	99	118	36	6
Abkhazians	105,308	7,239	990	149	129	333	95,853	163
Avars	600,989	544,016	2,677	293	767	2,777	4,230	44,072
Austrians	504	295	64	2	34	42	20	2
Aguls	18,740	17,728	78	20	128	235	32	204
Adygeys	124,826	122,908	688	139	139	296	269	105
Azerbaijanis	6,770,403	335,889	36,961	5,009	44,410	90,083	307,556	5,804,980
Albanians	3,988	298	3,343	11	16	72	8	6
Aleutians	702	644	25	2	7	6	—	—
Altays	70,777	69,409	150	27	191	689	27	14
Americans	277	185	11	3	4	8	41	2
English	343	223	58	9	9	12	5	1
Arabs	7,747	2,704	1,240	101	2,805	56	76	252

Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UkSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Armenians	4,623,232	532,390	54,200	4,933	50,537	19,119	437,211	390,505
Assyrians	26,160	9,622	2,759	163	186	472	6,206	646
Afghans	26,160	858	19,825	18	1,655	209	28	98
Balkars	85,126	78,341	244	43	488	2,967	241	206
Bashkirs	1,449,157	1,345,273	7,402	1,252	34,771	41,847	379	533
Belorussians	10,036,251	1,206,222	440,045	7,904,623	29,427	182,601	8,595	7,833
Beluchi	28,796	297	45	11	20	73	18	3
Bulgarians	372,941	32,785	233,800	813	2,166	10,426	671	270
Buryats	421,380	417,425	849	158	635	1,172	84	104
Hungarians	171,420	5,742	163,111	205	211	683	244	82
Veps	12,501	12,142	169	33	10	44	26	2
Vietnamese	3,396	2,142	472	54	233	88	46	325
Gagauz	197,768	10,051	31,967	189	190	978	206	105
Dutch	794	451	43	7	19	126	28	—
Greeks	358,068	91,699	98,594	695	10,453	46,746	100,324	583
Georgians	3,981,045	130,688	23,540	2,840	4,704	9,496	3,787,393	14,197
Dargins	365,038	353,348	1,550	162	2,030	1,917	320	854
Dolgans	6,945	6,584	182	16	37	56	6	1
Dungans	69,323	635	140	32	1,353	30,165	15	8
Jews	1,378,344	536,848	486,326	111,883	65,493	18,492	10,312	25,190
Highland Jews	18,513	11,282	136	73	617	391	54	5,484
Georgian Jews	16,054	1,172	56	4	210	186	14,314	30
Central Asian Jews	36,152	1,407	110	15	28,369	795	40	88
Izhors	820	449	9	—	29	5	2	3
Ingush	237,438	215,068	466	116	474	19,914	170	99
Spaniards	3,172	2,054	729	53	54	41	91	32
Italians	1,337	627	316	33	104	150	24	4
Itelmens	2,481	2,429	2	3	19	15	3	1
Kabardians	390,814	386,055	959	178	907	1,081	293	387
Kazakhs	8,135,818	635,865	10,505	2,266	808,227	6,534,616	2,631	1,639
Kalmyks	173,821	165,821	635	102	517	1,127	103	46
Karaites	2,602	680	1,404	16	55	35	22	8
Karakalpaks	423,520	6,155	273	152	411,878	1,387	82	102
Karachays	155,936	150,332	342	56	329	2,057	35	43
Karelians	130,929	124,921	2,276	918	194	753	51	45
Kets	1,113	1,084	8	3	5	11	1	—
Kirghiz	2,528,945	41,734	2,297	564	174,907	14,112	225	224
Chinese	11,355	5,197	679	78	816	3,731	110	20
Komis	344,519	336,309	3,959	798	472	1,259	99	70
Komi-Pere-myaks	152,060	147,269	2,146	285	171	1,579	71	13
Koreans	438,650	107,051	8,669	638	183,140	103,315	242	94



Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UkSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Koryaks	9,242	8,942	52	13	143	34	13	4
Crimeans	1,448	338	679	2	173	62	75	41
Cubans	2,811	1,566	520	55	253	86	19	221
Kumyks	281,933	277,163	868	162	713	1,710	155	324
Kurds	152,717	4,724	238	66	1,839	25,425	33,331	12,226
Laks	118,074	106,245	1,035	120	2,807	1,234	426	1,878
Latvians	1,458,986	46,829	7,142	2,658	1,131	3,373	530	324
Lezghins	466,006	257,270	4,810	652	3,071	13,905	720	171,395
Livs	226	64	6	1	3	7	—	—
Lithuanians	3,067,390	70,427	11,278	7,606	1,628	10,942	977	534
Mansi	8,474	8,279	37	32	23	38	—	5
Maris	670,868	643,698	7,368	906	2,964	12,201	424	274
Moldavians	3,352,352	172,671	324,525	4,964	5,955	33,098	2,842	1,915
Mordovians	1,153,987	1,072,939	19,332	2,620	11,914	30,036	415	720
Nanaians	12,023	11,883	39	14	14	35	5	4
Peoples of India and Pakistan	1,728	535	175	10	756	28	98	37
Nganasans	1,278	1,262	1	1	3	6	—	—
Negidals	622	587	10	2	15	6	—	—
Germans	2,038,603	842,295	37,849	3,517	39,809	957,518	1,546	748
Nentsy	34,665	34,190	204	60	60	73	4	2
Nivkhi	4,673	4,631	10	3	4	16	4	1
Nogays	75,181	73,703	331	40	91	543	52	118
Oroki	190	179	2	—	—	6	1	—
Orochi	915	883	19	—	1	8	1	—
Osetians	597,998	402,275	6,345	797	5,823	4,308	164,055	1,710
Persians	40,176	2,572	228	127	24,779	3,136	123	968
Poles	1,126,334	94,594	219,179	417,720	3,007	59,956	2,014	712
Romanians	146,071	5,996	134,825	152	158	955	62	51
Russians	145,155,489	119,865,946	11,355,582	1,342,099	1,653,478	6,227,549	341,172	392,304
Rutuls	20,388	19,503	75	10	53	250	103	336
Lapps	1,890	1,835	19	6	5	14	2	—
Selkups	3,612	3,564	11	10	4	13	7	—
Serbs	2,685	1,580	637	83	26	183	46	6
Slovaks	9,060	711	7,943	39	42	124	30	4
Tabasarans	97,531	93,587	932	102	457	1,146	62	558
Tajiks	4,215,372	38,208	4,447	920	933,560	25,514	1,193	702
Talysh	21,602	202	11	12	8	137	15	21,169
Tatars	6,648,760	5,522,096	86,875	12,436	467,829	327,982	4,099	28,019
Crimean Tatars	271,715	21,275	46,807	116	188,772	3,169	615	545
Tats	30,669	19,420	248	54	242	178	39	10,239
Tofalars	731	722	3	—	2	—	—	—
Tuvins	206,629	206,160	94	32	73	132	19	12

**Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)**

Nationality	USSR	RSFSR	UKSSR	BSSR	UzSSR	KaSSR	GSSR	AzSSR
Turks	207,512	9,890	262	55	106,302	49,567	1,375	17,705
Turkmen	2,728,965	39,739	3,399	777	121,578	3,846	361	340
Udins	7,971	1,102	109	15	46	366	93	6,125
Udmurts	746,793	714,833	8,583	1,205	2,466	15,855	209	165
Udegeys	2,011	1,902	24	29	14	19	4	—
Uzbeks	16,697,825	126,899	20,333	3,537	14,142,475	332,017	1,305	1,379
Uighurs	262,643	2,577	194	39	35,762	185,301	22	9
Ukrainians	44,186,006	4,362,872	37,419,053	291,008	153,197	896,240	52,443	32,345
Ulchis	3,233	3,173	13	4	13	11	2	1
Finns	67,359	47,102	1,086	311	181	1,010	64	28
French	701	352	168	12	9	33	43	10
Khakass	80,328	78,500	299	72	288	592	22	27
Khalkha-Mongolians	2,950	2,117	315	41	119	312	19	2
Khanty	22,521	22,283	91	14	36	53	1	—
Croats	780	479	156	12	14	42	10	7
Tsakhur	19,972	6,492	62	13	24	31	3	13,318
Tsygans	262,015	152,939	47,917	10,762	16,397	7,165	1,744	145
Circassians	52,363	50,764	447	50	211	311	185	73
Czechs	16,102	4,375	9,122	242	94	1,175	101	14
Chechens	956,879	898,999	1,844	298	1,006	49,507	609	456
Chuvans	1,511	1,384	35	15	10	22	6	8
Chuvash	1,842,346	1,773,645	20,395	3,323	10,074	22,305	542	489
Chukchi	15,184	15,107	22	1	3	24	10	5
Shors	16,652	15,745	68	14	283	388	8	2
Evenkis	30,163	29,901	111	21	37	48	15	1
Evens	17,199	17,055	25	25	31	32	3	1
Entsy	209	198	1	4	2	2	—	—
Eskimos	1,719	1,704	3	1	3	5	—	—
Estonians	1,026,649	46,390	4,208	804	854	3,397	2,316	324
Yukagirs	1,142	1,112	3	6	4	9	2	1
Yakuts	381,922	380,242	619	139	183	314	16	17
Japanese	683	591	23	5	19	19	13	—
Other nationalities	15,168	3,319	3,904	338	1,593	244	4,621	169
Nationality not indicated	17,279	15,513	177	71	231	121	129	92
Total	285,761,976	147,021,869	51,471,499	10,151,806	19,810,077	16,464,464	5,400,841	7,021,178

Note: According to data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, as of 1 January 1990 the country's population was 288,623,600.

**Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census**

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KISSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Abazins	11	13	8	41	3	19	6	—
Abkhazians	25	51	90	52	44	102	63	25
Avars	56	120	121	986	191	91	523	69

Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Austrians	2	16	5	5	3	8	1	5
Aguls	—	20	50	129	20	17	79	—
Adygeys	22	40	36	54	33	27	54	16
Azerbaijanis	1,314	2,642	2,765	15,775	3,556	84,860	33,365	1,238
Albanians	2	204	5	3	9	5	5	1
Aleutians	—	—	—	11	3	1	3	—
Altays	19	20	14	116	60	1	26	14
Americans	1	13	1	1	3	—	—	4
English	7	11	5	1	1	2	—	4
Arabs	7	26	22	109	276	55	7	11
Armenians	1,655	2,873	3,069	3,975	5,651	3,083,616	31,829	1,669
Assyrians	3	27	20	18	28	5,963	39	8
Afghans	—	16	9	92	2,088	8	1,256	—
Balkars	9	35	24	2,131	42	282	65	8
Bashkirs	420	610	629	4,026	6,821	145	4,678	371
Belorussians	63,169	19,608	119,702	9,187	7,247	1,061	9,220	27,711
Beluchi	—	29	1	4	13	2	28,280	—
Bulgarians	237	88,419	420	607	1,072	83	910	262
Buryats	43	156	128	229	162	78	104	53
Hungarians	107	299	347	57	21	35	35	241
Veps	7	6	5	5	4	1	10	37
Vietnamese	—	20	7	1	3	3	—	2
Gagauz	53	153,458	140	32	38	9	283	69
Dutch	—	4	11	80	5	9	1	10
Greeks	174	601	325	2,007	590	4,650	445	182
Georgians	658	1,102	1,378	1,143	976	1,364	960	606
Dargins	30	34	65	2,479	340	238	1,626	45
Dolgans	—	8	6	14	25	3	7	—
Dungans	1	4	3	36,928	22	13	4	—
Jews	12,314	65,672	22,897	5,604	9,701	676	2,323	4,613
Highland Jews	69	89	2	48	164	22	71	11
Georgian Jews	1	33	1	7	22	5	10	3
Central Asian Jews	6	5	—	346	4,879	17	72	3
Izhors	—	2	4	—	7	4	—	306
Ingush	43	36	39	592	88	33	281	19
Spaniards	15	20	43	10	4	12	4	10
Italians	10	7	9	8	23	19	—	3
Itelmens	—	—	—	2	—	—	4	3
Kabardinians	43	43	77	195	244	90	215	47
Kazakhs	663	1,108	1,044	37,318	11,376	334	87,802	424
Kalmyks	46	41	43	5,050	120	39	103	28
Karaites	289	43	14	9	16	5	1	5

Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)

Nationality	LISSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KISSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Karakalpaks	42	27	7	142	163	43	3,062	5
Karachays	21	86	23	2,509	45	8	27	23
Karelians	159	172	416	63	29	4	47	881
Kets	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Kirghiz	118	221	189	2,229,663	63,832	145	634	81
Chinese	11	26	7	576	58	10	28	8
Komis	134	295	394	280	154	15	85	196
Komi-Pere- myaks	33	75	70	186	67	8	49	38
Koreans	119	269	248	18,355	13,431	29	2,848	202
Koryaks	—	5	2	19	5	1	9	—
Crimeans	2	37	5	3	23	6	1	1
Cubans	—	20	9	39	18	2	—	3
Kumyks	35	52	65	157	125	50	322	32
Kurds	3	9	11	14,262	56	56,127	4,387	13
Laks	19	35	45	325	1,398	23	2,441	43
Latvians	4,229	472	1,387,757	392	310	145	559	3,135
Lezghins	112	218	348	2,493	307	102	10,425	178
Livs	—	—	135	—	5	4	—	1
Lithuanians	2,924,251	947	34,630	493	531	219	359	2,568
Mansi	—	1	3	1	8	43	3	1
Maris	241	397	470	419	606	35	506	359
Moldavians	1,450	2,794,749	3,223	1,875	879	525	2,466	1,215
Mordovians	491	1,088	1,053	3,818	5,519	489	2,568	985
Nanaians	—	4	2	4	3	1	9	6
Peoples of India and Pakistan	1	9	—	10	13	43	11	2
Nganasans	—	1	—	2	1	—	—	1
Negidals	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Germans	2,058	7,335	3,783	101,309	32,671	265	4,434	3,466
Nentsy	3	1	9	4	33	—	11	11
Nivkhi	—	1	—	2	—	—	1	—
Nogays	5	34	9	55	28	10	152	10
Oroki	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Orochi	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Osetians	273	403	490	758	7,861	331	2,368	201
Persians	5	30	10	154	388	14	7,637	5
Poles	257,994	4,739	60,416	1,389	716	270	620	3,008
Romanians	173	2,477	938	61	33	32	70	88
Russians	344,455	562,069	905,515	916,558	388,481	51,555	333,892	474,834
Rutuls	—	5	6	4	4	5	33	1
Lapps	—	1	1	—	2	—	—	5
Selkups	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1
Serbs	12	50	18	10	4	8	8	14

Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)

Nationality	LiSSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Slovaks	11	18	38	74	5	7	10	4
Tabasarans	11	18	24	183	60	36	345	10
Tajiks	522	592	343	33,518	3,172,420	171	3,149	113
Talysh	1	1	4	20	3	11	8	—
Tatars	5,135	3,392	4,828	70,068	72,228	470	39,245	4,058
Crimean Tatars	53	85	60	2,924	7,214	36	32	12
Tats	6	97	20	4	47	21	32	22
Tofalars	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
Tuvins	1	13	11	42	14	5	17	4
Turks	8	14	9	21,294	768	13	227	23
Turkmens	193	337	228	899	20,487	69	2,536,606	106
Udins	—	16	15	2	31	19	32	—
Udmurts	224	665	471	703	635	34	332	413
Udegeys	—	17	1	—	1	—	—	—
Uzbeks	1,453	1,391	925	550,096	1,197,841	246	317,333	595
Uighurs	11	44	19	36,779	566	—	1,308	12
Ukrainians	44,789	600,366	92,101	108,027	41,375	8,341	35,578	48,271
Ulchis	1	5	—	4	4	1	1	—
Finns	162	97	463	121	76	12	24	16,622
French	26	7	13	4	—	7	7	10
Khakass	10	52	24	296	84	6	42	14
Khalkha- Mongolians	1	—	1	16	3	—	3	1
Khanty	2	7	10	9	7	—	3	5
Croats	5	33	8	3	1	4	3	3
Tsakhur	—	1	—	2	1	4	17	4
Tsygans	2,718	11,571	7,044	990	1,791	48	119	665
Circassians	11	16	34	64	86	12	78	21
Czechs	67	591	102	111	29	15	27	37
Chechens	72	150	158	2,873	128	227	507	45
Chuvans	—	1	—	3	14	2	11	—
Chuvash	687	1,204	1,509	2,079	2,512	123	2,281	1,178
Chukchi	1	—	3	4	4	—	—	—
Shors	—	10	4	74	38	—	14	4
• Evenkis	—	5	10	8	4	1	1	—
Evens	1	3	3	3	5	5	3	4
Entsy	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
Eskimos	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Estonians	598	282	3,312	430	147	89	217	963,281
Yukagirs	—	3	—	—	—	—	2	—
Yakuts	15	57	119	80	63	—	22	36
Japanese	1	4	3	1	3	—	1	—
Other nationalities	29	103	65	74	19	175	199	316

**Distribution of the People's of the USSR by Union Republics According to the 1989 Census (Continued)**

Nationality	LISSR	MSSR	LaSSR	KiSSR	TaSSR	ArSSR	TuSSR	ESSR
Nationality not indicated	1	143	689	27	46	7	25	7
Total	3,674,802	4,335,360	2,666,567	4,257,755	5,092,603	3,304,776	3,522,717	1,565,662

Note: According to data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, as of 1 January 1990 the country's population was 288,623,600.

**Emigration Figures by Republics Detailed**

91UN0153C Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*  
in Russian No 34, Aug 90 p 13

[Response to letter to the editor under the rubric "Question—Answer": "He Moved Abroad..."]

[Text] I read in *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* material about the "brain drain." It cannot be denied that this is indeed an important problem. In general, how many people move abroad, from what regions and cities, and to where?

A. Pechulis, Ventspils

According to data of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, almost 235,000 people left our country in 1989. This is about 2.2 times more than in 1988. Almost one-third of those who moved abroad in 1989 for permanent residence were under the age of 18.

The total number of people who emigrated includes: 36 percent blue-collar workers; 30 percent white-collar workers; 2 percent kolkhoz farmers; 4.4 percent students; and more than one-fourth from among the unemployed population and pensioners.

Among those receiving authorization to leave, one out of every five was a resident of the Kazakh SSR, Ukrainian SSR, or RSFSR; 7.1 percent were from the Kirghiz SSR; 6.2 percent from the Belorussian SSR; and 5.2 percent were from the Armenian SSR.

About 40 percent of those leaving the RSFSR were residents of Leningrad and Moscow oblasts, and almost half of them were from the city of Moscow. One out of every two leaving the Ukrainian SSR was a resident of the city of Kiev or Odessa Oblast; more than 40 percent of those leaving the Belorussian SSR were residents of the city of Minsk, 30 percent were from Gomel Oblast; and about 20 percent were from Mogilev Oblast. More than one-fourth of the emigrants from the Kazakh SSR were residents of Karaganda Oblast, and one out of every five was from the city of Alma-Ata and Alma-Ata Oblast.

Some 646 citizens of the USSR were refused permission to move abroad. The main reasons for the refusal are reporting false information about oneself when submitting an application or security reasons.

Citizens of the USSR move mainly to capitalist countries for permanent residence (98 percent). These include Israel (44.7 percent), the FRG (41.8 percent), the USA (6 percent), and Greece (4.6 percent).

**Number of Individuals Moving Abroad for Permanent Residence by Republics (according to data of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs)**

Republic	1987	1988	1989
USSR	39,129	108,189	234,994
RSFSR	9,697	20,705	47,521
Ukrainian SSR	6,643	17,746	50,020
Belorussian SSR	757	3,204	14,612
Uzbek SSR	1,112	3,580	10,099
Kazakh SSR	7,113	13,579	52,927
Georgian SSR	730	867	3,449
Azerbaijan SSR	322	501	2,976
Lithuanian SSR	684	666	1,796
Moldavian SSR	1,794	2,219	7,488
Latvian SSR	525	1,051	3,066
Kirghiz SSR	1,391	10,618	16,757
Tajik SSR	4,650	6,000	10,463
Armenian SSR	5,932	15,815	12,188
Turkmen SSR	9	56	57
Estonian SSR	770	1,582	1,575

In 1989, 2.5 million citizens of the USSR moved abroad for temporary residence for private matters (88 percent to socialist countries and 12 percent to capitalist countries). Of that number, 26.5 percent went to meet relatives, 73 percent went to meet friends, and 0.6 percent went to visit people who were gravely ill and burial places.

Mainly residents of the Ukrainian SSR (57.5 percent), the RSFSR (16.3 percent), the Belorussian SSR (8.7 percent), and the Lithuanian SSR (5.5 percent) went abroad on private matters. Just over 1,000 of these individuals were given permission to remain abroad for permanent residence: 53 people refused to return or their whereabouts has not been established.

About 2,000 people moved to the USSR for permanent residence in 1989; 789 of them were citizens of the USSR.

During the past year, about 853,000 foreigners entered the USSR for temporary residence for personal matters

(96 percent from socialist countries). Of that number, 57.3 percent came to meet relatives, 41.7 percent came to meet friends, 0.5 percent came to visit people who were gravely ill and burial places, and 0.1 percent came

to enter into marriage. In addition, 41,900 citizens of the USSR were given permission to enter the USSR for temporary residence for private matters.

### Increase in Trade Crime Statistics Examined

914D0013A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*  
in Russian No 40, Oct 90 p 17

[Article by G. Sinilov, laboratory chief, USSR MVD VNII, doctor of juridical sciences, and S. Golovnin, deputy head of department, USSR MVD VNII, candidate of economic sciences: "New Metamorphoses of Criminal Profit"]

[Text] In the first half of 1990, there were 152,178 registered economic crimes. This is 4 percent more than last year. The damage done by criminals has increased by 7.2 percent, up to 131.8 million rubles. The average cost of a crime has also grown by 10.3 percent, to 1,045 rubles.

Analysis of statistical data shows that the progress of economic crime has, unfortunately, been occurring for some time. In the 4.5 years of the current 5-year period, 1.3 million crimes have been registered, roughly as many as in the last 5-year period. This process is not developing in quick jumps, but gradually, from year to year. In the past decade, the damage done to the national economy annually by this kind of shadow activity increased by 57.3 percent...

Study of more detailed information enables us to conclude that a perestroika of the structure of economic crimes is occurring along with the development of market relations. In the first half-year, for instance, the growth of damage from thefts increased an average of 3.2 percent, yet their number decreased by 14.3 percent. However, the number of thefts on especially large scales has grown by 42 percent, and petty thefts—by 5.9 percent. That is, among thieves basically the big "schemers" and the petty "pilferers" have become more active. The number of robberies has increased by 11.5 percent, while damage from them has increased by a factor of 2.5. Damage from abuse of official position has increased by 22.2 percent.

Under conditions of universal shortages, speculators have also "started moving." One-fifth of all crimes are of this type. Growth is observed both in criminally punishable speculation (by 4.4 percent), as well as in administratively punishable petty speculation (by 32.8 percent).

It is noteworthy that precisely speculation is often viewed as the classic crime of a market economy. This is a great mistake. In reality, speculation is a natural consequence of total shortage, an inalienable attribute of a command-administrative economy. Under conditions of a normal market economy, with a market saturated with consumer goods, speculation simply does not exist.

It is also wrong to identify short-counting, extortion and theft, which are now flourishing in the trade system, with market relations. This system is also the fruit of a distribution-type economy. It and the phenomena inherent in it are products of our previous economic relations.

Today, the temptation of an easy profit is drawing tens of thousands of people, who have access to goods or the right to distribute them, into speculative and illegal trade machinations. For the half-year alone, 25,630 people were exposed who had engaged in criminally punishable speculation, while 22,466 people were prosecuted for the deception of buyers and customers. Moreover, 52,875 petty speculators were held administratively responsible; 64,952 people—for trade out of hand in unregistered places; 37,636 people—for the illegal sale of goods; and 35,247 people—for the concealment of goods and for sale from auxiliary premises. Valuables worth 9 million rubles were confiscated from people who had committed criminally punishable speculation, while items of petty speculation and illegal sale worth 3.9 million rubles were confiscated from other law-breakers. We note a growth in mercenary crimes, related to cooperative activities, by a factor of 2.1. The sum of nonlabor incomes extracted in this regard increased by a factor of 7.9, to 43.1 million rubles.

As a rule, two categories of cooperatives break the law. The first consists of people who joined the cooperative movement in order to extract maximum incomes via illegal machinations, using their past criminal experience and connections. There are fairly many such people in cooperatives, which can be assessed as the expenses of the new direction in the economy and as the consequences of ill consideration and inconsistency in implementing cooperative forms of economic management and of scorn for anti-crime measures. The second category of cooperative workers enters into conflict with the law out of necessity: they are provoked to it by discrimination on the part of state officials. Difficulties with material and technical supply, obtaining premises, registration of cooperatives, receiving loans, defects in legal regulation, the lack of desire on the part of state bureaucrats to let power out of their hands, and even simply the outright bribery of officials: all this pushes cooperative workers toward theft and the acquisition of stolen goods, toward the bribery of officials who distribute raw materials, materials, equipment, premises, and financial resources. In any case, even though it is a question of crimes, it is obvious that many of them would not have occurred if the cooperative form of ownership had been protected from this.

New, untraditional methods of criminal profit are also appearing. There are cases of concealing incomes from taxation, non-equivalent barter deals which harm national economic interests and the interests of other economic subjects and the population, fictitious financial transactions, the transfer of funds from non-cash circulation into cash circulation channels and their illegal withdrawal, unconscientious forms of competition, etc. Such violations and crimes relate both to the formation of market relations, as well as to the inconsistency and unsystematic nature of the conversion to a market economy, which leaves a mass of loopholes for light-fingered, newly appearing "businessmen."



Thus, not only is damage from economic crimes growing, but it is changing its type and adapting and introducing itself into the market structures that are arising. Therefore, the strategy for struggle against economic crime should not only include making repressions for violations more strict, but also raising the exigency toward law enforcement agencies. Indeed, strictness and exigency are necessary, just as it is also necessary to resolve the cadre, material and technical, and financial problems of service in the struggle against economic crimes, as well as the problems of tax inspections. World and even our own domestic experiences confirm that cheap justice and tax inspections cost society too much. However, in the final account, we are dealing with the consequences of defects in our economic mechanism. Improvement of this mechanism is the most effective way to neutralize the factors and sources of crime.

Therefore, today we must radically review economic legislation and bring it into accordance with the operating conditions of a civilized market, oriented toward permissive, stimulating measures and the revocation of numerous unwarranted instructions. We must review the conditions and grounds for administrative and criminal accountability in the existing legislation on speculation, private enterprise activity, commercial mediation, and on other economic violations, taking the changes in economic legislation and the conditions of a market economy into account. We must raise accountability for the most dangerous types of economic crimes and violations: organized criminal activity, the laundering of illegally obtained incomes, fictitious economic transactions, the concealment of income from taxation, etc. We should scientifically substantiate the criteria for the criminalization or decriminalization of economic violations, as well as introduce, as a rule, mandatory criminological expert analysis of the big economic decisions being made. In our opinion, all these measures should be included in a union-wide program for struggle against economic crime. The program itself should be a component part of the overall concept for converting to a market economy.

### Origins of Increase in Violent Crime Analyzed

91UN0091A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
16 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Zhbanov: "Evil Has Roots: Reflections on the Community Outcry Not Far Removed from the Article 'Arbitrary Rule and Legality'"]

[Text] "...I am an ordinary Soviet prisoner. I have almost served out the two-and-a-half years to which a most humane court sentenced me. Thanks. I shall never forget these years, nor our state—for its just laws. Here I have seen a great deal of good: both how they kill and how they take away one's last shred of dignity—they constrain you, 'so you do not babble.' Only the spade is not taken away—they help you earn your bread; that is, they re-educate by labor. But I did not steal, nor did I beat up anyone. I am serving time for the fact that I did not

inform on my wife's only brother to the 'organs.' We have three children. Just how could I have lived with her after informing? By what morality? You eat, sleep and think that she is looking at a reptile, who could betray her at any time... Now it is known that my brother-in-law had nothing to do with it: 'his' crime was committed by a former procuracy official. But I no longer expect anything from the authorities: they have taken everything away from me..."

Abakov, Valeriy Pavlovich; Pavlodar, PR-162/5.

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"I was a convict. For several years I rotted behind barbed wire—and I atoned for my guilt. I survived. What could possibly keep me from returning to normal life and having a family, children? But a former z/k [prisoner] is worse than a homeless dog. It all started with the fact that they refused me a residence permit—without which it is impossible to get a job. And I, like a fool, took it into my head to take my complaint further... I traveled to Temryuk—to the ispolkom, the gorkom, the procuracy... For 11 days I hung around various entrances. Where did I not spend the night! And so, without success, I returned to the village to my relatives. To shame and sorrow. I started to drink. At first the local authorities try to chase you away, so that you are out of their sight; but if you have any thoughts of standing up for your rights, they will use any means to drive you back behind bars. And that is what happened to me..."

Ivan Muravyev; Novorossiysk, SIZO, 18/3.

This is—"from out there," from behind the thick walls. The muffled voices of the embittered. From afar, they all look alike, with their identical black work clothes and shaved heads—the Zeks. And in each of them the darkness of a lost soul. We—are here; they—are there.

I know, the camp theme is no longer popular today, and it is annoying; but have you thought about those who are there? It is most appropriate to quote the words of V. Gulyayev, chief of corrective affairs at the USSR MVD: "A criminal is a member of society. And society does not have the right to reject him, to throw him out beyond the barbed wire-topped wall and forget about him once and for all. It does not turn out that way! He will return..." But in what state will he return? Even if we were convinced of the fact that all of them "there," almost a million of them, that all of them have been justly separated from human life—only for the evil which they visited on people—that all of them there are guilty...

I understand: in a paroxysm of fear before the epidemic of robbery and assault, moreover quite often unsolved crimes (and what reveals more swiftly the impotence of our "Megaira" than the omnipotence of the uncaught "werewolfs") it is very tempting, of course, to see our salvation in terms of punitive treatment: the more Zeks there are—the less crime. But you see, it is naive to think that those who find themselves "there" will submissively close ranks under the banners of corrective-shock work,

like during the years of the great construction projects. "...Presently popular opinion has it that the camps contain only weak-minded brutes who do not understanding a thing," writes Ruslan Mzhavenadze from Georgia (Mtskhetskiy Rayon, Ksani, PO Box 123/37). "Not so! The people behind the barbed wire have their heads on their shoulders too, and not under their arms..." And a "colonist-resettler" from Komi ASSR develops the idea further: "...Apparently it does not reach the Moscow offices that the forest ITU [Corrective Labor Establishments] are powder kegs of evil and hatred, and they will grow along with the state plan for procurement of timber. At the present time there are 270 convicts in the 'MVD USSR Spetsles [Special Forest] System.' What kind of correction can one speak of, if the state greedily takes the profits for itself? The main thing in the figures is not man—but the cubic meter. The MVD provides income in the billions, and has a vested interest in young z/k's, in a cheap labor force, especially in deportees, whom it does not have to feed. And all the former z/k's who are at liberty, are its army of reserves, its hostages."

Meanwhile, if you can believe the reports from the MVD, the crime epidemic is not going to go away. Against a background of material difficulties, the demands are both impatient and threatening: "It is time to put a stop to it!" The masses, as we were taught, will increasingly take possession. We will finish them off—and...

Incidentally, not long ago one of the most prominent leading legal scholars, speaking on television, noted with bitter irony that, today we are far more likely to come down with hepatitis than to be robbed; the entire matter lies in the fact that the warnings of the Health Ministry do not cause such hysteria...

All that is so. We know, after all, that one does not hear cries "It is time to put a stop to it!" about sickness, and one has to resist them only by the laws of nature itself. With crime, we fancy that it is easier... For too long, the task has been persistently set (and every time—by means of science) to completely destroy the roots of crime and put an end to it once and for all. And we believed the promises. Although, when one thinks about it, such promises are no more reliable than, let us say, promises to do away with diseases once and for all, or with physical ugliness, unhappy marriages, and the like.

As we see, the idea has not yet entered our topsy-turvy consciousness, that dark inevitabilities can creep in even in our bright future.

At present, it is true, they are not saying, "root out and put an end to;" they are saying—"struggle." But with whom and how? The question is not an idle one.

The times are changing, but our official science continues to stand on the absolute knowledge of the fact (I am quoting from the "Juridical Encyclopedic Dictionary") that, "the causes of crime are rooted in the social system and are connected with the ideological conditions

of the people's existence;" that "people become criminals...by virtue of an unfavorable combination of circumstances;" that "the social causes appear at the level of the individual," and so forth. In short, the primordial human is as before, an inert biomass, from which emerges, figuratively speaking, either sheep or goats.

No doubt the view of the social milieu as the sole source of evil in society was of invaluable service to the leadership in their actions to destroy the "old world." But how then shall one evaluate the new solum with its double-dyed crime rate, when nothing at all remains of the old except its memoirs? Scientific answers lay in scholarly works. In practice, for decades the punitive mechanism has been pounding on only the man, calmly ignoring the "social reasons." Except that upon examination, the "mature and developed" dogma was evasive: We, they say, are not punishing the man for the crime, but only the criminal in the man; therefore, we do not have punishment, but labor re-education in isolation and—we hit upon it as an afterthought!—"in isolating a person from unfavorable surroundings." Well, casuistry and cynicism are twins, that much is clear...

But today? It is namely today that an artificially supercharged atmosphere of fear of the coming storm permits extricating from the dusky archives the images of "class interest" and the dictatorship that defends it. It is all so crude, and so obvious. Fearing that they will not remain in power, those who occupy the bureaucratic easy chairs, and other orators of that ilk from the United Front of workers and other such dogmatists with such neo-Bolshevik bluntness, are today disclosing the "social reasons" that are the direct causes of the present outbursts of inhumanity and greed, and which must be eliminated: political freedom, glasnost, the harmful influence of the "fourth estate," the anticipation of a market economy and, it goes without saying, the obvious weakness of restraint. And this is in addition to the fact that clever minds and dogmatists know how to arrange things cleverly, in order to focus the anger...

By the way, I do not engage in polemics with the zealots, the moreso because I do not believe in their idealistic selflessness. I count on my honest and thoughtful interlocutors and want to say that the world abroad, which was not brought up on the wisdom of our founding fathers, is far more cautious in its search for the causes of criminal behavior in man. There are, of course, purely social reasons too. But very regrettably, most often, alas..."only the devil knows." And it hardly bothers us at all, when out of ideological considerations, that which is called the "primary traits," which since time immemorial are inherent in the very nature of man (albeit to varying degrees), are completely ignored. You see, that which the Preacher [Ecclesiastes] said (nine centuries B.C.) has come to pass in our days: "And I also saw that all labor and all success in business produces envy among people." Is that not the reason? It is as if it were written about our days...

In other words, any time of trouble—anxiety, deprivation, a tendency toward chaos—does not so much give birth to as much as it arouses the dark and the criminal; in an atmosphere of disarray and permissiveness, loutishness and perverted nihilism [Smerdyakovshchina] have always begun to prevail: history is a spiral, and not stages on a great journey. And material burdens in and of themselves are not reasons for stealing either. Otherwise, the people in the Siege of Leningrad would not have survived.

But it is terrible, when an insidious, internal evil creeps out of a well-fed, happy being in human form. And it is not that which is on one's tongue, but what is in one's mind.

I do not dispute—that society must not cast off its share of guilt for the crime rate which is growing on its soil. (Is it not society itself that has given birth to criminal mismanagement, poor workmanship, and extortion? Or the feverish speculation in vodka and cigarettes that has become possible?) But, I think that one must not forget the main thing: one cannot get an apple from a thistle seed—no matter what kind of soil, nor what kind of environment. Our tragedy, and let us speak plainly, lies in the fact that as a result of unprecedented social selection (which came to naught); as a result of the terror, the famine, immigration and wars, which took away the flower of the nation, and too many of them—human thistles have put down deep roots, from top to bottom...

My comparison is arbitrary and, perhaps, awkward. But I am speaking about the roots of an insidious evil—and I will cite examples from our days, in order to develop the thought.

Living alone in the suburban Moscow settlement of Malakhovka, occupying a detached house, were two women—a mother and daughter. Both were elderly. A young domestic worker used to come and help them, and from her, her sweetheart, a certain young man called Seryozha learned that “the old folks must have valuables.” On a night in November, he silently broke into the house, smashed the skulls of the sleeping women with a brick, ransacked the dwelling and left with a sack. For the next two nights, just as if nothing had happened, he merrily drank and ate with his companions; on the third, he was arrested, and they immediately nailed him, as they say, with circumstantial evidence.

However, the investigation literally bogged down: drawing out the time of reckoning, Krekshin, the accused, carefully, bit by bit, drew from his memory the addresses of unsolved apartment burglaries, which he had committed prior to the murder: in three years there had been—120... Moreover, as they told me at the oblast procuracy, not for a moment was Krekshin troubled by the blood he spilled—only by the horror of his punishment. Think of it: the horror of punishment is stronger than the horror of murder itself...

I remember his bent, caterpillar-like figure on the defendant's bench, his quiet, polite little voice, and his foreign

expressions. An honors graduate of a History and Archival Institute, from a family with a spotless record, he was well-read and intelligent in his own way. But he did not want to work a single day in the specialty he had learned at the VUZ—he immediately became a scoundrel and an apartment burglar (note, that he worked alone), and finally, a murderer... What kind of theory of “social milieu” can explain the pathological purposefulness of his mind?

True, one cannot avoid social prejudices even here: by fatal coincidence, the murder victims were the daughter and spouse of the executed General Goglidze, one of Beria's henchman; therefore, the episode did not receive wide publicity.

They allowed Krekshin to live.

The court, of course, is more visible. I share a turmoil of doubts and vacillation—it was too sharp a break according to our laws: 15 years of forced isolation in the form of labor re-education (which does not distinguish in principle between a murderer and a thieving scoundrel) or—immediate execution! Sometimes here there is large “but”... The question is: what kind of effect can one count on for re-education, even if severe, in the given example. To be completely honest: forcible retribution—for life, perhaps.

I do not care if other criminologists think I am an ignoramus, I am deeply convinced that in the acts of evil that we see, we are dealing left and right with congenital depravity, criminally-depraved natures. Perhaps this is somehow retribution for the sins of one's fathers? Who knows. But the defect is already in the genetic code—a moral mutation. Incidentally, even in the last century, many psychiatrists, including the famous Morel, in investigating the staggering (then still-rare) instances of “harmless mania,” tended toward a conclusion on the existence of “moral insanity”—an inborn lack (or extreme dullness) of moral feelings in normal reasoning, clear-cut and cold. Should one be surprised, that criminals of this type are extremely perspicacious?..

Alas, contemporary black-or-white evaluations—to acknowledge that one is changeable, or incorrigible—do little to shed light on the inhuman essential nature of a Krekshin. But whom would there be to investigate, if we had not explained as anything other than brain damage, and the unswerving obstinacy of the “plaintiffs,” the legal maneuverings, disagreement with official policy and even religious mindset. For today, models of behavior are studied only from the point of view of normative communist morality, from a code of law which is unaware of mercy and repentance and lacks moral sensibility—with which it is completely comfortable—that naturally arrives at the appropriate event “without witnesses.” But there are no criteria for preventive protection whatsoever. And therefore every instance of brutality is—unexpected, as if due to lack of police vigilance; and then, a routine analysis of the

close-by "reasons and conditions" and a preventative (in any case) roundup of former zeks.

We are fooling ourselves. How, if not by exposing the roots of atavism, could the manifestation of evil which was displayed, for example, in the events in Sumgait, be nurtured? The facts are well-known. At the court in Sumgait, I was staggered by the simple-minded revelation of one of the murderers: "I saw how they were beating them—and I became aroused!..." His instincts were awakened.

What can one say: a lot of people like Krekshin have been formed if even—as in the years of militant atheism—a priest on his way to the cathedral can get a hatchet in the back of his head. In truth, the philosopher was right: man is worse than a beast, when he is—a beast.

There are no two ways about it—the state is obligated to apply all the force of its laws to protect society, each and every person, from any encroachments on his legal rights. One can only welcome the recent order of the President on the strictest observance of legality—in order to halt the wave of crime, restrain destabilizing processes, and finally "sober up" the mood of legal nihilism (permissiveness) with its corrupting sabotage, "pipe dreams" of shady economics, and the increasing irresponsibility of responsible officials. This is the concern of everyone—it concerns also those who are protecting our rights. The inevitability of responsibility—is a principle of a rule-of-law state.

But, from bitter experience of years past, I will say openly that I am afraid. I fear that for certain commanders of "red hundreds" a signal from the center will be heard—for mass action: so that under the "statistic of effectiveness," the plan for "logging" would be fulfilled. Not that it is not already time to be afraid of "Krekshins"—on the left and on the right.

It was also somehow alarming that the day after the order (without, perhaps, attributing special significance to each word), the government rushed out practical instructions on "struggle with crime in all its manifestations!" Painfully familiar. After all if, in all its manifestations, does that mean in accordance with all articles of the present criminal law with its stainless-steel traps? Well, the good thing is at least they managed to root out the heretical Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. And for those which remain, which are supposedly not in use, but are nevertheless in force?

It goes without saying, that if the law is strict but just, then even the strictest legality is only for the good. "The administration of justice is joy for the righteous man and fear for those who do evil;" and this, as you can imagine, is also from far off, from the Proverbs of King Solomon. But if injustice is embedded in the law itself, which cuts to the bone the natural right of man to personal liberty, intimate feelings, way of life and family honor? Can one tolerate such a law, if we want to see ourselves as a civilized society?

In the article, "Proizvol i zakonnost [Arbitrary Rule and Legality]," (IZVESTIYA No 195 for this year) I stated, in general, the simple notion that: all our legislation, having in mind its many years of heartless purposefulness, must be viewed through the prism of good human behavior; one cannot consider lawful that which is immoral. All those dark inventions of the barracks regime—refusal to give information, refusal to testify against one's relatives, commercial mediation, making moonshine without intention of sale, living without a residence permit, violation of administrative surveillance and so on—that entire legion, the purpose of which is only to dehumanize, make bitter, and sow distrust in everything except the law of the strong.

But what if the law itself with its truly devilish virtuosity weaves such circumstances that people become permanent zeks?

"I would like to share my pain and misfortune and express my opinion about one article of the existing law—[Article] 198 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. I do not know who that wise head is that dreamed up administrative surveillance as a means of struggle with recidivist crime. But I have had frequent occasion to hear from those who were jailed 'for surveillance': 'Eh, it would have been better if I had stolen—at least I would have been jailed for a reason.' Nothing is left except hatred for the authorities! I am convinced that it would never even occur to the majority of citizens that you do not have to commit "such things," or to become a criminal for violation of surveillance. Look: let us say I became acquainted with a girl, and she expresses the wish to go with me to the theater. Sorry, sweetheart; I am not allowed. Otherwise—it is a violation. And three violations—is a criminal case. It is as if you are free, but like you are in a camp. Without the permission of the police the one under surveillance does not have the right to travel to another city, or even outside the city—for mushrooms or go to the river. In the evening, after 20:00 one cannot go to the movies, to a discotheque, drop in on a friend to watch the "Vremya" program or reports from Supreme Soviet sessions discussing the problems of democracy. At no time can one visit a restaurant or even buy a cigarette if they are sold in the wine and liquor department. Incidentally, it is not forbidden to use spirits. But to approach the counter with a bottle—is a violation! In the best case, before a holiday one might ask someone in line, 'Please buy a bottle for a poor man under surveillance.' But much more likely, he will buy around the corner from speculators. Finally, the one under surveillance is obliged to appear once a week at the police station to check in.

"In a word—you have been declared a potential criminal. The precinct inspector will answer for you with his head. Thus it is easier for him not to burden his head with excessive responsibility; to catch you three times—and you are on the docket. I have no doubt that there are also unpublicized work allocations for an urgent roundup to bring zek labor brigades up to strength (according to my estimates, one prisoner in ten is in

prison for surveillance violation). Incidentally, even the court session for this article is no longer than an hour.

"I was released from my first conviction (actually for cause) in 1982. I was 24, and had a wife and child. I resolved to start a new life. But I had to pay obeisance to the precinct inspector, and I immediately had a hostile relationship with him. He literally walked on my heels—and he got me. I stole from no one and struck no one—but was sent to prison. They gave me a year, which is not much. But I lost my wife. When I got out, I was in the middle of a desert and under surveillance once again, and I wept with rage. In short, the hell with everything! And in two months—a new [sentence]. Until there is a law on the presumption of innocence—it is a fiction."

Volodin, Yu.A., city of Vyborg, Investigative Isolation Cell (IZ-45/3).

What is there to say? If the struggle with crime—and only with real and not imaginary crime—can still to a certain extent, even temporarily and partially, bring consolation, or even a feeling of being protected, then does it not defy common sense—to simultaneously add new irritants, and to artificially multiply the problems of the unfortunate souls? Is it not a crime to provoke recidivist crime, while hunting for "live bait," or to put it more accurately—while entrapping?!

It is thought, for example, that the colony-settlements were created for humanitarian purposes—for the social adaptation of those who have "started out on the path to correction." But here is a short item. This time, a letter from Sverdlovsk Oblast (UShch-349/2) from 24-year-old Vladimir Sharov, convicted for the first time and "for good behavior" transferred to settle in the village of Aksarikha. It is understood even without pictures, that the inhuman fettering of life by the hands and feet with the "sticky web of surveillance," already burdened by the daily quest for food, could hardly be considered a time of social adaptation. However, Fortune smiled upon Vladimir. His bride arrived, and they got married. A go-getter, she organized a sewing cooperative. When their wages came they began to dress better and feel more and more independent. But the bosses did not care for the latter... "a bete noire, a bad example for the other slaves." Without warning, they closed the cooperative—without any explanation whatever. They entrapped the husband in two violations of the regime, and the third they crudely fabricated. And so you see, once again he is in the zone, and his wife is expecting a child. Thanks to Fate, Vladimir's parents, abandoning everything, traveled to Aksarikha—to save the family from perishing. But Sharov still has a year to serve on his term. "The colonial czars are trying to do everything to break up the settlers' families, because when a person is alone it is easier to keep him in fear and obedience to any arbitrary rule..."

I cannot say that there is a lot of mail in response, but what there is, is altogether sufficient, to reveal the bitterness of those who have already been burned once—

young people, who have not yet lost their health (when their healthy offspring would be marked as well), who are secretly hunted down, who have not harmed anyone, who are not aroused by the cry "it is time to put a stop to it" but are nevertheless a powerful source of criminogenic emanations—the rules for passport and administrative surveillance, violations of which are punished by incarceration.

Here, you see, we have quite accurately traced the perfidious vested interests of the regime to continually keep under their thumbs a huge contingent of convicts (just like a reserve army of camp labor), who when convenient can be easily and swiftly turned into recidivists, and can be used to replenish the thinning ranks behind the barbed wire. And all of them, who are consciously refused residence permits—officially in 70 cities (Leningrad television recently showed a home-grown "world record-holder:" he has been convicted more than 20 times for not having residence permits in his native city); all of them who are under the "trusteeship" of administrative surveillance; all those who are in the colony-settlements, all of them are—hostages. It is easy to consider what a delicate instrument the "regulated" crime-rate statistic is. And the number of people, by conservative estimates, amounts to hundreds of thousands every year [sent]—"out there."

One could cry out long and loud. Because of everything that is happening to us, one could also bare one's fangs, and stretch out one's arms. But no—I believe, I want to believe in a better future. For it has already been ordained—that hope is the last to desert us.

It is namely today, right now, in these cursed days of confrontation, of frenzied activity and dark trials of soul and conscience, that we must not permit ourselves to become so hardened that we are not touched by what we really are and pass on the other side, unconcerned. And so I quoted these few letters from captivity in the timid hope that not all that is merciful has abandoned us in the vanity of vanities—we cannot help feeling the scalding insult and helpless anguish of those who have already abandoned the hope of returning to freedom, those whom we fear so greatly. But, while sending young people "over there," we nevertheless must not fail to also think about what kind of people return "from there." Deeply bitter feelings—are not the same as that insidious evil that is always on their mind. We are not speaking about Krekshins.

I know that somewhere out there in the academic offices, they are patiently drawing up new drafts of the Fundamentals of Criminal Law; that unhurried discussions are going on about establishing a new Soviet penitentiary system, one that supposedly corresponds with world humanitarian standards; but I have strong doubts that the line will ever extend to the republic codes.

But can one wait? Can one wait for years, until these creeping rootlets of lawful evil, legalized arbitrary rule, finally die out. Why should they not be ripped out of the

law, these scandalous clever tricks of the regime, these articles from the RSFSR Criminal Code—failure to denounce, administrative surveillance, and passport articles... After all, these are all feudal anachronisms, and like boils on the forehead, have long been in plain sight of everyone, and are very, very well-known.

Even such a small thing as repealing these criminal and administrative bans, which have compromised themselves, will be a sign of good hope: democratization—not in words, but in deeds—will extend to all, even to the least-accessible, darkest spheres of our lives. Indeed, one session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet would be more than enough, so that hundreds of thousands of those who “have no privacy” could breathe freely.

**Republic, Oblast Crime Figures from Jan-Sep 90**  
91UN0091B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
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[USSR MVD Report: “Statistics Without Commentary”]

[Text] They say that statistics know everything, if of course, the information on this or that aspect of life is gathered skillfully, honestly, and without intention of concealing or falsifying something. Such information is not only interesting, it is also useful in a direct, practical sense. And hardly ever do statistics require any kind of commentary. A thinking person can himself make out what is behind one figure or another. And IZVESTIYA's new rubric, “Statistics Without Commentary,” will help; we hope it will be varied and that it will have a long life.

**Regions Having the Lowest Indicators in the Struggle with Crime for January-September 1990**

Regions	Dynamics of Crimes Registered (+, - & % of same period last year)			Crime Solution Rate (%)		Number of Unsolved Crimes	+,- in Percent
	All Crimes	Severe Crimes	Crimes under Criminal Investigation	All Lines of Work	Under Criminal Investigation		
Armenian Republic	+34.4	+87.6	+71.1	57.8	37.4	2,788	+2.3 times
Estonian Republic	+21.2	+23.9	+24.3	31.2	25.2	10,397	+38.5
Latvian Republic	+17.7	+21.2	+20.7	45.2	36.0	12,317	+48.7
Mordovian ASSR	+29.2	+26.3	+41.1	54.4	41.4	3,193	+88.4
Tuva ASSR	+27.3	+43.3	+29.9	40.0	33.1	3,662	+68.2
Karelian ASSR	+26.1	+19.9	+27.5	50.3	42.1	3,738	+58.3
Yakutsk ASSR	+23.5	+21.9	+24.3	47.5	38.2	5,239	+44.4
Buryat ASSR	+23.0	+26.5	+28.0	66.3	58.9	3,903	+60.0
Nizhegorod Oblast	+42.1	+39.6	+51.2	46.8	38.1	17,071	+68.9
Novosibirsk Oblast	+30.2	+42.2	+38.7	47.7	37.9	13,842	+2.0 times
Yaroslavl Oblast	+29.0	+29.6	+34.7	50.8	42.0	6,239	+71.4
Vologda Oblast	+26.2	+32.2	+32.7	57.7	48.8	4,386	+61.2
Tversk Oblast	+24.0	+17.8	+29.7	57.5	48.7	5,463	62.8
Kaliningrad Oblast	+22.3	+20.6	+26.0	57.4	48.5	3,287	+26.7
Bryansk Oblast	+21.9	+22.9	+27.9	69.0	60.9	3,128	+67.7
Primorskiy Kray	+21.9	+23.3	+26.0	44.0	37.7	15,774	+52.5

**Oblast Crime Figures From Jan-Sep 90**  
91UN0091C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Text]

[USSR MVD Report: “Statistics Without Commentary”]

## Regions Having the Lowest Indicators in the Struggle with Crime for January-September 1990

Regions	Dynamics of Registered Crimes (+, - in % of same period last year)			Crime Solution Rate (%)		Number of Unsolved Crimes	+,- in Percent
	All Crimes	Severe Crimes	Crimes Under Criminal Investigation	All Lines of Work	Under Criminal Investigation		
Vladimir Oblast	+17.2	+16.3	+21.8	67.2	58.0	3,277	+43.5
Volgograd Oblast	+7.2	+17.4	+10.0	58.3	49.8	8,530	+20.5
Voronezh Oblast	+12.8	+21.8	+16.7	73.4	62.7	4,026	+34.2
Ivanov Oblast	+16.6	+25.6	+19.7	63.3	55.5	3,192	+53.8
Irkutsk Oblast	+8.9	+12.9	+8.1	52.6	43.2	14,807	+14.9
Kaluga Oblast	+2.9	+16.0	+6.0	72.7	66.4	1,553	+16.8
Kamchatka Oblast	+11.7	-1.5	+12.5	49.0	35.8	2,473	+47.3
Kemerovo Oblast	-6.8	-0.6	-8.9	61.8	53.3	9,912	-8.1
Kirov Oblast	+16.2	+28.0	+19.4	68.6	60.6	3,361	+35.1
Kostroma Oblast	+20.6	+25.3	+22.1	65.6	55.9	1,748	+35.3
Kuybyshev Oblast	+9.9	+18.7	+10.0	57.0	46.5	10,123	+19.2
Kurgan Oblast	+7.7	-2.0	+9.1	62.6	53.0	4,463	+19.3
Kursk Oblast	+11.6	+27.4	+15.6	73.1	63.1	1,701	+8.0
Leningrad Oblast	+8.0	+9.0	+8.0	54.8	45.5	7,879	+27.1
Leningrad city	+6.5	+13.7	+9.8	49.4	40.1	19,642	+21.1
Lipetsk Oblast	+10.5	+17.7	+10.1	69.0	58.5	2,060	+20.8
Magadan Oblast	+18.7	+28.9	+23.7	54.0	43.9	2,307	+25.2
Moscow Oblast	+5.0	+17.7	+4.5	63.6	54.8	11,593	+17.9
Moscow city	+8.9	+15.0	+6.7	58.9	49.1	16,181	+17.8
Murmansk Oblast	+6.6	+3.8	+7.6	58.2	50.6	3,353	+24.1
Novgorod Oblast	+13.5	+17.3	+18.4	66.9	56.1	2,145	+49.6
Omsk Oblast	+13.2	+42.6	+15.5	65.5	56.4	5,326	+27.2
Orenburg Oblast	+2.5	+9.8	+7.9	61.8	51.4	5,435	+28.0
Orlov Oblast	+3.1	+12.8	+5.6	74.2	65.6	1,273	+11.4
Penza Oblast	+10.8	+16.6	+18.5	72.5	59.9	2,206	+49.8
Perm Oblast	+14.2	+23.7	+18.2	53.3	46.4	12,734	+43.4
Pskov Oblast	+16.8	+7.3	+17.4	56.0	45.8	3,860	+35.1
Rostov Oblast	+5.7	+9.2	+6.0	47.4	37.3	20,994	+15.1
Ryazan Oblast	+16.5	+0.1	+21.1	67.8	57.3	2,930	+34.3
Saratov Oblast	+17.4	38.4	+22.9	51.3	40.6	10,799	+49.3
Sakhalin Oblast	+12.4	+18.7	+16.4	49.7	37.6	3,553	+46.0
Sverdlovsk Oblast	+8.6	+13.9	+11.3	53.3	44.3	20,850	+40.6

Regions Having the Lowest Indicators in the Struggle with Crime for January-September 1990 (Continued)

Regions	Dynamics of Registered Crimes (+, - in % of same period last year)			Crime Solution Rate (%)		Number of Unsolved Crimes	+,- in Percent
	All Crimes	Severe Crimes	Crimes Under Criminal Investigation	All Lines of Work	Under Criminal Investigation		
Smolensk Oblast	+5.7	+6.9	+6.9	69.0	59.5	2,557	+26.1
Tambov Oblast	-0.1	-8.7	-0.6	68.2	59.3	2,874	+28.6
Tomsk Oblast	+16.1	+28.4	+18.0	43.6	34.8	6,144	+62.5
Tula Oblast	+8.1	+13.9	+11.4	60.2	50.5	4,787	+36.0
Tyumen Oblast	+11.5	+15.5	+11.8	46.3	38.2	18,853	+24.0
Ulyanov Oblast	+11.3	+16.2	+11.8	46.8	37.9	4,925	+42.4
Chelyabinsk Oblast	+11.0	+16.5	+14.5	57.2	49.3	11,761	+39.3
Chita Oblast	+7.6	+22.0	+10.0	59.4	50.5	5,169	+21.4

Prison Conditions for Female Guards Described

91UN0130A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Oct 90  
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by V. Kornev, special correspondent of IZVESTIYA: "On Guard—Only Women: What the 'Feminization' of the Pretrial Isolators Leads To"; followed by statement from the editorial board]

[Text] In the pretrial isolator [SIZO] in Volgograd they made it possible for me to see practically everything. Including, as they say here, the cells of the "prisoners sentenced to death"—sentenced to the supreme measure of punishment. And at almost every step I encountered...women in uniform. They were on duty in the corridors and in the passages, and they opened, jingling the keys, the cell doors. Even among the posts on the towers there were ladies with automatic weapons. How many of them are there here?

The deputy chief of the Oblast Administration for Internal Affairs, V. Kantemirov: "Men make up only 39 percent of the young officers, the rest are women."

Almost two-thirds! Women are sergeants, sergeant-majors.... Now they call them "guards" [kontrolery], previously—more precisely: chief warders. They carry on their shoulders all of the, so to speak, unskilled labor in these specific institutions.

"My opinion regarding this," Colonel Kantemirov says, "I have set forth in official letters to the ministry. But things are getting worse and worse: The conditions of service in the SIZOs (read—prisons.—Author), by comparison, let us say, with the colonies are not only more difficult. They are simply exhausting...."

Indeed, if in the ITU (corrective labor institution) there is an 8-hour work day, in the SIZO—a 12-hour work day with a 30-minute break for lunch. There—while on duty,

you can go out into the fresh air. Here you are on duty in a close facility, practically deprived of natural light. Until you get your pension, it is 25 years day after day in such conditions. At the same time, in a corrective labor institution they pay wage increments—ranging from 10-20 percent, in the SIZO—nothing.

And, you see, not only people under investigation are kept in the isolator. Here are imprisoned also those who have already been convicted, but whose sentence has not yet entered into force. In the cells I happened to talk with people arrested on accusation of theft and fraud, high-jacking and murder....

"Here in our institution we have people accused of having committed crimes according to almost all articles of the Criminal Code. Murders, burglaries, rapes, robberies," M. Yefremov, the deputy chief of the SIZO for operation.

I add: Several of the prisoners in custody are ill with tuberculosis, among them are also people with mental disorders. In short, even for men, service here is "both dangerous and difficult," and for women.... Nevertheless, in the corrective labor institutions service remains the prerogative of the strong sex, but in the SIZOs "feminization" is making rapid progress.

"It is necessary to return immediately to guarding by men," says Colonel Kantemirov. "We are behind a critical line. Do we really have to wait until events burst forth a bit more terrible than the seizure of female hostages?"

Specialists see wages as the first obstacle on this road. Since 1971 the increase has come to...20 rubles. At present, the guard staff receives an average of R180. But this is on the average, upon joining the service a "start-up" sum up to R165....



"What sort of man," B. Dinnik, the chief of the SIZO, reasons, "will come to work for us for this kind of money, considering our conditions and the specific nature, as well as the lack of prestige, to put it mildly, of the service in such institutions? I am afraid that before long posts in the SIZO will become completely deserted."

A gloomy prognosis. But life and statistics support it. Today the incomplete list of young officers comes to 36 people. This is almost one-third of the number of those who are serving, feeling, of course, the additional burdens. This year, trying to find a way out of the crisis situation, the staff members of the SIZO went to labor collectives and the military registration and enlistment offices. They met and talked with workers and soldiers transferred to the reserve. As a result of the preliminary selection, 270 invitations were sent for service in the SIZO. And what of it? There were 16 responses. The remaining ones, having weighed the conditions of work and the pay for it, changed their mind. Well, of the 16, the medical commission recognized only three as fit for the service.

And the SIZO in Volgograd is calculated for 1,850 people. But it is constantly overfilled. Every day they admit here and send from here around 400-500 arrested persons. During a year—approximately 15,000. And this in the presence of an incomplete staff of young officers, in the presence of the fact that almost two-thirds of the chief warders are women.

At the same time, an investigation conducted by staff member of the Administration of Internal Affairs and the SIZO has shown: Precisely during the first weeks and months, the arrested persons develop heightened excitability, irritability, at times reaching hatred. You see, the conditions of the life of the person have changed, he is in isolation. Interrogations, confrontations, investigation experiments.... All this is reflected in the state of mind of a person. Hence stresses and frustrations. And sometimes there are even new crimes, already within the walls of the SIZO. Moreover, frequently the victims become exactly collaborators of the SIZO.

Neither Colonel Kantemirov, nor the officials of the SIZO could tell me, whether or not the psychologists and sociologists of their departmental institutes had studied what the feminization of the guard of SIZOs would lead to? Did the theorists make any recommendations in connection with this? Another thing is known: The "practitioners" have drawn their conclusions, the wave of the seizure of hostages has rolled even to the SIZO in Volgograd. And, of course, among the hostages were basically women....

The terrorists, and among them—three under investigation for a murder committed with particular cruelty, dictated in the SIZO here their conditions, threatening that otherwise "they will at once finish off a woman." Two aspects in this story deserve special attention. Men offered themselves as hostages in exchange for the

woman: A leading official of the SIZO and the procurator. The terrorists flatly refused the exchange: "It will be cheap." They understood: They will more quickly attain concessions when the life even of a representative of the young officer staff is endangered, as long as it is a woman.

During the current year, already 18 escapes and seven seizures of hostages have occurred in the SIZOs of the oblast. This is many more than during the corresponding period of the past year. Disconcerting is the thought: And what if they had succeeded? The seizure of women was planned. Moreover, the consequences of this on any day and at any moment can turn into a tragedy for the inhabitants of the places where the SIZOs are located.

Approximately at the same time as in Volgograd, analogous events took place in Saratov. There they released terrorists into the city, and this ended (IZVESTIYA told this story) with new crimes. In Volgograd they made another choice: An order was given to the group which had organized the seizure. The woman was saved. And nevertheless, both the one and the other variant are fraught with mortal risk.

Well, and now about the moral aspect of the matter. There is eloquent testimony of how low the women themselves regard the prestige of the profession of guard.

"At the reception of parcels from relatives," Sergeant-Major L. Khrustaleva explained, "in the prison store, at the duty stations next to cells occupied by women, our work would look natural. But it is a shame to acknowledge that you are on duty next to cells occupied by men. This is not normal. This is men's work!"

Is it terrifying for them?

"A bit terrifying," Khrustaleva acknowledged. "Even when you stand on the tower with a tommy-gun."

"Of course, we are afraid," Senior Sergeant N. Chomo confirmed. "We are women...."

In the corridor of the SIZO there hangs a photocopy of a czarist edict dated 1 January 1908. According to this edict, Junior Warder Ivan Smirnov, "For Excellence in Especially Difficult Conditions of Prison Guard" became a hereditary honored citizen of the city of Tsaritsyn. Prestigious? Without a doubt. This in addition to high payment for work under difficult conditions.

...With the support of the chief of the Oblast Administration of Internal Affairs, Maj Gen of the Militia V. Dergachev, Kantemirov was able to convince the oblistpolkom to allot a bit of money from the local budget to raise the wages of the workers of the SIZOs. But this agreement is in effect only until 1 January. Whether it will prove possible to prolong it is not known. What is more, in general this problem must be solved in principle. One-time sacrifices will not save the situation.

"We are hoping for changes," said the chief of the Administration of Internal Affairs, V. Dergachev, "we

are hoping that at last a reasonable approach will prevail. You see, up to now red tape is being dragged out even with the solution of a question which does not require any material expenditures: We are talking about legal responsibility for an infringement on the life and health of the staff members of SIZOs."

...Leaving the SIZO, I glanced back. On the tower a woman stiffened in tension with a tommy-gun.

**From the editors:** We asked the chief of the Main Administration for Correctional Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to comment on this material. The 42-year old Vladimir Gulyayev was appointed to this post not so long ago, but has already succeeded in winning the reputation of a man of democratic views, having declared in some of his interviews that the USSR's system of corrective labor institutions, in its present form, increases the number of criminals in the country and is also a system for depriving people of their rights and not for the restriction of freedom for crimes committed. His proposals for the reform of prisons, camps, and SIZOs are based on the fact that the state should not exploit the labor of the prisoners, especially as during the transition to a market economy the labor productivity of "zeks" [prisoners] will not be competitive. Gulyayev is asking the government for R3.5 billion in order to provide normal food for the prisoners, to build modern prisons instead of the neglected old ones, as well as to provide adequate pay for the people who are guarding criminals.

Vladimir Gulyayev, too, is extremely alarmed by the feminization of the guard of the SIZOs. In his words, the low pay and the lack of work prestige in his department are one of the most serious problems.

"According to our calculations, a total of about 1,000 women should work in the 248 SIZOs located throughout the USSR," says Vladimir Aleksandrovich. "They are needed since at present there are about 7,000 women and more than 15,000 minors imprisoned in SIZOs. With this contingent, of course, women can work best of all. But in actuality the representatives of the weak sex are several times greater in our service. I understand that this is an outrage, but, alas, for the time being there is no other way out. Practically no men come to us to work. However, I think, that it will prove possible to change the situation."

Vladimir Gulyayev proposes to introduce the rank of "warrant officer of the internal service", which, in his opinion, will raise the prestige of this profession. In addition to this, to double the wages for guards. It is also necessary to secure through legislation the legal protection of the people who serve in places of imprisonment. All these proposals have been officially registered and sent to the authorities, as they say, "upstairs." However... Vladimir Gulyayev, is nevertheless an optimist. He believes that common sense will triumph in our society.

"If we begin to create a system of civilized treatment of criminals, it means we ourselves will become civilized people," he says.

#### **Resolution on Estonian Police Law Published**

*91UN0096A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 27 Sep 90 p 1*

[Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet resolution: "On Implementation of the Estonian Republic Police Law"]

[Text] It is hereby resolved:

1. to establish that the passage of an Estonian Republic Police Law marks the beginning of a period in which militia structures of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs will be dismantled, with this process to be complete by 1 March 1991, at which time new police facilities and services will commence operations in accordance with the Estonian Republic Police Law. During the aforementioned period the militia, though in the process of elimination, will continue to perform its assigned tasks to the extent that those tasks have not already been assumed by the police.

2. to instruct the Estonian Republic Government chairman to appoint a general director of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Department and police prefects and establish police prefectures' areas of jurisdiction not later than 1 November 1990.

3. to instruct the Estonian Republic minister of internal affairs:

—A. to submit for approval to the Estonian Republic Government by 1 November 1990 the titles of duties and salaries of police employees, as well as their tax obligation;

—B. to submit for approval to the Estonian Republic Government by 1 December 1990 the Estonian Republic Police Charter as well as a description of uniforms and insignia of policemen and regulations governing the wearing of them;

—C. to submit for approval to the Estonian Republic Government by 1 January 1991 statutes on the Police Department and the prefecture of police;

—D. to submit for approval to the Estonian Republic Government other standardizing acts regulating the functions of the police no later than 1 February 1991.

4. to instruct the Estonian Republic Government:

—A. to establish a Pretrial Investigation Department and State Protection Department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and to approve a statute in regard to these departments by 1 November 1990;

—B. to form a medical commission under the Ministry of Internal Affairs by 1 January 1991 for the purpose of certifying the health status of individuals applying for service in the Police Department.

5. to establish that until the passage of a resolution on Estonian Republic policemen's pensions the Statute on USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Personnel Pensions will serve as a guideline for the provision of pensions to both militia and police personnel.

A. Ruutel, chairman,  
Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet  
Tallinn, 20 September 1990

### **Estonian Police Law Published**

91UN0096B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 27 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Estonian Republic law: "On the Police"]

### **[Text] Chapter I: General Statutes**

#### **Article 1: Tasks of the Estonian Republic Police Law**

The Estonian Republic Police Law defines the place and role of the police within the system of state organs and organs of local government, establishes the basic tasks, obligations, rights, responsibility and organizational foundations of the police and makes provision for monitoring of their activities.

#### **Article 2: The Police and Police Personnel**

1. The police are an executive organ of state authority which in connection with the performance of their assigned tasks may in the manner and under the conditions established by laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic employ special means and firearms. As a state department the police is under the jurisdiction of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Local or regional police subunits and services may be established on the basis of agreements with organs of local government.

3. All full-time police personnel are civil servants who serve as representatives of state authority within the context of the performance of their official duties and within the limits of their authority.

4. Police personnel working on a volunteer basis or under contract are regarded as civil servants during such time as they are directly performing official assignments; their legal status, duties and rights are established by this present law and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic.

#### **Article 3: Basic Functions of the Police**

The police preserve public order, protect the legitimate interests of individuals and organizations, take measures to prevent crime, conduct investigations of crimes, punish the guilty and carry out sentences within the limits of their authority.

#### **Article 4: Basis of Police Activity**

1. The police act upon principles of lawfulness and humanism in their efforts to preserve law and order and ensure the security of society.

2. In the performance of their duties the police cooperate with other state organs, public organizations, citizens and citizens' associations.

3. All individuals within the territory of the Estonian Republic and falling within its jurisdiction are under police protection regardless of their citizenship, nationality or race, skin color, sex, language, religious belief, social origin, social or property status, degree of education or other factors.

4. In their functions the police are prohibited from resorting to illegal physical violence or mental abuse or from treating or punishing individuals in a demeaning manner.

5. The police are prohibited from establishing structural units of parties, sociopolitical organizations and social movements within their ranks. Police personnel are independent of political influence in the performance of their official duties.

#### **Article 5: Glasnost in Regard to Police Work**

1. The police shall inform state organs, organs of local government and the public regarding their activities.

2. Information containing state or official secrets or trade secrets belonging to organizations and individuals is not to be divulged, nor information obtained in the course of official police work which could damage the honor and dignity of citizens, hamper a criminal investigation or encourage criminal activity.

3. The police are obligated upon receipt of an appropriate citizen inquiry to inform that citizen of the information regarding him or her which is stored in the police information system.

4. It is forbidden to reveal to a citizen information regarding other individuals.

5. Procedures for disclosure of information from the police information system are established by the Estonian Republic Government based on recommendations from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

#### **Article 6: Participation of State Organs and Organs of Local Government, Public Organizations and Citizens in Preservation of Public Order and Anti-Crime Efforts**

1. State organs, organs of local government and officials are obligated to render the police comprehensive assistance in the performance of police duties.

2. Participation by public organizations, citizens and citizens' associations in the preservation of public order and anti-crime efforts, as well as their powers and legal protection, are regulated by the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic.

#### Article 7: Monitoring of Police Activities

In addition to the Estonian Republic Government the procuracy, state control organs and commissions and authorized organs of local government have the right to monitor police activities according to procedures established by the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic. Monitoring of the legality of security police activities is to be carried out by an authorized commission of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.

#### Chapter II: Structure and Functions of the Estonian Republic Police

##### Article 8: Police Structure

1. The police are part of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs administrative structure.

2. The territorial and divisional subunits of the police are the Republic Police Bureau, prefectures of police, police departments, constabularies and the auxiliary subunits which serve them.

3. The Republic Police Bureau is comprised of: the Criminal Police Bureau, the Security Police Bureau, the Highway Police Bureau, the Passport Bureau, the Bureau for Police Information and Analysis, and the Police Reserves.

4. A prefecture, as a rule, encompasses the territory of a republic city and uyezd. Upon agreement with the appropriate uyezd and city (republic city) soviets or—by authorization of those soviets—with the appropriate ispolkoms a prefecture's area of jurisdiction may be expanded to include several uyezds or be limited to the territory of a republic city. The exception to this is the Transportation Police, which operate throughout the entire territory of the republic.

5. Police department and constabularies are established in cities, towns, villages and volosts in accordance with the specific needs of the local area, population size, the state of law and order and other factors which are of importance from the standpoint of police work.

6. In official (functional) terms the police are subdivided into field, criminal and highway police units and security police.

##### Article 9: Estonian Republic Police Institutions and Their Functions

1. The central police institution is the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs State Police Department (hereafter referred to as the Police Department).

2. The Police Department is comprised of a general director of police, a chief inspector of police (who serves simultaneously as deputy general director), a police advisor, consultants, a deputy director for financial administration and a clerical section. In terms of authority the general director of police is subordinate to the minister of internal affairs.

3. The Police Department performs the following functions:

(1) direction of police work and coordination of police work with other organs of state power and state administration;

(2) material, technical and information-related support for police work;

(3) selection of police personnel, including police reserves, and organization of police training and advanced training courses;

(4) monitoring of police services and regional police subunits, and rendering of assistance to them if necessary;

(5) organization of official communications with police and militia agencies of other states and international police organizations.

4. The Police Bureau is the republic subunit of the police which performs its assigned functions throughout the republic's territory. The head of the police bureau is a commissar who in terms of authority is subordinate to the general director of police. The Information and Analysis Bureau and the Passport Bureau are headed by directors.

5. The Police Reserves are police subunits of the field police at the disposal of the general director of police, to be employed in regions determined by the Estonian Republic Government. The Police Reserves are headed by a commissar.

6. A police prefecture is headed by a prefect who in terms of authority is subordinate to the general director of police. In terms of territorial organization a prefecture is subdivided into local police departments, which may in turn be further subdivided into constabularies.

7. A police prefecture performs the following functions:

(1) direction of police work within the prefecture's jurisdiction, coordination of activities between police services, preservation of public order, crime prevention, and criminal investigation;

(2) selection of and record keeping on police personnel, and assignment of police personnel for training and advanced training courses;

(3) organization within its jurisdiction of cooperation between the police and other state organs and organs of local self-government, public organizations, citizens and citizens' associations;

(4) monitoring of the appearance of its territory and environmental protection;

(5) participation in highway inspection;

(6) maintenance of contacts with the public, institutions, enterprises and organizations;

(7) performance of other tasks based on this present law and on other laws and standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic.

8. A police prefecture performs its assigned tasks through local police departments and constabularies.

9. A police prefecture has a detention center, while a police department has a detention cell.

10. The Prefecture of Transportation Police ensures public order in rail, air and water transport and at facilities relating to these forms of transportation, takes steps to prevent crime and conducts criminal investigation.

#### **Article 10: Basic Functions of Police Services**

##### **1. Functions of the field police:**

(1) performance of patrol and watch services to preserve public order and prevent crime and other violations of the law;

(2) monitoring of compliance with requirements governing public appearance and facilities and environmental protection;

(3) preservation of order and rendering of emergency assistance during rescue efforts in the event of fires, natural disasters, accidents and other emergency situations;

(4) conducting of individual investigations upon discovery of evidence of crimes;

(5) cooperation with independent units for the preservation of order and citizens' security services;

(6) levying of administrative penalties and implementation of sentencing and resolutions by courts and administrative penalties within the limits of their authority;

2. The criminal police handle crime prevention and investigation of crimes.

3. The highway police patrol the highways, punish motor vehicle violators within the limits of their authority, conduct immediate investigation into highway accidents which bear signs of criminal activity and render accident victims emergency medical and technical assistance.

4. The security police combat terrorism and organized crime, protect the territorial integrity of the state, protect state, scientific, technological and trade secrets, and ensure the security of national cultural treasures, state institutions and politicians and public figures.

5. All police services are obligated to render each other assistance in the preservation of public order, prevention of criminal violations and apprehension of criminals without waiting for special instructions to do so.

6. In the event of natural disasters, accidents, massive unrest and other emergency situations or in order to keep order during the conducting of major state events the

general director of police can with the consent of the minister of internal affairs mobilize all police personnel without regard for their specific job sector or day-to-day official duties.

#### **Article 11: Procedures for Appointment and Firing of Police Personnel**

1. The general director of the Police Department is appointed to his position and may be relieved of that position by the Estonian Republic Government chairman at the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs.

Any individual with higher education and five years of previous experience in law enforcement administrative positions may be appointed general director of the Police Department.

2. Other officials of the Police Department are appointed to their positions and relieved of those positions by the Estonian Republic minister of internal affairs at the suggestion of the general director of the Police Department.

3. The structure and size of the Police Department are determined by the Estonian Republic Government.

4. The commissar of the Police Reserves, the commissar of the Police Bureau, the director of the Passport Bureau, the director of the Information and Analysis Bureau and the prefect of the Transportation Police are appointed and relieved of their duties by the Estonian Republic minister of internal affairs at the suggestion of the general director of the Police Department.

5. Other officials in the Police Reserves, Transportation Police prefects and Police Bureau officials are appointed and relieved of their duties by the general director of police at the recommendation of the commissars of the corresponding bureaus, the director of the Information and Analysis Bureau and the prefect of the Transportation Police.

6. The structure and size of the Police Bureau and the Transportation Police Prefecture are established by the Estonian Republic minister of internal affairs at the recommendation of the Police Department general director.

7. A prefect of police is appointed and relieved of his duties by the Estonian Republic Government chairman at the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs and with the consent of a city (republic city) or uyezd soviet.

8. Other prefecture officials are appointed and relieved of their duties by the prefect.

9. The structure and size of the prefecture of police are determined by the general director of police with consideration given to the specific needs of each uyezd or city and requests from local government.

10. The personnel of local police departments and constabularies are appointed and relieved of their duties by the prefect with the consent of local government organs at the suggestion of the subprefect of field police.

### Chapter III: Police Duties

#### Article 12: Police Duties

1. The police, in accordance with their functions:

(1) communicate with citizens in a respectful manner and render them all possible assistance within the limits of their authority;

(2) protect the life, health, honor, dignity and personal and real property of citizens from illegal infringement and other threats;

(3) keep order in public places;

(4) receive and register information on violations of the law and other events and take immediate steps to prevent, interdict and uncover lawbreaking;

(5) file criminal charges, conduct investigations and perform other functions and duties as described in criminal and procedural legislation;

(6) carry out sentencing and court decisions within the limits of their authority, perform administrative arrests and protect and escort individuals under arrest or protective custody;

(7) guarantee the rights and legitimate interests of individuals brought to the police, if necessary taking steps to render them medical or other assistance;

(8) participate in efforts to prevent drug abuse, public drunkenness, loitering and other negative phenomena;

(9) perform administrative supervision;

(10) render assistance with the readjustment to society of individuals released from prison;

(11) conduct cases involving administrative violations of the law;

(12) search for missing individuals and other individual in accordance with procedures described by the law and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic;

(13) protect sites designated by the Estonian Republic Government;

(14) regulate traffic and patrol roads, monitor the condition of roads, streets and public transportation, and issue driver's licenses;

(15) monitor compliance with establish regulations governing the opening and functioning of sites under police jurisdiction;

(16) issue citizens passports, register citizens' places of residence and moves to new residences and monitor compliance by citizens and officials with passport regulations;

(17) respond to citizens' questions in accordance with legally established procedures;

(18) issue foreign travel documents and documents allowing entry into the Estonian Republic within the limits of their authority, and check compliance with regulations governing entry and exit by foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship;

(19) inform the appropriate state organs and organs of local government of the crime situation, of automobile accidents, fires, other accidents, natural disasters and other emergency situations and take emergency measures to eliminate their effects, save lives and render people assistance; render assistance to individuals victimized by crime or unable to assist themselves;

(20) safeguard objects and documents which have been found or turned over to the police and take immediate steps to return them to their owner or rightful possessor;

(21) help protect the environment, natural resources and natural sites.

2. Within the limits of their authority the police render assistance:

(1) to health care and veterinary inspection organs with the conducting of quarantine measures in the event of an epidemic or isolated outbreak of disease;

(2) to treatment facilities which are carrying out in accordance with the standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic involuntary commitment of individuals who on account of the state of their health represent a threat to themselves and others;

(3) to fire departments and rescue services in the performance of their official duties, if necessary taking action to maintain public order.

### Chapter IV: Police Rights

#### Article 13: Police Rights

1. The police have a right to:

(1) demand that citizens and public officials maintain public order and cease violations of the law, and apply legally permitted means of compulsion to lawbreakers;

(2) check the identification documents of individuals suspected of violating the law;

(3) fill out reports on administrative violations of the law, impose administrative penalties, carry out administrative detention and use other legally permissible measures to combat administrative lawbreaking;

- (4) subpoena citizens and public officials in connection with civil and criminal cases being conducted by the police;
- (5) detain and take into custody in accordance with the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic individuals suspected of committing crimes;
- (6) detain according to established procedures transients and indigents, as well as individuals with suspended prison sentences dependent on mandatory attendance at work, as well as individuals paroled from penal institutions on condition of mandatory work attendance, in the event that they leave their place of employment;
- (7) transport to treatment institutions or police facilities individuals who as a result of alcohol- or drug-induced intoxication may present a danger to themselves and other citizens, as well as citizens who violate the law, in order to determine their identity and if necessary to fill out an administrative police report;
- (8) enforce involuntary commitment of citizens in the cases provided for by the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic;
- (9) photograph and fingerprint individuals detained or taken into custody as crime suspects, transients and indigent persons, as well as individuals with suspended sentences dependent upon mandatory work attendance, individuals with paroles from penal institutions dependent upon mandatory work attendance, and persons subjected to administrative arrest;
- (10) record on audio tape, video tape or film the individuals listed in point 9, section 1 of the present article, with those individuals' knowledge, and conduct personal searches and searches of those individuals' belongings in accordance with procedures established by the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic;
- (11) conduct personal searches of individuals brought in to sober up, and hold their personal items and documents in storage;
- (12) employ various methods to search for fugitives and use technical and other means to uncover crimes, but without violating citizens' constitutional rights thereby;
- (13) monitor the storage of valuable materials at enterprises, institutions and organizations in accordance with the laws and other standardizing documents of the Estonian Republic.
- (14) enter citizens' homes and other structures as well as structures belonging to organizations in order to pursue individuals who have committed a crime, as well as in the event of natural disasters or other emergency situations which threaten citizens' safety;
- (15) enter the homes of individuals under administrative supervision;
- (16) if necessary or in the event of hazard close or limit movement along sections of roads and streets; forbid the use of a vehicle if its design or condition are not in compliance with established requirements; stop vehicles in the event that a crime has been committed and check the driver's licenses of drivers, as well as documents pertaining to the vehicle itself and its load;
- (17) restrict from driving those individuals who do not have documents confirming their right to drive or use a certain category of vehicle; restrict from driving persons suspected of being in a state of alcohol- or drug-induced intoxication, test them at the scene or send them in for testing by specialists (refusal by an individual to submit to testing constitutes confirmation of intoxication);
- (18) grant organizations permission to purchase, store, and transport weapons, ammunition, and explosives; grant citizens permission (licenses) to purchase, store, and carry firearms and ammunition; confiscate weapons from organizations and citizens when the law is violated in their storage and use;
- (19) issue permits (licenses) for the establishment and operation of firearms repair enterprises, pyrotechnical enterprises and shooting ranges, issue stores permits (licenses) to sell firearms, and revoke those permits if necessary;
- (20) issue and revoke licenses to establish and operate private detective agencies according to established procedures;
- (21) use means of public transportation within the Estonian Republic free of charge in the manner prescribed by the Estonian Republic Government;
- (22) make use if necessary of means of communications belonging to organizations, and in emergencies also make use of motor vehicles belonging to them (with the exception of means of transportation belonging to diplomatic, consular and other representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as special-purpose motor vehicles) in order to travel to the scene of an event or natural disaster, transport citizens requiring immediate medical assistance to treatment centers, or transport lawbreakers to police facilities;
- (23) demand and receive from organizations according to procedures prescribed in the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic information required for the performance of the police's assigned tasks;
- (24) use the mass media to inform the public about crimes, discover the circumstances surrounding a crime, apprehend criminals, prevent crime and maintain public order;
- (25) present awards to individuals and police personnel who perform notable services in regard to the preservation of public order and the fight against crime.

## **Chapter V: Use of Special Means and Firearms**

### **Article 14: Use of Special Means**

1. The police have the right in the performance of their official duties to use special means, the types of and procedures for use of which are determined by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. Special means are used:

- (1) to thwart criminal assaults and free hostages;
- (2) to halt massive unrest and violations of public order by groups of people;
- (3) to liberate parcels of lands, buildings, rooms and means of transportation seized by illegal means;
- (4) in connection with the arrest of lawbreakers and their transport to the police or official buildings, when inmates are transported from one location to another, and to protect detainees, as well as against individuals arrested and taken into custody on an administrative basis in the event that they refuse to submit or resist police personnel or other individuals performing their public duties in regard to preservation of public order or the fight against crime, or if there is adequate reason to assume that certain individuals might escape and cause harm to other people, their surrounding or themselves.

2. When special means are employed by the police against citizens consideration is given to the nature of the violations of law occurring and the specific circumstances. In the event that special means are employed damage to citizens' health must be minimized.

3. Police personnel may employ means of self-defense and the tactics of hand-to-hand combat in the performance of their official duties and in order to ensure their personal safety.

### **Article 15: Use of Firearms**

1. Police personnel have a right to carry and use firearms.
2. Procedures governing the use of firearms are established by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

## **Chapter VI: Service in the Police**

### **Article 16: Composition of Police Personnel**

1. Volunteers for police service are accepted from among citizens over the age of 18 who are capable in terms of their personal and moral qualities, educational level, degree of physical training and health status of performing the duties entrusted to the police.

Police personnel must be fluent in the official language and be capable of conversing with citizens in the commonly-used language of their specific region when performing their official duties. Fluency in foreign languages is encouraged.

2. Police personnel must swear an oath upon entry into service. The text of the official oath and procedures for the swearing-in ceremony are approved by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

3. All police personnel are subject to certification in accordance with their position and official title. The procedures for and system of certification of police personnel, job descriptions, official titles and ranks of police personnel are established by the Estonian Republic Government at the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs.

### **Article 17: Training of Police Personnel**

1. Police personnel are trained at the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Training Center and other educational institutions.

2. Persons accepted for training at the Police Training Center are regarded as being on active police service.

3. The statute on the Police Training Center and its curriculum are approved by the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs with the consent of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Education.

4. Training or advanced training of police personnel can also be carried out by agreement in appropriate educational institutions in other states.

### **Article 18: Police Uniforms**

1. A description of police uniforms and insignia and procedures governing the wearing of them are determined by the Estonian Republic Government.

2. The name and rank of each police officer should be worn in a visible place on his uniform.

### **Article 19: Conditions and Regulations of Police Service**

The conditions and regulations of police service are established by the Police Service Charter, which is approved by the Estonian Republic Government.

## **Chapter VII: State Protection, Responsibility of Police Personnel and Social Guarantees for Police Personnel**

### **Article 20: Legal Protection and Guarantees Governing Activities by Police Personnel**

1. In the performance of his duties a police officer is a representative of state authority and compliance with his legitimate demands and instructions is mandatory for all citizens and public officials. Police personnel are under the protection of the state and their honor and dignity are protected by law.

2. Police personnel have a right to form trade unions to protect their rights and interests.

3. Political parties, public organizations and social movements and their members do not have a right to interfere in the work of police personnel or give them orders.



4. No one has the right to require police personnel to perform functions which are not the responsibility of the police under the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic.

5. In the event that a police officer receives an order or instruction which is in contradiction to the law he is to be guided by the law.

6. In the event that a police officer dies while performing his official duties the state will pay his dependents a one-time payment equal to his salary for 10 years (120 months); in the event that a police officer become disabled and unable to work he will be compensated in accordance with current legislation.

#### **Article 21: Responsibility of the Police Officer**

1. Under the laws and other standardizing acts of the Estonian Republic a police officer bears responsibility, including material responsibility, for illegal acts or failure to act.

2. Compliance with an illegal order or instruction does not relieve a police officer of responsibility for his actions.

3. A police officer will serve any prison sentence incurred for the commission of a criminal act under the same conditions as other prisoners.

4. Citizen complaints regarding actions by a police officer are considered and decisions in regard to them made by the head of the police facility in which the police officer works. In the event of disagreement with the decision which is made the citizen may appeal to higher-level police authorities or to an organ which is competent to investigate police activities, or he may turn to the courts.

#### **Article 22: Provision of Housing to Police Officers**

1. If necessary police officers will be provided with housing in connection with their official duties.

2. The executive organ of local government supplies constables and precinct officers with official living quarters in their zone of service.

#### **Article 23: Salaries of Police Officers**

1. The salary conditions and tax obligation of police officers are determined by the Estonian Republic Government.

2. Police officers shall work an eight-hour work day or a 40-hour work week. If necessary police officers may by decision of the head of their police facility be assigned to work beyond this standard work period. Work by police officers at night, on weekends and during official holidays and overtime work will result in bonus pay. The amount of this bonus pay and procedures for payment of it are to be established by the Estonian Republic Government.

### **Chapter VIII: Police Financing and Material-Technical Supply**

#### **Article 24: Police Financing**

1. The police are financed:

(1) out of the Estonian Republic State Budget and local budgets;

(2) out of funds received as a result of contracts concluded according to established procedure;

(3) out of nonbudgetary capital, special-purpose funds and other receipts.

2. The police subunits and services listed in the second part of Article 2 of the present law are to be maintained with funds from the local budget.

3. Subunits responsible for the security of special sites will be maintained with funds received on the basis of contracts.

4. Nonbudgetary funds will be used for material-technical supply of the police and incentives for police officers.

5. The number of police personnel to be financed out of the Estonian Republic State Budget is to be determined by the Estonian Republic Government.

6. The number of police personnel financed out of the local budget is to be determined by the local government after consultation with the prefect.

#### **Article 25: Material-Technical Supply of the Police**

1. The police's material-technical supply will be provided with funds allocated for the financing of police facilities.

2. The Estonian Republic Minister of Internal Affairs will be responsible for the supply of uniforms, weapons, ammunition, operational equipment, communications equipment, information technology and special means to the police.

3. The system and standards of material-technical supply to the police are to be established by the Estonian Republic Government at the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs.

A. Ruutel, chairman,  
Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet;  
Tallinn, 20 September 1990.

### **Former Major Describes Political Conflict With Latvian KGB**

91UF0047A Riga *ATMODA* in Latvian No 37,  
21 Aug 90 p 11

[Interview with V. Rudans by Mikhail Bombin: "Organ, or Special Service?"]

[Text] These days, no one is surprised any more by interviews with former employees of security services.

The socialist system is collapsing before us, and gone is the unfulfilled dream of communism. Today, we can speak of the "idea of communism" as having been in the past, but we cannot say the same about the embodiments of this idea—the CPSU and the KGB. For although there is a crisis in its credibility, the Communist Party still has almost unlimited power, and is striving with all its might to preserve this power. All governmental administrative institutions still remain in the hands of the CPSU, including the KGB.

Ever since Oleg Kalugin's testimony appeared in the mass media, it seems that it is difficult to say anything new about the KGB as a whole. Therefore, in our talk with former Latvian SSR KGB Major V. Rudans, we only touched on matters specific to the Republic of Latvia.

[ATMODA] Mr. Rudans, please tell us about the conflict with your former employers.

[Rudans] This conflict, if it can be called that, began in 1988. I took the national reawakening of the Latvian people seriously. In 1988 I opposed the campaign of persecution launched at that time against Anatolijs Gorbunovs, and wrote an article about it for the wall newspaper of my department. A few days later, in accordance with instructions from our superiors, the newspaper was liquidated. The next conflictual situation came to a head in 1989 when I was working in the department investigating the processes occurring in the National Independence Movement of Latvia. When I began this work, I was not an adherent of the ideas of the National Independence Movement of Latvia, and assigned myself only one task—to honestly determine just what sort of movement it was. For the most part, I had to conduct analytic work, which included using secret sources of information. I came to the conclusion that contrary to what we were being told, the National Independence Movement of Latvia was not an anticonstitutional force. I did not conceal my conclusions, and even made them known to my immediate superiors. At the same time, I also began propounding the thesis of de-ideologizing the KGB.

[ATMODA] Pardon me for interrupting, but are you a member of the CPSU?

[Rudans] No, I am no longer a member of the CPSU; I have joined the Independent Communist Party of Latvia. It is precisely this that was used as the pretext for retiring me from the KGB. At least, that is what the official documents indicated. Of course, I also encountered opposition in connection with de-ideologization. My "matter" was reviewed several times, and there were also some talks in person. By 1989, I had gotten two "public" reprimands—a Party reprimand and a service reprimand. My conduct during a plenum of the (at that time still united) Latvian CP Central Committee served as the pretext. I refused to participate in a so-called

"patrol." A "patrol" in *chekist* parlance is a group that sees to the security of the participants of a sociopolitical event—in particular, a Central Committee plenum. Let me add that even *chekists* themselves do not always appreciate what dangers these people face... I refused and was punished, but after this incident the leadership began to see the light. As far as I know, after this incident, "patrols" were no longer organized. The culmination of the conflict came in the spring of 1990 when, following the split in the Communist Party of Latvia, I became a follower of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia.

[ATMODA] But each person can choose the party of his liking...

[Rudans] That is not the case with *chekists*. At least, not yet it is not. The mere fact that unlike Rubiks' party, the Independent Communist Party of Latvia supports the independence of the Republic, served as the pretext for the deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR KGB (this term is used despite the fact that the Republic of Latvia has been in existence since 4 May), General Major Chervinskiy, to write a petition—an official document to the KGB cadre administration—requesting I be retired. In this document, two "charges" were brought against me—the intention to join the Independent Communist Party, and the incident mentioned above.

[ATMODA] Did you get any support from KGB employees? Did any of them share your beliefs?

[Rudans] Before I answer this question, a little should be said about the specific traits of KGB employees. Although exceptions are of course possible, the people who end up there are not of just any character. KGB employees know that they are working in an extremely politicized structural unit of the state. (The paradox of the KGB lies in the fact that, although this committee is a structural unit of the state, it is at the same time extremely politicized—politicization being the concerted influence of a single party. For the time being, no tendencies indicating any retreat from this tendency are evident.) Therefore, I could not have hoped for anyone to publicly support my opinions.

[ATMODA] Last Monday you turned in your KGB identity card. What are you now, and how might your situation develop in the future?

[Rudans] For the time being I am unemployed. I consider my good command of German to be my trump for the future. I acquired it during the four and a half years I spent in what used to be the GDR on assignment from my institution. I was one of the USSR KGB representatives in the former GDR Ministry for State Security.

[ATMODA] Mr. Rudans, please tell us about your most recent work in the KGB. If possible, let us touch on 1985, when you worked in the department of religious affairs.

[Rudans] At the end of 1985 I returned from East Germany and was assigned to work in the 5th Department (now the "Department for the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional System"). At that time, there was a very broad spectrum of work being done in religious affairs. Actually, the same situation exists today, although the USSR KGB leadership denies it. I really do not know why the "higher comrades in Moscow" allow such an obvious contradiction between words and deeds. I will tell you about what I myself had to do: In the beginning, my purview was over Evangelical Christians—so-called Pentecostals; and later on, Baptists. After having delved into these matters, I came to the conclusion that the work of *chekists* in this environment had no future. It became clear to me why the Pentecostals wanted to emigrate from the USSR: It has to do with the decades-long persecution of this sect. To the extent possible, I tried to help them. I do not want to exaggerate my deeds, but for whatever it is worth, I was able to help the families of the noted Pentecostal sons Goretikh and Voborikin to emigrate.

[ATMODA] On 4 May, the Supreme Soviet of Latvia ratified the Declaration of Independence. How was this event received by employees of the KGB? Did it not cause discord among them along the lines of nationality or political opinion?

[Rudans] I do not think that any discord within the Latvian KGB has occurred, and it is doubtful that there will be any in the near future. Actually, already since the end of 1917—that is, since the KGB's establishment—to this day, our security services have not corresponded to their names. They have always been institutions that see to the security not of the state, but of the party organs. The tragedy of the KGB lies in the fact that, judging from recent events, it is unable to overcome its monoparty inclination. In my opinion, sooner or later, the KGB will have to do so—the later, the worse for the committee. In this regard, some symptomatic indications are evident, though they are attributable not to the leadership, but to the rank and file. I believe the first thing to do would be to abolish the CPSU party cells.

[ATMODA] Until recently, the KGB actively recruited informants—known by the people as *stukachi*. As far as I know, from 1970 to 1986, a huge number of informants were recruited. Even children were not spared this bitter cup. Has this practice been preserved?

[Rudans] This is a difficult question to answer. If we examine the KGB as a special service in the generally accepted meaning of the term, then I have to say that the use of various secret sources of information—including agencies—is one of the fundamentals in the activity of special services. Therefore, to oppose this kind of activity would mean to oppose the activity of special services as a whole. It would seem that the question is not that certain persons are secretly cooperating with the committee; the question is, in what way these people are being used, what sort of information they are acquiring,

and how this information is being appraised—whether objectively, or tendentiously—as the KGB has done so often in the past.

[ATMODA] As someone who has had dealings with the KGB and the infamous Article 190, I am really curious: The KGB employees who for years hunted "underground publications" and tracked down books, or in other words, deliberately prevented us access to information—what are they doing now? It is hard to believe that these people could suddenly have "restructured" themselves and are now in every way possible honorably working in the name of the general welfare. Given that such "cadres" have been preserved, what in your opinion are the chances for restructuring in the KGB—something its leadership so enjoys debating.

[Rudans] I agree with this assessment. Both the all-union and the republic KGB leadership have not changed their position. For example, I just cannot understand how someone like Bobkov—who spent his whole "conscious life" combatting dissidents—can remain in his post of first deputy to Kryuchkov. That to me is the most graphic evidence that the KGB is for now unable to overcome its old deleterious ways. But again, let me emphasize that they have no other choice. If in a year's time the KGB is unable to "overcome itself," then the question of its abolishment will only be natural.

[ATMODA] In this regard, is the KGB even needed at all?

[Rudans] I do not know whether the KGB is needed. But these days, security institutions are indispensable to independent states. And they will be indispensable to those states that will form in the territory of the present-day USSR, and of course, to Russia also. What they will be like—that is a "personal matter" of these states. In my opinion, the Republic of Latvia should start thinking about what kind of special services it will need. Experience shows that a special service is an expensive commodity for the state. But I have never heard of a state that managed without one. Of course, the new state will have to consider the experience of the *cheka* and similar "organs," and will have to make some inferences. First of all, greater attention must be paid to the selection of cadres—moreover, in a way diametrically opposed to that of the KGB's. No less important would be the organization of strong control by the Parliament over the activities of the services from the very time of their creation. In my opinion, that will encourage a more humane bent in the activities of future security services.

[ATMODA] Have you felt any "punitive actions" on the part of your former colleagues?

[Rudans] Not so far. I would like to believe none will happen in the future, either. I do not intend to reveal any state secrets, talk about concrete individuals who provide information, nor about people who are under the attention of the KGB.

[ATMODA] What is your assessment of the legal harassment begun against your former colleague, Oleg Kalugin?

[Rudmans] I have read several publications [on the matter]. I could put my signature to any one of them.

"Kalugin's epopee" attests to the fact that the USSR KGB leadership has not even reached the 1985 level of thinking. Needless to say, I do not see anything punishable in what General Kalugin said.

[ATMODA] Thank you for an interesting conversation.

**Salykov Reports UNEP Plans for Environmental Project Assistance***91WN0067A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 90 Union Edition p 4*

[Interview with K. S. Salykov, head of delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources, by G. Stepanov, under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Interview"; date, place, and occasion not specified]

[Text] The ecological disasters which have turned enormous areas of the Soviet Union into empty, dying lands have never been strictly its own internal affair. The international community has long been seriously concerned about the continuing destruction of nature in the regions of Lake Baikal, the Aral Sea, and the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. But forms of real help by the international community have only begun to take shape in recent years. The recent trip to Kenya by a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources, made at the invitation of the executive director of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), Mustafa Tolba, was devoted to increasing the effectiveness of this help. The IZVESTIYA correspondent asked the head of the delegation, K. S. Salykov to tell about the results of the cooperation with UNEP.

[Salykov] In the fall of 1989, M. Tolba visited the USSR. It was at that time that I asked him to include the problem of the Aral in his program. In January 1990 M. Tolba and V. F. Petrovskiy, the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, signed a document on cooperation in formulating a plan of action to restore the Aral Sea.

We are now holding a competition to develop a plan for saving the Aral, and already more than 200 works of Soviet scientists and specialists have been submitted. Several of the best of them will be selected before the end of this year, and an international group of experts under the aegis of UNEP will study them in early 1991.

[Stepanov] How was the trip to Kenya, and what were its results?

[Salykov] Working meetings were held at the UNEP staff headquarters in Nairobi with M. Tolba and his deputies and leaders of the main UNEP subdivisions. We were shown programs conducted by UNEP such as, for example, the Global Natural Resources Data Base, the International Environmental Information System, and others. As a result of consultations which ended with the signing of a joint protocol, we reached several basic agreements. First, the UNEP leadership agreed that the Aral Project must be accelerated and its legal status enhanced. Thus there appeared in the UNEP structure the Center for the Aral Sea, and its staff will not be individual experts, but rather a permanent working group of specialists. The project will be substantially expanded by inclusion in it of several topics that were omitted initially. On our part, a number of additional

work-performing organizations will also be included in it, for example the department for emergency situations, which was recently created in the Council of Ministers. UNESCO and other UN organizations may possibly make their contribution to carrying out the project. The amount of financial investment in the project will be increased and our ecology center created in the city of Nukus near the Aral will also receive material aid from UNEP. The main thing we have to do is eliminate the consequences of desertification in this region.

Secondly, UNEP agreed to help us overcome the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. A detailed joint plan of action will be formulated in the first half of 1991. Thirdly, UNEP will take part in work to prevent Lake Baikal from becoming polluted. Some countries have already expressed a desire to cooperate with us to perform this task, and UNEP may assume the role of coordinator.

**IAEA Radiation Monitoring Work in USSR Detailed***91WN0067B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by M. Korolev, I. Melnikov, and A. Simurov: "Chernobyl Order: 'Our Motto Is Openness'"]

[Text] If we could use some supersensitive instrument to draw a curve which describes the behavior of people in the zone sprinkled with Chernobyl ash, something incredibly complicated and dancing diabolically would come out. It would reflect secrecy and cover-up, breakthroughs of parliamentary and public rally glasnost, disputes among scientists, people's health, the condition of the animal and plant world, political ambitions of leaders and social organization leaders. And the Lord knows what else...

All this appears clearly, visibly, and tangibly when you meet people in Belorussia, in the strictly controlled zones. In the eyes and words of the people you talk with, you see and hear that they don't believe the politicians, or the medical workers, or the journalists. And they add: we don't believe even our own, people born and bred here. Let's have foreign independent experts!

In Bragin and Cherikov one of us observed the work of a group of foreign specialists headed by an Austrian, Rudolf Hohman. To each of the people who had sat before the measuring instruments in the microbus for a while, they explained the instruments' readings, which were run through an "electronic brain." And again people doubted. Not only because increased doses of radiation were not registered, but also because the figures coincided with the data of the local rayon hospital.

The representatives of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] should be given due credit. Scientists from 20 countries trade off with one another and day after day scrupulously examine people and livestock farms, visit homes, farms, hospitals, and work places,

take thousands and thousands of samples, and gather up individual dosimeters passed out earlier. And all this is sent by plane in special containers to the IAEA laboratory near Vienna, with the active participation of Irzha Viranek, the head of the IAEA Mobile Staff Headquarters in Gomel.

If once again we mentally draw one more curve—the paths of charitable aid (both our own and foreign) for those who suffered from the Chernobyl disaster, we discover that the second curve is in no way superimposed upon the first one and does not coincide with it. Not in terms of time, scale, or succession. Is distrust perhaps one of the reasons for this?

Judging from everything, the desire to calm the population also dictated the recent report in the Belorussian press by the Belorussian SSR State Committee on Problems of Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster. Among the different questions, it says, international experts are supposed to give answers to the following, in particular:

How accurate are the methods used up to now to determine individual and collective radiation doses?

Is there clear evidence that signs which are deadly to health have increased among the population in regions where more radioactive fall-out occurred as compared with regions with a lower degree of contamination?

Do the data gathered by independent groups correspond with that accumulated by Soviet experts in the past four years?

Looking for answers to these questions, we also met with Doctor Pierre-Robert Danezi and his associates in Seibersdorf—an IAEA laboratory was set up there.

Finding the road from Vienna to Seibersdorf was not simple, and after entering the director's office, we could not restrain from joking: so the laboratory is hidden away!

"Really?" Danezi shrugged his shoulders and turned to his deputy, Yugoslav physicist Vlado Valkovich. "We've been working together here for almost four years now and we didn't notice. The slogan of our laboratory is openness. It always has been since the laboratory was first founded in the summer of 1962 in the tiny Lower Austrian village of Seibersdorf. The place was built on a large scale because the United States gave 600,000 dollars and other IAEA countries turned over experimental equipment free of charge. The Austrian government set a symbolic lease payment for the large land area, charging the agency 1 shilling a year.

"There are now three departments operating within the framework of this scientific institution. One of them, the guarantee analysis laboratory, specializes in isotope and

chemical analysis of samples of atomic material taken by the IAEA while inspecting atomic installations in dozens of states."

From the director's window, we could see a group of young people in white gowns going to the experimental field. From the color of their skin, it was not difficult to guess that they represented different continents. They were trainees. In the laboratory they learn methods of improving grain varieties using mutations induced by radiation. Indeed, the trainees in the entomology section also return to their native lands as good magicians. After mastering the methods of sterilization of insect pests using radiation, they give invaluable help to farmers. Here are just two examples. The fruit fly has almost vanished in Mexico, and that means half a billion dollars of additional profits a year for the country. The population of Tsetse flies, the scourge of local animal husbandry, has been destroyed in Nigeria in an agricultural zone with an area of 1,500 square kilometers.

Turning our attention to the group of trainees, P.-R. Danezi notes:

"No question, theoretical formulations and experiments are held in high regard in the laboratory, but all the same we consider our main tasks to be training specialists from 'third world' countries and improving the qualifications of young scientists. Trainees are working on a whole range of problems, but special attention is being given to dosimetry, the study of radioactivity, and substantiation of basic standards compulsory for the IAEA member-countries. The laboratory formulates these methods and uses them itself. So we are the dictators of fashion in our scientific field."

We inquire, how are materials and developments distributed to clients—free of charge or on a commercial basis? It is explained that the developing countries receive everything free of charge. Moreover, subsidies are even given for some programs, and representatives of certain countries are permitted to visit IAEA and discuss questions which arise. But a commercial basis is also offered in the agency's activity. Thus, within the framework of the "analytical quality control" program, standard materials are sold for 40 dollars a unit. At the same time, similar materials from the National Bureau of Standards of the United States cost 100-200 dollars a piece.

Within the laboratory's walls, about 100 people go through training every year and learn methods which are new to them, determining the content of radionuclides in soil and food products, for example. After receiving their diplomas following exams, they are able to work at the level imposed by IAEA. The laboratory gives them the ability to use modern instruments and introduces them to progressive methods.

Other forms of training cadres are also used: interregional educational courses; and the group training method, where five or six IAEA specialists study a certain practical problem together for half a year. Here

mentor relations, the transmission of know-how firsthand, and direct observation of unusual experiments are given free range.

As we can see, specialists of the highest qualifications are participating in the project "Ecological Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster." The person we were talking with called this project a "pulsating" one, thereby emphasizing its intensity and uniqueness.

"The project was not on the IAEA calendar and in general it is fundamentally new," Doctor Danezi reflects aloud. "The first step toward this was made in October 1989, when the USSR government asked the agency to conduct an independent expert examination of Chernobyl. Since that time, several influential international organizations have worked on the project, and our laboratory has become a kind of working spoke in this wheel. We use every means to try to help the independent experts, who are headed by Professor Itsudzo Sigmatsu, director of the research fund on radiation effects in Hiroshima. The task of the expert group includes collecting materials and analyzing the information obtained—on radiation doses, on the content of radionuclides in food products, and the like. The conclusions will be made after careful study which rules out subjectivity in opinions. That is especially important for the victims, since quite a considerable number of them, as we know, distrust the results of studies done by their own specialists.

"We are specifically defining the nature of contamination of the environment according to components," Danezi explained. "These are radioactive contamination of soil, plants, and underground water. The same principle is the basis for studying the impact on people's health of rare elements which are accumulated or migrate in nature.

"Our laboratory is also charged with combining the data obtained, analyzing it, and then summarizing it. The very difficult work began several months ago, with no allowance for mistakes. It will last a long time and the first results will be clear only by the very end of the year."

The laboratory's director does not exaggerate the difficulty of the task it faces. The samples are marked secretly so that the person studying them does not know where they were sent from, from the contamination zone or from a clean zone, or perhaps he got a control sample from who-knows-where. Usually it is dry milk, dried grass, a clump of soil, or filters from the air and water systems of the Chernobyl zone. The results of these analyses done outside the laboratory are gathered in Seibersdorf. It is there that they are then processed and the quality of the work is checked.

Without knowing the data on the concentration of radionuclides in the samples sent, the laboratory associates will also send them anonymously for analysis to scientists of various countries which have offered their services voluntarily and free of charge. The information

material accumulated will go for identification, and only afterwards will be announced according to the appropriate IAEA standards.

"Our agency's specialists," emphasizes Danezi, "are aware that the materials from Chernobyl are unique to the highest degree, and analysis of them in various corners of the world is an unprecedented experiment in international cooperation among scientists."

In order to become familiar with the character as well as the technical level of the instruments and methods which Soviet scientific organizations use in their work, the IAEA experts and their independent colleagues have made and will continue to make trips to Belorussia and the Ukraine. Verifying compliance with standard procedures for selecting samples for analysis is also part of the experts' task. An expert examination has already been done to determine whether the characteristics of the samples and measurements taken by IAEA specialists at particular points match the data given in dosimetry maps published in the USSR.

One of the key tasks of the agency's scientists was measuring the radiation doses people have received and are receiving. In doing so, they also take into account the doses included with contaminated foodstuffs. All the work is done in close contact with Soviet scientists and encompasses the regions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the RSFSR which have suffered.

Many subdivisions of the Seibersdorf complex are involved in fulfilling the "Chernobyl order." Thus, in the food cycle laboratory we were shown samples of products from Belorussia, from the Ukraine, and from the Bryansk region. A comprehensive analysis of them will provide a picture which reflects the situation in regions affected by the disaster.

Painstaking work to interpret the incoming information is ahead. The results of the research are important to a broad circle of specialists, especially medical workers. The prestige the laboratory has achieved over the decades creates an atmosphere of trust. Scientists throughout the world have good reason for believing that the Seibersdorf data is irrefragable.

The hours in Seibersdorf flew by unnoticed. When the long line of research offices and chambers—radiation defense, dosimetry, and many others—was behind us, we asked Doctor Danezi a few more questions.

"How are the interrelationships between the laboratory and the neighboring population being structured?"

"Work is done in the physical-chemical research wing on a level not exceeding the natural radioactivity background," the director answered concretely. "Analytical groups deal with preparations which have a higher level of radioactivity. But the protection methods used and the professionalism of the associates have as yet given rise to no conflicts with the local population. Representatives of the Austrian federal Ministry for Health and

Environmental Protection visit the laboratory and study the documentation, methodological recommendations, and procedures for conducting experiments. Up to now there have been no misunderstandings. The laboratory has been declared extra-territorial, and we have the right not to invite Austrian experts. But they are frequent guests here and we show them how we work; that promotes mutual understanding."

"In some places the idea is expressed: how much can the IAEA experts be trusted? And don't they have a heightened interest in using the contaminated territories as a unique research ground; doesn't that lead to dragging out the work?"

"The objectivity of the conclusions is based on a comparison of data obtained by IAEA associates and by independent experts. In addition, the agency cannot help but value its reputation. When the project is over, the results will be published, and each person who wishes may familiarize himself with the methods for conducting the analyses and calculations."

"Do the specialists see realistic ways to overcome radiophobia among the people?"

"The question is very complicated," answers Doctor Danezi after pondering a moment. "However, if we return again to the Chernobyl experience, in the groups of experts who are traveling to the USSR, there are psychologists who are directly involved in working on this problem. Their recommendations will be included in the final report. I hope that they will identify realistic ways to get rid of groundless fear among the people on the basis of the real picture."

In bidding farewell, Doctor Danezi said:

"You can visit us any time and receive the information you are interested in. IAEA policy is openness and free access to the facts which the public needs."

### **Official Urges Changes in National, Local Environmental Protection Structure**

91WN0030A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 38, Sep 90 pp 10-11

[Article under the rubric of "Problems of Ecology" by A. Tsygankov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations of the USSR Council of Ministers: "Nature Is Still Hoping"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The union republics are acquiring sovereignty and full economic independence. All natural resources are being transferred to republic ownership, and their transfer to Union jurisdiction is possible only under lease conditions, as for example, in the RSFSR. How should the rights and the responsibility for environmental protection matters now be divided between the center and the local organs of power? The question is

extremely important: the future of many generations depends on whether we are able to find the correct answer to it.

The current system was established a total of two years ago. Its structure presumed a network of unified environmental protection organs, which monitor at the local level all the parts of the biosphere—bodies of water, the air and land resources. However, agencies concerned with fishing and land, as well as other organs, have been reluctant to hand over their functions and staffs to the environmental protection system. The Kostroma authorities proposed the establishment of a fully unified service, but the Union Minrybkhov (Ministry of the Fish Industry) and Goskomles (State Committee for Forestry) objected. That same fate befell an initiative by the Kamchatka authorities. One would hope that all this was in the past; based on the laws which have been adopted, the Union republics can now use their own authority to establish unified environmental protection organs. Will they want to? Or will departmental ambitions once again prove stronger?

And now with regard to the mutual relations of the republics and the center. They will hardly develop constructively if the deputy corps and executive organs do not recognize that nature is one and does not take administrative boundaries into consideration. Life shows that, alas, not everyone understands this. Here are just two examples. Kaspvodnadzor, the unified organ established to monitor the state of the Caspian Sea, has been eliminated. The result will hardly be positive. Goskompriroda (USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature) discussed the idea of a single monitoring service for the Baltic Sea, but this was rejected by the Baltic republics. Maybe this is to be expected; maybe this a natural process by which central organs which no one needs have begun to wither away?

I have had occasion to participate in all of the more or less serious organizational changes in the environmental protection organs during the last decade, and I am convinced that the center must and can play a worthy role in the new system. Above all, it retains the state ecological expertise in systems for developing and siting productive forces, especially major facilities of economic importance; after all, in this process one needs to take into account negative consequences for countries other than our own.

It is essential to create a nationwide system to collect, process and analyze data on the state of the environment and the use of natural resources. This information is necessary when providing information to the public and when preparing annual reports for international organizations. If we do in fact support the concept of stable development put forward by the International Commission on the Environment and Development, then we must coordinate the ecological consequences of every republic's economy policy. At the same time, it is completely realistic to think of achieving a reasonable combination of decentralization, on the one hand, in the



administration of resource-utilization with regard to resources which are vitally necessary for the local population, and, on the other hand, effective monitoring of strategic resources, which ensure the stable position in the international community of the Union and of each republic as well.

Finally, it is necessary to understand that the health of our descendants depends on the species diversity of plants and animals more than on the extra ton of steel or kilowatt of energy per capita. And this kind of diversity can be preserved if we can create specially protected territories and make the transition to more rational economic activity in all places, and not just in individual "principalities."

The republic is becoming the real master of territory and resources; this means that the role of its planning organs is increasing sharply. In my view, it is these organs which must determine the scheduled figures on the reduction of waste for every enterprise located within the territory of the republic. USSR Gosplan will allot the funds for environmental protection in those regions which, on the basis of Union legislative acts, will be recognized as ecological disaster zones.

The main burden of monitoring the state of nature and the fulfillment of environmental protection measures rests with the local environmental protection organs, which are directly linked to the soviets of people's deputies. They draw conclusions on the possibility of developing industrial production units. In the past the leaders of industrial enterprises kept the public ignorant of the negative ecological consequences of production, and today that public no longer believes the promises that modern equipment and technology make it possible to create safe sites for the neutralization of toxic wastes, for example. But in a situation of political demagoguery there are few who will agree to this choice of site. Under conditions of complete glasnost and objectivity the republic must get local organs to agree, of course, with a guarantee of comprehensive and constant monitoring. Otherwise, obstinacy will lead sooner or later to the death of both people and of nature.

It is the local organ which must become the main source of information on the state of the natural environment, on emergency ecological situations and the measures which must be taken. Unfortunately, people now prefer to "go to the top" immediately even on those questions which can be resolved only at the local level. This is evidence of the soviets' incomplete utilization of their executive potential.

Of course, it is necessary to provide information not only to the public but also to the environmental protection structures at all levels. A steady flow of data on the content of pollution in the water, air, soil and foodstuffs is essential. At present a great deal of information comes from subdivisions of USSR Goskomgidromet (State

Committee for Hydrometeorology), which has an extensive network for the collection and analysis of information throughout the country. However, a proposal has already been made in the RSFSR to transform USSR Goskomgidromet into a republic-level organ. When resolving the question of its status, it would be no sin to think not only about political motives but also about scientific realities. Weather and climate are not formed according to directions from "all-knowing" authorities; they depend on global and cosmic processes.

In September of this year the USSR Academy of Sciences, along with USSR Minzdrav (Ministry of Health), USSR Goskompriroda and other ministries and agencies, will introduce into the USSR Council of Ministers proposals concerning the establishment of an All-Union Chemical-Analytical Center for Operational Ecological Monitoring. It will include scientific-research institutes which will have the most skilled personnel and newest equipment, their branches in various regions, as well as systems for selecting samples for analysis and for delivering them. Lessons from the events in Gorlovka, Dvinskaya Guba and other places have shown that when an effective analysis is needed, a great deal of time is spent on coordination.

It is clear that the mutual relations between the republics and the Union environmental protection committees need rethinking, and their structure needs changing. For example, during discussions in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources a proposal was made to make the Main State Ecological Expert Commission into an independent organization and to transfer to it the staff and appropriations from the expert offices of those ministries and agencies which are being closed down. Given that the ecological consequences of mistaken economic decisions are extremely serious, the work of an independent State Ecological Expert Commission could have a noticeable impact even in the immediate future. At the same time the Union organ would not play a command role—it could become a methodology and coordinating center, and if necessary, it would act as an arbiter.

In short, there has emerged a real prospect for radical improvement in the organization of the environmental protection system. It would seem that it is time for the leaders of the republic-level committees and the Union ecological organs to sit down together and talk.

#### **Deputy Minister Assesses Pollution Impact on Public Health**

*91WN0120A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 90  
Second Edition p 6*

[Interview with A. Kondrusev by N. Gogol: "Poison Without Illusions: Who Will Guarantee the Right to Health?"]

[Text] A reader of us from Dnepropetrovsk is convinced that he became disabled as a result of many years of mercury poisoning while he was working in a harmful

production area. But he cannot prove that he is correct either at the enterprise or in court... There has been no ending to the battles surrounding the plant engaged in the production of protein-vitamin concentrates in Kirishi. The public has demanded the closing down of the plant, but, according to specialists from VNIIsintezbelok [All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Protein Synthesis], the detrimental effect of production on the environment has been greatly exaggerated, and, in their opinion, the plant must continue operating... Who will judge these and many other disputes? My conversational partner asserts that a critical need has developed for enacting the principles of sanitation legislation for the USSR and the union republics, without which the resolution of the tremendous number of problems that are threatening society and specific individuals is impossible. I give the floor to A. Kondrusev, USSR Chief State Sanitation Physician, USSR Deputy Minister of Health.

[A. Kondrusev] Among the 60 most highly developed countries in the world, our country is in 54th place with regard to life expectancy for men and 47th place for women. Moreover, the situation is worsening from year to year. During the past 20 years the overall mortality rate of the population increased from 8.2 to 10.1 per 1000 inhabitants. The infant mortality rate is 22.7 per 1000 live births. One of the important reasons for the increased disease rate and the low life expectancy is the extremely unsatisfactory state of sanitation, as well as the ecological situation that has developed in the USSR.

In our country more than 40 million people live in cities where the level of pollution of the atmospheric air sometimes is 10 times higher than the standard. As a result, in those cities the disease rate of the population for certain diseases is higher than the nationwide indicator by a factor of 1.5-2 or more.

According to data provided by the laboratories at sanitation and epidemiology stations, every fourth sampling of the drinking water in the water-supply system shows that, with regard to chemical readings, the water fails to meet the sanitation requirements and can be dangerous to the health.

A substantial influence is exerted on the population's health by improper nutrition and the quality of food products. The results of analyses of food products attest to the fact that a considerable number of them are contaminated by foreign substances that are dangerous to the health.

Can it be that no one in our country is working on these problems? No, the USSR operates 4478 sanitation and epidemiology stations and 546 decontamination stations, it has 65,000 specialists...

[N. Gogol] Why, then, hasn't their work made our life, if we can express it this way, ecologically safe?

[A. Kondrusev] One of the main reasons is that the country lacks a legislative act regulating the relations in

the area of guaranteeing sanitation and epidemiological safety, as a single legal basis.

In the legislative acts that are currently in effect, there is no legal assertion of the responsibility borne by all the state agencies for failure to fulfill the requirements of the normative documents, and there is a lack of any legal guarantees for the activities of, or the legal protection of, officials, including the main state sanitation physicians.

In the Principles of the Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republic With Regard to Public Health, the articles that pertain to the country's sanitation and epidemiological safety are, for the most part, of a declarative nature. The fundamental questions of protecting people's health are regulated, practically speaking, by legally binding acts—governmental decrees or the government-approved Statute Governing State Sanitation Inspection in the USSR—but the country lacks an effective mechanism for administering the sanitation-and-epidemiological and radiation situation. As a consequence, the governmental decrees governing the protection of the environment, the improvement of working and everyday living conditions, etc., which defined the specific tasks for the ministries and departments and for the Councils of Ministers of the union republics, were executed in an extremely unsatisfactory manner. They did not have any material, economic, or legal foundation under them.

Many aspects of the law and legally binding acts that are in effect are now obsolete and fail to reflect the changes in the sanitation-and-epidemiological and radiation situation in the country, which has become greatly aggravated as a result of the Chernobyl accident, or the threat of the spread of AIDS.

Putting it more succinctly, there is now a vital need to create a nationwide legislative act that would resolve these and other questions. The work on this act has been carried out for the past three years by a commission under the USSR Ministry of Health.

The resultant draft of the principles of sanitation legislation for the USSR and the union republics proceeds from the assumption that the guaranteeing of the sanitation-and-epidemiological and radiation safety of the population acts as a guarantee of the constitutional right of USSR citizens to the protection of their health.

To prevent this right from becoming just the latest in a series of declarations, a number of conditions have been stipulated. For example, the right of citizens to receive complete, reliable information concerning the state of the environment and the epidemiological situation, and their influence upon people's health, and concerning the results of hygienic and other special surveys. Furthermore, the right of citizens to participate in the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of the fulfillment of decisions, if their implementation is linked with an effect exerted on the public's health or on the environment. The right of citizens to be compensated for the damages linked with the impairment of their health by

all types of effects exerted by the projects in the environment. And, finally, the opportunity to complain directly to the court concerning the actions of state agencies and officials who infringe upon these rights.

For the first time in the practice of Soviet legislation, provision is made for a system of measures of legal and economic responsibility for the damages inflicted on people's health as a consequence of the unfavorable factors in the environment. Also, there have been formulated for the first time the guarantees of the independence of the main state sanitation physicians, which independence is assured, in particular, by the banning of improper interference in their activities and by the establishment of responsibility for violating it.

A new system has been proposed for the imposition of fines—their size depends not upon the level of the main state sanitation physician (of the USSR, the union and autonomous republics, the krays and oblasts, cities, and rayons), as has been the case up until now, but, instead, it is established in accordance with the violation. There has been a sharp increase in the size of the fine imposed on officials (up to 1000 rubles) and on citizens (up to 200 rubles).

[N. Gogol] With the increase in the independence of the republics and the corresponding increase in the role played by the republic ministries of health, won't a law that has been engendered in Moscow be perceived as an alien, unnecessary one?

[A. Kondrusev] Well, first of all, the law was not created behind the scenes. In response to the draft of the Principles that we sent to the outlying areas, we received replies by the Councils of Ministers of eleven republics (we did not receive any materials from Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia) and the ministries of health of all the union republics. Practically all the republics that took part in the discussion of the legislative bill were in favor of preserving the country's single sanitation-and-epidemiological service with vertical subordination to a superior agency and to the Soviets of People's Deputies, and this has a completely sound foundation under it.

Take, for example, the ecological problems. Frequently the scope of these problems extends beyond the confines of a particular region or republic. Consequently, in order to resolve them it is necessary to centralize the efforts, and means. Or take such a problem as the spread of AIDS. Confining it to a republic-level ministry of health is equivalent to deliberately depriving one's own patients of the necessary skilled aid.

Without a doubt, in guaranteeing the public's sanitation-and-epidemiological safety there are a large number of questions that ought to be resolved on a nationwide level. For example, such a necessary thing as the organizing of nationwide registries and the administration of the state system of hygienic regulation and registration of chemicals. The resolution of these questions at a nationwide level will preclude the duplication in the union

republics, and will guarantee the high scientific level of research and an economizing of the funds.

It would be desirable also to conduct at a nationwide level the planning of the fundamental scientific research, thus making it possible to save tremendous amounts of money for the country as a whole, and also to organize emergency aid in the event that any emergency situations develop, in areas of an ecological disaster, etc.

In this process, of course, a considerable number of questions must move into the jurisdiction of the republics, which will resolve them with a consideration of the peculiarities of their own regions, on the basis of a Union Treaty.

[N. Gogol] The implementation of any law requires additional financing, and the proposed draft is no exception. Won't the expenditures prove to be too great for the state treasury?

[A. Kondrusev] We have made the necessary computations. Additional expenses will be required for the implementation of the right of the citizens to receive information, for the legal protection of their rights, and for the pledges to create the conditions for forming a healthy way of life. However, even the preliminary estimate for the introduction of this law presupposes a considerable economic effect as a result of a sharp increase in the sizes of the fine, the collection of damages to compensate for the violation of sanitation legislation, etc.

But the basic effect can be expected as a result of the reduction in the disease rate (payment of doctors' certifications, losses in production), the reduction of expenditures to eliminate the consequences of epidemics, poisonings, and accidents, to improve the working conditions, everyday-living and recreational conditions, and, consequently, people's health.

I want to note that the enactment of sanitation legislation is taking on special immediacy under conditions of the developing market relations, the assimilation of various management forms (leasing, small enterprises, small farms), and the increasing of the independence of each producer. If the changes in the economy are not followed by the improvement of sanitation legislation, the ecological situation in the country can become uncontrollable.

### **Vorontsov Calls for New System of Bureaucratic Responsibility for Environment**

91WN0110A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 46, 17 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection: "Disaster Caused by... Thoughtlessness"]

[Text] A fantastically rich gas and oil field has been discovered in the Northern Caspian region (around Tengiz), in Kazakhstan. It is clear that this is a region

which may someday replace Western Siberia for us. But does that mean that this field should be used as quickly as possible and to the greatest extent possible?

Oil and gas in that area are found at a very great depth, between three and four kilometers deep, and come from the ground under pressures of 180-200 atmospheres. Our leading expert on seismic monitoring, Azariy Gamburtsev, who works at the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute, has expressed serious concern over large-scale development of the Tengiz oil field in particular. It is a field which has not been the subject of adequate seismic study. Several years will be needed in order to do a seismic survey of the region. There are believed to be a number of faults in the area.

We still remember the Gazli earthquake. Seismic activity can be caused not only by the properties of the Earth's crust itself, but also by quantities of gas, oil and so forth surging forth from underground. This disrupts the primary structure of ground strata, and secondary seismic activity results. We have no experience with development of such rich fields with such vast quantities of oil and gas under such great pressure. If, God forbid, a fire were to start under such conditions how would we extinguish it? So let us not be in too great a hurry; let us make some observations first. Should we perhaps leave this field for our children and grandchildren?

Now a word about the Astrakhan Gas Condensation Combine. It was built with French technology using French equipment, and analogous plants are in operation in France. It should be noted that in France as well these plants did not operate in a nonpolluting manner at first. Yet after five to seven years of operation they presently produce virtually no emissions. The question arises: why does French technology and French equipment not work in our country? What is the problem?

One could claim that we do not have enough qualified personnel, that we have a harsher climate with wide temperature variations, etc. That is definitely true. But something else has also become evident. The Astrakhan Natural Gas Condensation Plant was designed to operate with a continuous supply of electricity. Yet within the past year alone the power was cut off over 160 times! As a result sulphur solidified in the pipelines.

When we purchase technologies from the West we are told that they are nonpolluting, and this is demonstrated. Yes, they are nonpolluting, but only when strict discipline is observed. And what are these hundreds of power cutoffs but a basic lack of discipline? This also represents a basic failure on the part of the planners who did not foresee to what degree the electric power supply to these plants would be reliable.

Now on to the subject of technocratic thinking. I recently met with one of the USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairmen (I will not reveal his name), who was firmly convinced that all demonstrations by the Greens are aimed solely at undermining the Soviet system and depriving the party of its authority.

Of course, many demonstrations by the Greens which lack essential information and often an adequate level of qualification are marked by many extremist excesses. But it would be wrong to see only that, just as it would be wrong to regard every party member as a party bureaucrat or every official as a representative of the administrative-command system. Why should we regard any person who supports environmental protection as an enemy of the Soviet system?

Labels have been applied: "green bawlers," "loud-mouths," "demonstration anarchy," etc. Do we need to think very hard to realize where this demonstration anarchy came from, who caused it? It was caused by these same people who for years said: I said it, so it must be true. People who kept from the people the truth about our country's ecological condition.

It was right for the 28th Party Congress to give a political assessment of efforts to hide the truth about the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Because we began telling the truth about Chernobyl only at the beginning of 1989. Until that time we just had other Council of Ministers deputy chairmen who did not take personal responsibility for this. And some of them actually thought that they were acting like heroes: they crawled into the scorching heat themselves and sent others...

In January of this year at the request of a public health station and environmental protection organs in the northern part of Sverdlovsk Oblast a shop producing chlorosulfonic acid was shut down as a result of its state of total disarray from an ecological standpoint. Twelve days after the shop was closed the roof caved in and crushed all the production equipment.

But here is the remarkable thing. A great fuss was made about the fact that State Committee for Environmental Protection organs and public health agencies were shutting down this production facility. People wrote that our country would be deprived of medicines as a result of environmental protection organs' incorrect stance. But not a word is said about the fact that the closing of the shop prior to the disaster resulted in no workers being killed and an explosion being averted.

It has been repeatedly stated that ecology, in contrast to the economy, requires not 10-year planning, but at a minimum 50-year planning, long-range, extraordinary decisions. But we have people who think this way: just let me get through this quarter, and maybe the next one, too... The plan at any price, just as long as one can turn in a good report and not appear to be lagging behind.

Recently a good essay on Pittsburgh by Vladimir Peskov appeared in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. In America there was very strong resistance from companies when Pittsburgh's metal production facilities began to be shut down for environmental reasons. Pittsburgh is to America as Magnitogorsk is to us. Of course this was a blow to a large number of firms, and the technocrats there resisted just as ours are doing now. Yet over there other levers were operating. Public pressure proved to be

stronger than the resistance. It forced billions (two or three billion dollars) in expenditures to make Pittsburgh a city with a clear sky and non-polluting industries. We need to do the same thing.

At this time we have an ecological program extending to the year 2005. We have a USSR Supreme Soviet resolution from 27 November 1989 which requires that the ecological situation be normalized in every city by 1995. That is splendid, but unrealistic. But at least it is a goal. We have looked over plans made by the Ministry of Metallurgy, for instance. Reduction in pollution is planned in Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Mariupol and Zaporozhe, and there are plans for a parallel reduction of pollution in Krivoy Rog. Krivoy Rog today releases 1.380 million metric tons of pollutants a year. Not counting an additional one million tons of so-called unorganized emissions, i.e. when blasting takes place once a week dust is raised. Every Friday in Krivoy Rog 5,000-6,000 people, including bedfast elderly people and children, are put out on the street for several hours so that blasting can be done in a nearby open-pit mine, so that nothing will happen to them. Can you imagine that situation?

Thus, the Ministry of Metallurgy plans to reduce 1.380 million metric tons of pollutants to 700,000 by the year 2005. That means that in 2005 the ecological situation in Krivoy Rog will be worse by a factor of two than it presently is in Mariupol, Zaporozhe and Dnepropetrovsk. So let us explain that honestly to the people of Krivoy Rog. And we are talking about a time 15 years from now. Life can be planned for five years, or for seven to ten at the maximum. So what do we do—put Krivoy Rog on a rotating shift system? No, of course not, no one is seriously considering that. So I posed this question to Kachanovskiy, Ukrainian Council of Ministers deputy chairman (though he is no longer in that position): what are they going to do about Krivoy Rog? He replied: "That is not ours, it is all under Union jurisdiction; nothing is up to us." But it is in their republic! I met with Serafim Vasilyevich Kolpakov, minister of metallurgy, and asked: what is going to happen to Krivoy Rog? And he looked at me with the look of a man who has seen much in life, a look that said: "Young man, neither you nor I is going to be minister in 2005." His attention is focused on the current quarterly plan, and he may give some thought to the next quarter...

Such is life. Kolpakov is neither bad nor good, he is simply steering by the coordinates of a system in which it is only possible to think in terms of one or two quarters.

We need a completely different system of thinking, a different system of responsibility to the people.

(Editor's note: We hope that publishing this article by N. Vorontsov will prompt those who are developing this sort of technologies to give him some answers. For are they not their own enemies, and the enemies of their children and grandchildren? What is the logic behind their actions? That is what we would like to know.)

### National Government Urged Not To Give Local Bodies Control Over Parks

91WN0062A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 90  
p 3

[Article by K. Smirnov: "Do Not Let Baykal Go for a Pittance"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] An All-Union conference called "USSR National Parks—Their Present and Future" has come to an end in Novgorod. Three hundred of the participants signed a letter expressing their concern to the President of the Soviet Union and to the supreme soviets of the USSR and of the Union republics. Its message was: put a stop to the selling off of the nation's natural heritage, which is of value to the planet and to all mankind.

There is a barometer which measures accurately the concern of a people and a state for their future: how much land they set aside for parks. In this regard our country had quite good traditions and scientific support, but departmental dictates made it impossible to achieve a civilized level. There were great hopes that with perestroika and the dismantling of the command-administrative system, the areas under protection would be expanded and more attention would be given to them.

Scientists, specialists and other workers employed by the parks and wildlife sanctuaries think that these hopes have been dashed by the fact that the legislative activity of the perestroika period absolutely fails to take into account the specific features of park management.

With the transfer to the local soviets of all rights to land and its resources there is an intolerable tendency on the part of local organs of authority to redraw the boundaries of parks, each of which has significance—ranging from republic-level significance at the very least, to Union-level or even international significance. Enterprising people have begun to sniff around the park system. Attempts are being made to include park land in every kind of commercial association, enterprise, consortium, etc.

Under threat is the very idea of the long-term program to develop a network of specially-protected natural areas in the period up to 2000, which is being worked out in accordance with a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning urgent measures for the country's ecological recovery. Land-owners and land-users are opposing with increasing frequency the establishment of new parks, nature preserves, wildlife sanctuaries and monuments of nature; they are demanding enormous sums in exchange for giving up land for these purposes.

The participants at the All-Union Conference appealed to the USSR President to publish a presidential ukase halting all actions which have the effect of closing state wildlife sanctuaries or national parks, reducing their area or handing them over to local organs of authority.

When we carry to the absurd the noble idea of national sovereignty and local self-determination, when we try to

divide into parts rivers which flow through various republics and even clouds which fly over sovereign territories, then we know where to look for an analogy—in the Biblical parable about the two women who could not share one child or in the fantastic prediction made by the writer M. Ilin 55 years ago. He imagined that a way would be found to make the weather and took out a patent on it: "The prices for rain, fog, clouds, snow, for an end to rain, to snow and to fog grow and grow. The population has to pay for what it never paid for before, for that small thing which used to come by itself, for free."

We have not come to that point yet, but we are getting there. And in 20 years we have not yet resolved the problem—which can be solved—of payment for natural resources and for damage to them. However, park lands are not part of this utilitarian market circle. Baykal is as priceless as the Hermitage.

### **Goskompriroda Subordination Said To Foster Conflicts of Interest**

*91WN0062B Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Nov 90 p 2*

[Article by P. Penezhko: "A 'Kept' Expert Commission, or Who Is Paying USSR Goskompriroda and for What?"]

[Text] Can the labor collective of a pulp-and-paper combine pay extra "for adherence to principles" to public-health and fish-protection workers? In principle one can find some kind of sly method for making doctors and inspectors materially interested in not being too zealous about monitoring waste and the number of ruined fish.

Smugglers can probably establish a "joint" enterprise with customs workers in order to increase the mobility of their goods. However, in our country the law-enforcement organs vigilantly keep track of such initiatives, calling them quite ill-advised. But all this is at the local level, at the grass-roots, so to speak. And if something similar happens somewhere higher up, at the level of ministers, state committees and various very new associations? We have not yet heard anything similar from this Olympus although there have already been quite a few occasions. The people of Rostov recently encountered one of them when they went to the capital to demand an independent ecological expert commission on a nuclear power plant planned for the banks of the Tsimlyansk Water Reservoir.

Earlier they had used their own resources to hold an expert commission of this kind, and they established that the project did not meet safety requirements. Remember, the power plant was to be located on the banks of the Tsimlyansk Water Reservoir, and for two million residents of the region there is no other source of water supply. Moreover, nearly all of Russia's southern granary is irrigated by water from the Don.

The arguments would seem to be very serious ones. But at the Union ministry they encountered a surprising response Ye. Ignatenko, the head of Minatomenergoprom's (Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry) main administration, came to Rostov with an offer of clean water to be diverted from the northern rivers, in exchange for the people's agreement not to interfere with the construction of the power plant. After him came V. Ponomarev and A. Arutyunyan, staff members from the Institute for the Radiation Safety of Atomic Power Plants, seemingly for an expert commission on the project, but most of their time they spent advertising computers to the local population.

At this point the population began to suspect something wrong, and they hurried about organizing rallies and sending delegates to Moscow, to USSR Goskompriroda (State Committee for the Protection of Nature), seriously believing that it has the most independent experts, who are the farthest removed from commercial interests. The Rostov people attempted to show that the region did not even have enough water to supply all four units of the AES [nuclear electric power station] being built.

That is precisely why you need pure northern water, said Ye. Minayev, chairman of USSR Goskompriroda, along with his subordinate Yu. Maksimenko, as together they tried to convince the delegates. And, they added, the water-hungry AES will force the government willy nilly to finish building the Volga-Don Canal-2.

So we oppose the canal as well, said the delegates, completely at a loss; they had "covered" that issue along with the diversion of northern waters!

That is not your concern, the guardians of nature consoled them; just as they closed it, they will open it.

Later I asked Minayev: is the digging of the canal continuing on the quiet? Yevgeniy Vladimirovich (Minayev) only lifted his eyes to the ceiling enigmatically. In general, he is a great diplomat. Ten years ago as a deputy head of Glavgosekspertiza (Main State Expert Commission) of USSR Gosstroy, Minayev decisively rejected an alternative site for the Rostov power plant which would have doubled its distance from the city. Closer to the AES, he said, the citizens would be warmer and they would find it more convenient to get to work.

Later, despite all the protests and criticism, Minayev managed to approve the plan for the capital's Northern TETs even without a protective zone around it. And now this frenzied curator of nature is organizing all kinds of "independent" expert commissions within the new apparatus.

Who will be doing this work? The self-financing Transsonik Scientific-Production Association, which has its headquarters in Odessa. The state has already allotted 900,000 rubles for this.

Goskompriroda has allotted it?, I ask Minayev.

No. USSR Promstroybank is doing the financing—from the project estimate.

How is that possible? The funds for the construction of an AES and its ecological expert commission are coming out of the same pocket? Moreover, this is not even an expert commission but rather an "ecological substantiation" as they say in a banking parlance. That is, the goal of this expensive enterprise is not to analyze this project in detail but to explain to stupid people how good it will be for them when construction of all four units is completed.

And what is this Transsonik Association? What kind of powerful scientific personnel is it recruiting? It turns out that the association has an agency in Moscow, and its director is V. Yevdokimov, who is, incidentally, a former employee of Atomenergo.

For the first while our meeting with Vladimir Grigoryevich (Yevdokimov) was very uncomfortable. He turned on a tape recorder and literally pelted me with questions: how and why is there such interest in Transsonik? But then the conversation eased a bit, and I heard the familiar words about the need to evaluate humanely the effect of energy facilities on the environment.

In the United States, Vladimir Grigoryevich noted with regret, similar work costs from \$10-50 million.

But after all, over there they probably carry out the ecological study "before" and not "after."

Good Lord, what is the difference?, said the "independent" expert as he condescendingly brushed away the thought.

And, indeed, there is almost none because the the Transsonik experts are not given access to the technical designs of the project. For example, they make a rough calculation of the background radiation beyond the plant's fence. And then they look at how to compensate people for having a dangerous neighbor: with sociocultural facilities? Roads? With kopecks per kilowatt?

That is useful. But one must remember that the Americans have set themselves more difficult tasks. Especially after Three Mile Island. And it would not hurt us to do the same after Chernobyl. For example, to figure out how serious water and air pollution added to background radiation will influence the life span. However, Transsonik is not making prognoses of this kind.

However, as for what kind of scientific forces Transsonik has recruited, Yevdokimov limited himself to the most general description. He says it has attracted quite serious personnel. Then Minayev familiarized me with a sample of their product: an ecological substantiation study for the Bashkir AES. Tens of names of which, no matter how hard I try, I cannot remember a single one which is even slightly well known on the ecological front. I am willing to take their word that these are serious scientific workers but why, nonetheless, is their labor paid for

from the estimate for the plant's construction? Only because they have a connection with the "atomic" agency?

And also because Transsonik's ecological activities are reliably linked through commercial ties to Goskompiroda. As a Western lawyer would say: "A consolidation of the state apparatus and entrepreneurial interests forbidden by the law (in their country, of course) is taking place," and he would present the court with "Regulations Concerning Joint Enterprises," signed by the Odessa chief V. Yevdokimov, and Yu. Maksimenko, the deputy of Ye. Minayev.

They have at their disposal a press and a current account in Promstroybank, from which they also draw funds for ecological substantiation studies, impact evaluations and the preparation of documents. At the same time they are taking a large number of orders, keeping track of progress made in the fulfillment of agreements and making representations... "at all the state institutions, enterprises and public organizations, as well as with foreign partners."

What is this "making representations," on a *khozraschet* (self-financing) basis? To put it more simply—they are cooperating with "foreign partners." After all, Transsonik has its hand in the same "pocket" as Goskompiroda and the International Fuel and Energy Association, in the establishment of which it invested a quarter of a million rubles. The association was established by the USSR Sovmin (Council of Ministers) "for the maximum possible development of international ties for the purpose of concentrating the scientific and technical potential of various countries on the resolution of the most important inter-sector problems in the fuel and energy complex."

That is, the atomic Transsonik, thanks to forms of the International Fuel and Energy Association, now imparts to its work an international attractiveness, and it would seem that this claim is not so inoffensive as it seems at first glance. As the scandalous experience of joint projects in the construction of chemical giants in Western Siberia has shown, our partners are enticed not only by the cheapness of our natural resources and manpower but also by the extremely low level of ecological requirements for projects. And here we are now presenting the International Fuel and Energy Association as an initiator of new, even more grandiose projects (that is what is was established for!). Its co-founder Transsonik "cooks up" for them the substantiation studies, like blini, while its business partner, Goskompiroda, has nothing to do except stamp its agreement and receive part of the "joint" honorarium.

For this reason, let Yevdokimov and Maksimenko not take offense, but their activities remind us painfully of an attempt to subordinate Goskompiroda to the laws of the "regulated market." Moreover, they are taking the regulation upon themselves. And the first results of the joint commercial efforts are already at hand. The



Latin abbreviation for the International Fuel and Energy Association adorns the title page of the first volume of publicity substantiations for the Bashkir AES project. After studying it carefully, the most fervent opponent of nuclear power in the republic will inevitably come to the conclusion that for all his problems caused by industrial pollutants there is no better solution than "background radiation which does not exceed the norms."

That is exactly how our agencies answer the legitimate demands of citizens: if you want a washing machine, then agree to a new battery of coke ovens in Nizhny Tagil. You will not get analgin until we start up a BVK (protein-vitamin concentrate) production unit. Take one or the other: either unlimited subscriptions to newspapers and magazines or a clean Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga.

In short, the agencies have mounted a counterattack. And its beginning was signaled, no matter how strange it may seem, by a USSR Sovmin resolution adopted in February of the current year, with a name which would seem to reflect a deep love of mankind: "Concerning Urgent Measures To Normalize the Consumer Market, the Circulation of Money and To Strengthen State Monitoring of Prices."

But do not be surprised if in point 12 you find these words: "...under the pretext of inadequate ecological safety and for other reasons there continues—based on decisions by republic and local organs—the practice of illegally interrupting or halting the operations of enterprises under Union jurisdiction, including their subdivisions and production units in the space industry, the medical products industry, the pulp-and-paper industry, metallurgy and other branches of industry; this disrupts the fulfillment of production plans, including those for consumer goods which are to be used by many other enterprises in the country. Establish that interrupting or halting their operations is permitted in exceptional cases and only with permission granted in advance by USSR Sovmin."

Thus on the one hand, commercial temptation, and on the other an ukase from above. With the first alternative you set the price for yourself. With the second, however, there is an absolute dead end because Goskompriroda is directly subordinate to USSR Sovmin.

It would seem obvious that for Goskompriroda, like its foreign counterparts, to cope effectively with its tasks it needs to be set above the agencies; that is, obviously it must be made directly subordinate to the President. But in the highest echelons of power there is no talk of this yet.

And in all of this story about the fading scandal surrounding the Rostov AES the only somewhat hopeful news is that under pressure from the public the oblast soviet declared a freeze on its construction, and the decision was supported by the Sovmin of the Russian Federation.

But now we face the so-called collision of norms, in which the organs of local self-determination throw down a challenge to the supreme executive authority.

Is it one more crisis provoked by the apparatus at a time so rich in crises?

### **RSFSR Environmental Protection Officials Request Resolution of Authority**

*91WN0042A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN  
in Russian No 42, Oct 90 p 9*

[“An Open Letter to I. S. Silayev, RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman”]

[Text] **Respected Ivan Stepanovich!**

Today an extremely frightening ecological situation has been created on the territory of the RSFSR, one that threatens us with irrevocable consequences. The lives of the peoples and nationalities that live within the RSFSR are at stake.

We, the participants of a Russian conference of republic (ASSR), kray and oblast environmental protection committee chairmen, support the resolution of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on the creation of an ecological resource block, which we hope will stabilize and improve the ecological situation in the republic. We are convinced that the leading role in this must be assigned to the RSFSR State Committee on the Ecology and the Utilization of Natural Resources and its local organs.

However, the fact that the ministries and departments that utilize natural resources, including those that are members of the ecological block, retain along with economic functions, the functions of government administration, regulation and environmental protection, is today a cause for concern.

We feel that this state of affairs is impermissible. We earnestly request that you, after final examination and confirmation of the organizational structure of the RSFSR State Committee on the Ecology and the Utilization of Natural Resources and its local organs, accept our proposals on the functions of the committees, the basic one being the principle that government administration, regulation and protection of the utilization of natural resources be transferred to them from all of the ministries and departments, including those that are members of the ecological resource block.

We consider the main purpose of the republic (ASSR), kray and oblast committee, as a single organ, to be the implementation of government administration and regulation of compliance with environmental protection legislation and the assurance of the optimal utilization of natural resources. For the fulfillment of this task, we propose conferring upon the committees on the ecology and the utilization of natural resources the following functions:

- introducing monitoring and effective regulation of environmental quality, based on an integrated ecological information system;



- introducing a registry of natural resources;
- developing and coordinating integrated plans for environmental protection and the rational utilization of natural resources;
- conducting ecological evaluations of plans for new construction, reconstruction, enterprise expansion, new technologies, products, equipment, integrated plans for land development, programs for the utilization of mineral and raw material resources;
- the examination and confirmation of ecological standards for each consumer of natural resources, the coordination of limits on the consumption of natural resources, of standards for disposal (discard) of harmful toxic substances into the surrounding environment, the siting of public utilities;
- developing and submitting for confirmation by local Soviets standards for fees to be charged for the utilization of natural resources, as well as for the pollution of the environment (standard, extra);
- participation in the formulation of taxation and financial policy for the utilization of natural resources, submitting proposals for increasing (decreasing) taxation rates, introducing financial privileges for enterprises, including joint ventures, organizations, cooperatives and other production and scientific subdivisions, depending on their operations and their effectiveness in the resolution of ecological problems;
- organizing a regulatory system for the timely payment for standard (extra) disposal (discard), for the siting of wastes, for the receipt of fines and suits for the pollution of the environment. Assuring the development and preparation of proposals for the utilization of environmental protection funds;
- introducing claims work, examining administrative responsibility for violations of environmental protection legislation;
- implementing government monitoring of compliance with environmental protection legislation, rules and standards for the utilization of natural resources throughout all of the ecospheres, including laboratory monitoring through the use of instruments on all lands, enterprises and organizations, including the military-industrial complex;
- examining and coordinating ecological passports and annual enterprise and organization plans for environmental protection;
- participating in the development of comprehensive plans for land and for branches of the national economy geared towards improving the ecological situation in the region;
- forming a cooperative system including all of the departmental laboratories, based on an integrated method of management, in order to monitor environmental pollution;
- implementing environmental protection work in close cooperation with public organizations and movements, regularly informing the population on the state of the ecological situation, implementing the propagandizing of ecological knowledge;

- organizing radiological, toxicological and biological monitoring, as well as monitoring of the utilization, storage and transport of pesticides;
- assuring the fulfillment on its territory of the international obligations and agreements that have been adopted, cooperation with international organizations, movements and bordering foreign territories in protecting the environment;
- introducing proposals for the creations of specially preserved territories (nature preserves [zapovedniki, zakazniki], national parks, natural monuments) and implementing monitoring of their operations.

Besides this, we feel it is necessary that the departments responsible for the economic operations that affect the state of natural resources lose their government regulatory functions. And that their corresponding staffs and material-technical base should be transferred to the committees on the ecology and the utilization of natural resources so that they can organize government regulatory subdivisions.

The fisheries conservation system of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries should be eliminated, and the staffs should be transferred to subdivisions of Rosrybkhos in order to organize conservation departments, and to the committees on the ecology and the utilization of natural resources in order to organize subdivisions for government regulation, utilization and conservation of fisheries reserves, as well. Besides this, kray and oblast hunting administrations should also transfer their functions of government regulation of the utilization and conservation of the animal world and the corresponding staff to the committees on the ecology and the utilization of natural resources as well, while the departmental preservation functions should be performed by the hunting industry consumers.

The Committee on the Ecology and the Utilization of Natural Resources, with the goal of providing the opportunity to expose violations of established standards for the disposal (discard) of toxic substances and of compliance with legal requirements through the use of sanctions, and also for conducting calibrations of instrumental methods for measuring the disposal (discard) of toxic substances should be empowered within its structure and in the necessary order to conduct inspections of laboratory monitoring with its structural subdivisions in the territorial committees.

We feel that it is necessary to carry out the following first-priority measures.

Concentrate the functions of government administration and regulation of environmental protection and the utilization of natural resources on the territory of the republic in the RFSFR Committees on the Ecology and the Utilization of Natural Resources.

Resolve the question of transferring local organs of the RFSFR State Committee on the Ecology and the Utilization of Natural Resources [Gosecology] to the republic

budget. The RFSFR Ministry of Finances should introduce changes in the "Listing of Special Substances" for the RFSFR Gosecology.

Examine the question of creating the production conditions necessary for the committees on the ecology to operate normally, and for the centralized allotment of capital investments to the construction of housing and to the committees' production base.

Equip the committees with material-technical resources, the first priority being automobiles, portable monitoring devices and laboratory equipment, ordered through the government under separate lines in Gosplan, Gassnab, and the Ministry of Finances.

Urgently develop and ratify a resolution on the committee and fundamental laws on environmental protection in the republic.

We feel that the RFSFR Council of Ministers Committee on Water Use, formed in accordance with the RFSFR Council of Ministers resolution of August 13, 1990 (No. 299) should not duplicate the work of the RFSFR State Committee on the Environment and its local structural subdivisions.

With the goal of eliminating disunity and parallelism in operations and in order to assure real government regulation of the utilization of natural resources, we feel that the only acceptable solution is to transfer in their entirety the divisions of the former RFSFR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Use that deal with the complete utilization of water resources and with their material base to oblast, kray and republic (ASSR) environmental protection committees.

The Committee on Water Use should include in its obligations only economic operations functions.

On behalf of conference participants:

V. AGEYEV, chairman, Rostov Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. V. BAKUNIN, chairman, Chelyabinsk Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. YE. VASILYUK, chairman, Kurgansk Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. N. VASILYEV, deputy chairman, Buryat ASSR State Committee on Environmental Protection. V. VOYTSYTSKIY, chairman, Saratov Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. V. GOLENKO, chairman, Khakass Autonomous Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. O. DOROSHCHENKOV, chairman, Altay Kray Committee on Environmental Protection. YE. IVONA, chairman, Adyge Autonomous Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. V. IDIMECHEV, chairman, Krasnoyarsk Kray Committee on Environmental Protection. V. KAZANTSEV, chairman, Perm Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. KROKHMAL, chairman, Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. KULIKOV, chairman, Orenburg Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. MEDVEDEV, chairman,

Maritime Kray Committee on Environmental Protection. A. METELEV, chairman, Jewish Autonomous Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. N. NOSOVTSSEV, chairman, Amur Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. OSTROVSKIY, chairman, Chita Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. PETRIK, chairman, Novosibirsk Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. A. POLOVINKO, chairman, Krasnodar Kray Committee on Environmental Protection. V. SAFAROV, chairman, Bashkir ASSR Committee on Environmental Protection. V. SKACHKOV, deputy chairman, Khabarovsk Kray Committee on Environmental Protection. ZH. STROKACH, chairman, Chuvash ASSR Committee on Environmental Protection. V. SEMENYAK, chairman, Omsk Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. N. TRUNOV, chairman, Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast Committee on Environmental Protection. V. TSIKEYEV, chairman, Kalmyk ASSR State Committee on Environmental Protection. N. YAKOVLEV, chairman, Stavropol Kray Committee on Environmental Protection.

#### **Ukrainian Greens Official on Group's Political, Ecological Goals**

*91WN0031A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 28 Sep 90 pp 4-5*

[Interview by V. Tsion with Andrey Glazovoy, deputy chairman of the Zelenyy Svit (Green) Association of the Ukraine, date and place not specified: "Green—the Color of Salvation"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] I first heard about the existence of the Green Party about ten years ago. It seems that the television program "Vremya" (Time) showed us, the Soviet viewers, bearded men in shorts, who were introducing something like panic into the officially respectable life of the West German Bundestag. The calculation of our ideologists was simple: look at what these capitalists, these rotten bourgeois governments have brought their peoples to in the pursuit of ready money! In order to increase the righteous indignation about their predatory policies, their customs and their inhuman morality, the happy Soviet viewer (who could not even dream of such horrors!) was "treated" to a ghastly tale about the Rhine, the cesspool of Europe. But the first domestic greens were not shown on television, and the ecological demonstration which they organized to mark the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, was dispersed by the police. Some two years have passed and we are no longer surprised by pickets at the Khmel'nitskiy AES [nuclear electric power station], by placards at the Supreme Soviet, nor by the funeral rites for a murdered tree organized by the greens in Goloseyevo. Moreover, in the recent elections the Zelenyy Svit (Green) Ukrainian Ecological Association presented itself as a real political force. The creation of a Ukrainian green party is on the agenda, something which the papers reported as early as this spring. Our guest

today is the deputy chairman of Zelenyy Svit (ZS), the historian and journalist Andrey Glazovoy.

[Glazovoy] The first ecological groups in the Ukraine appeared in 1987. In 1988 many of them turned into mass organizations. The ecological movement developed with particular energy in the Crimea, the Carpathians, Chernovtsy, and Odessa. A while later many of these organizations united into a republic-wide association. By the way, the process of unification was difficult; there was a certain amount of mistrust. And the Belokamen-naya organization, in its efforts to create something immense, at first sent us.. directives. What can you do—the paradoxes of Moscow thinking are characteristic even of democrats. Today it is funny to talk about this, but then the unknown Moscow People's Front was showering instructions on the Baltics, which were picking up speed. However, in early 1989 (according to data from the Ukr SSR Committee on Youth Organizations) the Ukraine had about 300 informal ecological associations in operation, but today their numbers have sharply decreased, above all because the weak ones have disbanded, while the strong ones have joined together in Zelenyy Svit. It is difficult to say how many members there are. Sometimes the figure of half a million appears in the papers. I would give a more conservative figure: the republic has approximately 15,000-20,000 people participating actively in the green movement on a regular basis.

[Tsion] Your organization is, after all, one of the few which in a relatively short time has managed to achieve very real and substantial results.

[Glazovoy] They are constantly saying to us that we picket, raise a fuss, shout, hold demonstrations in gas masks, organize rallies (sometimes, it is true, with our mouths bound shut, as when we were protesting discrimination against our candidates in the elections), but we do nothing.

And today the greens are picketing the Khmel'nitskiy AES; they are presenting its director with a mutant pig and a bouquet of flowers, which are also mutants. Of course, this is the purely external aspect of our activities. But it is also necessary in order to shake people up! And one must not think that we limit ourselves to this. While some people are "laying siege" to the power plant with placards and signs, others (scientists from our expert council) are engaged in serious research work. Incidentally, our first independent expert panel was held on the subject of Khortitsa Island. Scientists from the Council of Production Forces and other academic organizations have done all the essential work free under the aegis of ZS. And in time this expert commission helped to save this wonderful island; it is true that today the Zaporozhye City Soviet is again "bursting forth" with its idea of a "cheap bridge." Then there was Bykovnya, where a former mayor of Kiev, Zgurskiy, and his team wanted to build a station. After joining the "fight," the local group of informals, who were then not yet members of ZS, turned to us for help. Above all they needed publicity in

the mass media, as well as scientific-methodological support. Our specialists held an alternative expert commission, which completely destroyed the assessment of the forest carried out by the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee]. The official experts saw in the Bykovnya forests only a timber deal. In our report the price came out about three times higher because we took into consideration not only the cubic meters of timber, but also the amount of ozone which the city would not receive, the ant hills which would be killed, the oxygen losses... We have special calculation methods; they are approximate, of course, but they do guarantee accuracy up to a million rubles.

However, one cannot claim that it is only the greens who have accomplished things. As a rule, we work with Rukh and other organizations, or simply with individual volunteers. As for specific projects, they vary from cleaning up a small river near Odessa (in which oil floated before and now crayfish swim) to halting construction of the Chigirin AES.

However, expert commissions are the prerogative of the organization's headquarters. No less important is the work of the rank-and-file activists. Let us talk about Khortitsa again. Anyone who has been to Zaporozhye knows what this city is like. Pure sulfur pours straight out of smokestacks there, and everyone who forgets his umbrella at home risks ending up under acid rain. As a consequence, there is a high mortality rate and a higher than normal rate of childhood illness. And literally in the midst of this industrial hell is a little island of living nature! It is something unique and astonishing! There are places where even rare plants have sprung up, and there are six burrows in which fox families live! Of course, the island has a nature-preserve administration, which is supposed to protect it. But its staff is small and its resources meager. The main point is that there is in operation here a public Committee to Protect Khortitsa, which was established by the local journalist Konstantin Sushko (the Committee subsequently became the nucleus of the Zaporozhye Division of Zelenyy Svit). Volunteers (ordinary school children and older students) protect the nature preserve; they drive away poachers and prevent vehicles from entering. They partitioned off part of the island; it is a heavenly place there now. That is, the greens did what the state services had not managed to do in decades! And during all this time Khortitsa, according to documents, was protected by law.

The protection of the law is not something you can put your hands on. It is the real people, keeping track of every burrow and every hedgehog and protecting each individual fox, who have achieved the impossible... It is those very real actions which we cannot get along without. However, green practice cannot be separated from green policy; otherwise one fine day a bulldozer will appear (it is unimportant whose—it may belong to the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry or the Ministry of Atomic Energy), and all the hedgehogs, burrows and ant hills, all the colossal labor of the volunteers will go under the shovel. Here lies

the basic miscalculation of our old organizations, including the Society for the Protection of Nature (SPN). They were afraid to enter politics, and for this reason they reminded one of defenceless young naturalists, shaking not only before every ministry but also before every chairman of a city soviet.

[Tsion] Most likely it was in order to concentrate efforts on political actions that a core group came forward from within the ranks of the association to take the initiative in preparing a green party congress?

[Glazovoy] Undoubtedly. Speaking honestly, Zelenyy Svit had an undistinguished election campaign. The weak spots in the movement showed up here. On the one hand, it is good to do things on a massive scale, but on the other, the lack of a firm structure led to a situation in which we were frequently late with an effective response, and we did not get up-to-date information soon enough...Incidentally, many Western countries have mass ecological movements (for example, the West German Bund) and green parties which exist in parallel. The latter, as a rule are not large, but mobile, well-organized and that means able to function well. Naturally, our Ukrainian green party will concentrate, above all, on politics, that is, on work in parliament, in government, in the soviets at all levels and in the mass media. In other words, it will carry out political lobbying in the ecology sphere. This is indispensable. Without it you cannot straighten out the nuclear power situation, you cannot resolve the problem of building radar stations (the owners here are serious ones—the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Defense)... And, of course, ideological work. Incidentally, two trends have been identified in our new party, as among our colleagues abroad; they are identified with the “fundamentalists” and “realists.” The “realists” think that the green party of the Ukraine is a special phenomenon, for this reason it must be firmly “linked” to today’s realities in the republic. In that they are undoubtedly right, and many of their proposals are being taken into consideration. The “fundamentalists,” in contrast, think that the greens must be guided by universal principles which are the same for all countries (greens, they say, are green in Africa too). It is another matter that in every specific political situation it is necessary to look for these allies or make those contacts. The West German greens, for example, at one time slipped up badly in their contacts with the communists. With the social democrats everything is OK, the alliance has proved to be effective. Although, of course, they are not thrilled with each other: the greens consider the social democrats to be linked with the bourgeois establishment and too pretentious. The SD’s [Social Democrats] on the other hand, see in the greens cranks who want everything here and now. On the other hand, this is not surprising; after all, the greens in their country are a left-radical party, which arouses the caution of the ordinary burgher.

[Tsion] But to return to one’s roots—in which political forces of the Ukraine do you see your closest allies? What are your relations with the Communist Party?

[Glazovoy] Their communists and ours are not the same. In our country they are the ruling party, or more accurately, organization, and it is unimportant what it is called. It is true that today greens are part of the ruling coalitions in Ivano-Frankovsk and Ternopol. I think that with the development of a multiparty system, the greens will not have a great influence. As for me (as a “fundamentalist,” you will not get anything out of me), in general, I think that it is preferable for us to remain in opposition. For ecology this is useful. But it is difficult to predict the political future. If we are among the government parties, good, if we are not, even better. As for allies, in the Supreme Soviet, for example, our people naturally joined the Narodna Rada, and they were in the democratic bloc from the very start. We have traditionally had good relations with Rukh, and quite satisfactory ones with the republicans. Guests from the West are surprised; after all, the URP [Ukrainian Republican Party] stands for principles of traditional classical capitalism. In their Western countries an alliance of the left-wing greens’ with right-wing conservatives would be simply impossible. But at the present stage of democratic changes it is necessary to look for points in common with today’s “rightists” as well as the “leftists” (naturally in the classical, and not in our homegrown “broken-mirror” interpretation). Recently I was moved by an interview with a people’s deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, the first secretary of the Bakhchisarayskiy Party Raykom, which was published in the local paper. It said that supposedly on the very first day in parliament a bloc emerged with an anticommunist, anti-Soviet foundation, and it included representatives of Rukh, Tovaristvo Ukrainskoy Movi, Zelenyy Svit and so on. And this is very typical. From the very beginning our communist leadership (I do not say communists because a democratic platform became part of Narodna Rada) itself marked off a watershed: we and all the rest. And it made monstrous efforts to keep everything that way. For this reason it is logical for us to have an alliance first of all with those who advocate democratic principles. But whether they are “rightists” or “leftists” is not of primary importance. Incidentally, Zelenyy Svit is also participating in the work of a new organization, the Alliance of Democratic Forces, in which both larger movements as well as small parties are represented.

[Tsion] Andrey, you said that it is preferable for the greens to remain in opposition. But in that case can you count on having your opinion taken into account when important government decisions are being made?

[Glazovoy] In countries with multiparty systems, (not with two-party systems), in the Netherlands or the FRG, for example, a party which has won more than five percent of the votes in an election is already a real force; it is in a position to influence policy and “stand firm” in parliament. As a result of pressure brought by the West German Green Party a whole series of measures was adopted to improve the ecology of transportation. Under the influence of the greens, the Bundestag decided that about two-thirds of the state funds allotted for energy

were to go for the development of nontraditional alternative forms of power! In general, however, there are two paths in the theory and practice of environmental protection: the European and the American. The European way consists of public movements of the green type, which draw people's attention; they picket nuclear power plants, lie down on the rails in front of trains carrying radioactive wastes or join hands to block the movement of trains carrying toxic freight. That is, the raise-the-alarm path. And there is the American way. After reports by very serious ecology specialists (such as Barry Commoner and others), the American government established—as long ago as 1970—the Federal Environmental Protection Agency with exceptional powers. It levied crushing fines on polluters, it had the right to close any enterprise. The best specialists were recruited to work for it, and no expense was spared for them. The best experts in America were invited to carry out ecological monitoring or to analyze any given situation. This federal agency has accomplished a great deal. In the last 20 years the United States has achieved colossal success in the area of environmental protection. Not only have the Great Lakes been saved (which, if you recall our Baykal and Aral, is by itself unprecedented). They have restored cities to a satisfactory condition, solved the problem of gas pollution, etc. etc.

[Tsion] Probably only rich nations are in a position to do such things. After all, if they close some small plant in Svidrigayloka tomorrow, half the country will end up without baby food or some other item. Something like that happened with the packaging for food products after one of our pulp and paper combines was closed.

[Glazovoy] The situation in their country is different. After all, if the state ruins Ford, the state itself does not suffer at all from this. In our country the state is a super monopoly which owns all the plants and factories. No matter whom we "go after," we end up attacking the state. No matter which ministry tries to beat us off, in the end, it is the state which has the reins in its hands. It is no accident that greens throughout the world are actively engaged in antimonopoly activities.

[Tsion] However, one of the points of our economic reform is the demonopolization of production and the privatization of the economy. But here something disturbs me. It is no secret to anyone, for example, that in Russia the ecological movements frequently close ranks with antimarket, right-wing populist forces.

[Glazovoy] Well, in the first place, if it came to that, let us make a distinction between the greens and the ecologists. They are not exactly the same. The concept of the greens includes not only the struggle for environmental protection but also the struggle for social justice. Moreover, for us this means the maximum reduction in the rights of the state (it is no accident that greens have one foot in the youth movement of the 60's, and they accept many elements of scientific anarchism). In the Netherlands, for example, there are "anarchist greens." In

short, we are for maximum independence for the municipalities, and not only for them. We think that the state is above all an association of groups of citizens taking initiative according to their interests. The state only sums up the efforts of citizens, nothing more. It can be a sort of steward, but in no way a dictator, nor a ruler and not a leader. We do not believe that some day (as the ecologists think) a good state will bring order to ecology. Neither an intelligent tsar nor an enlightened minister will accomplish anything here. Unless all of life is truly democratized, unless it is humanized, unless social problems are resolved, no other problems, including ecological ones, can be solved.

[Tsion] But this question is addressed to you first of all as a "fundamentalist." What do you think, in the actual situation which has developed in the Ukraine is cosmopolitanism a positive or negative phenomenon?

[Glazovoy] This question disturbs us greatly. On the one hand, throughout the world the greens are one of the most nonnationalistic of parties. It is impossible to resolve global ecological problems within closed national boundaries. But in the given situation in the Ukraine (and here the fundamentalists and realists agree) the national movement is undoubtedly progressive. It is not, after all, directed against another nation, it is directed against an empire, and consequently it is justified and completely natural. Incidentally, Western colleagues who visited the Ukraine originally looked at us with suspicion: these greens, they thought, who cooperate so closely with national organizations, are strange. We had to persuade them (and in the end they were convinced) that our national movements are sufficiently specific. They attended a rally of Rukh in Odessa, which took place under blue and yellow flags, where no one spoke a word of Ukrainian, and what is more, could not speak it. They saw two small boys who were trying unsuccessfully to talk with us in the language of their grandfathers. They were struck by two Jewish members of the intelligentsia hurrying to an event organized by the Society for Jewish Culture: in their button holes they had little blue and yellow flags. At one of the Kiev rallies, when they saw Ukrainian national banners together with Baltic, Georgian, Jewish and Russian ones, they finally became convinced that our alliance with the national forces was justified. The main thing that distinguishes the Ukrainian greens from the Western ones is their attitude toward the revival of the national culture and language. For us this is a painful problem. Although, it is true, the Norwegians are now also upset about the state of their old language. In this way we understand ecology not only as the protection of nature, but in a significantly broader sense, as the protection of the environment in which man lives, his spirituality and all the rest. And because the national and historical elements of our culture have been destroyed everything needs to be restored. It is simpler for the Western greens—they inherited their national cultures in an excellent state.

[Tsion] And, in truth, one can hardly expect from a denationalized person a respectful attitude toward the

land of his ancestors. What does Khortitsa and its trampled ground mean to him? A person who has lost one's native language is like someone who has lost his mother. He spits on his native history, on the ancient symbols of his grandfather's land. A person of that ilk will not feel his heart touched at the sight of a ploughed up burial mound or a destroyed Kazakh grave... One cannot help but recall the respectful attitude of the Lithuanians toward their traditions, their history, and that means to their land. Maybe they resisted so desperately the construction of the Ignalina AES because they remembered that over there, at that oak tree, King Gediminas changed his faithful horse upon his return from a long crusade. Ecological consciousness does not develop on barren ground. Literature and journalistic writing play an important role in its formation. But what disturbs me is that with the seeming abundance of publications which vividly describe the horrors of an ecological catastrophe which is real for us, one does not so frequently encounter intelligent, well-crafted, accessibly written articles which would develop in the reader an ecological culture in a broad, I would even say planetary, sense.

[Glazovoy] You are right. In the West they call this deep, all-encompassing ecology. This problem is reflected in quite a bit of detail in the Zelenyy Svit platform. Alas, at present few of us can talk about this in an easily accessible and broad manner. There is Academician D. Grodzinskiy, who understands and writes about ecology in a global sense. Or such ZS leaders as A. Demidenko and N. Preobrazhenskaya, who interpret ecology at the level of a world view. And there is S. Grabovskiy, who is seriously engaged in providing "philosophical support" for the green movement: he writes interestingly, although not always accessibly.

For now we mainly "shake things up." The times are such that at first it is necessary simply to shout. Although, of course, cries of down with nuclear power plants are not enough. It is essential to develop the new thinking, to teach people to interpret the entire world as consisting of harmony among man, the biosphere and civilization. Alas, at one time ecology fell into the same category as genetics and cybernetics in our country. In the West even literate greens, who recite by heart Teilhard de Chardin, to our shame (not theirs), have not heard the name Vernadskiy! And where could they have heard it? After all, Vernadskiy was one of the fathers of today's ecological philosophy, one of the forerunners of today's green movement. What did we know about him? Everything was lost, mutilated... The Ukraine has almost no professional ecologists—there was no one to train them. However, biologists—they are not so bad, better in any case (I ask for forgiveness in advance) than livestock specialists or agronomists.

[Tsion] In short, for a start ecological propaganda is necessary—clear, accessible, popular... At present it seems to me that in our country only a small group of university intellectuals is studying green problems in a truly deep way. In my opinion, several other forms are

necessary... For example, I myself would participate with enormous pleasure in an eco-campaign on my day off; I would do some work with a shovel, cleaning out a polluted river. I am not talking yet about a well-organized youth camp. What is attractive here is not just the so-called green aspect but the purely psychological one as well. For many young people who are not too communicative this would be a splendid opportunity to get together and make new friends.

[Glazovoy] In this area, of course, we are still underdeveloped. But, God willing, everything lies ahead. The main point is that the first shoots have already appeared. As for camps and campaigns, here the ecological section of the Lvov "Tovaristvo Leva" has succeeded. Incidentally, it is fully independent and is not a part of Zelenyy Svit. For several years in a row the young people there have done a brilliant job of organizing catamaran expeditions down the Dnestr. As a result, a detailed ecological map of this long-suffering river has been compiled. Incidentally, the Lvov people are very similar to typical Western greens: the same marches, the youth tent camps. Although when talking with young people in general, we have a problem. Our green movement is one the "oldest."

We had one other problem... You probably know the favorite line of the nuclear power supporters: "Fine, we will close the nuclear power plants and we can all live by torchlight." For this reason we are trying to offer alternatives. As for nuclear power, it would seem that through joint efforts it has already been proven that this is not the only possible way. We can manage fine without it. There are energy-saving, nontraditional sources... If we would heat the sky a little less and produce fewer goods that no one needs, we could manage easily without nuclear power plants. Let us look at how it will be in this regard with sovereignty, to whatever extent that becomes a reality. After all, at present even the most menacing decrees of the former Supreme Soviet (for example, the ones on Rubezhnoye, Lisichansk and Severodonetsk) are not functioning and will not function. No one is paying attention to them, they are not funded, and that means, where will the people who wish to carry them out come from? In addition, the Union ministries had in mind the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine with all of its decrees. Contacts with Russia are another matter. More and more they will be with the Russia of Yeltsin. But for now there exists Moscow imperial thinking (and it is Moscow thinking, not Russian thinking), and for now they look at the republics (including Russia) as if they were colonies; the only path for the greens is independence.

Let us try to abstract ourselves for a moment from personal patriotism and imagine the following profoundly pragmatic formula: "Can ecological problems in the Ukraine be resolved while we remain part of the Soviet Union in its present form?" The answer is absolutely unambiguous: "It is impossible!" And this has been proven many times. As long as the imperial structure exists, as long as every ministry conducts itself like an occupier in the republic, we will achieve nothing.

Thus, even when we discuss matters purely pragmatically, putting aside such noble feelings as patriotism, it is easy to come to the one possible conclusion: only with an independent Ukraine will it be possible to pursue ecology in a genuine way.

[Tsion] But even then there is the danger that instead of the Union monster-ministries, "native" Ukrainians will continue their evil deeds?

[Glazovoy] Yes, there is that risk. It would seem that the Ministry of the Chemistry Industry, for example, after changing from Union to republic status, will do the same things... But it will be much easier to "dish it out" to such a ministry when it is in Kiev rather than Moscow. And it will be simpler to apply pressure, although I do not comfort myself with illusions. Ecological problems will exist even in an independent Ukraine, and I have had occasion to meet many managers who are ferocious destroyers and murderers of nature, and all the same they are my compatriots. So we should not vulgarize everything and say that the whole problem lies with the "Moscow occupiers." It lies with the Moscow system, it is true, but those who carry it out are home grown. So it is naive to think that once independence has been obtained, paradise will reign. For this reason I am confident that then, too, the greens will remain in opposition.

[Tsion] Earlier you mentioned the Society for the Protection of Nature, which is currently doing well. How are yours relations with it and other environmental protection organizations developing?

[Glazovoy] At first the society displayed a hostile reaction to us, while the republic-level State Committee for Environmental Protection (Goskompriroda) tried to show that we could not be. When a small notice appeared in RABOCHAYA GAZETA in January 1988 saying that Zelenyy Svit had been established, an incredible scandal arose. D.I. Protsenko, then chairman of Goskompriroda, called Yelchenko, who in turned called the editorial board. Protsenko tried to prove that there could be no greens and that nature was the prerogative of Protsenko and her committee. But recently a public committee was established under the auspices of Goskompriroda and greens where invited to participate. The idea was that the public committee should define the policy of the state committee. Alas, as before, Goskompriroda continues to do what it considers necessary. And, after all this body has colossal rights, which to its shame and disgrace are going virtually unexercised. It can halt any construction, close down any production unit, adopt the most radical measures. But it limits itself to only symbolic fines of 20, 100 or 200 rubles. Goskompriroda is a sleeping tiger, put to sleep by its own leadership. But in general, we want to be friends with everyone. And with the Society for the Protection of Nature too. Incidentally, until recently it had about 19 million (!) members (this is more than the working population of the republic). To be fair I should note that a large number of gifted and energetic people work there, both locally, in the oblast organizations, and

even in the apparatus. But there are also those who have simply found themselves a quiet warm place. The main deficiency of the Ukrainian SPN is the impenetrable conservatism of its republic leadership.

Recently many Ukrainian SPN activists, including veterans of the society (people such as "Grandpa" Grigoriy Goncharenko, candidate of biological sciences) have been coming to us with increasing frequency, bringing with them good practical ideas. After all, we are too politicized. And, you are right, we need as many elementary ecological practices as possible in each individual home and apartment building.

[Tsion] And, in conclusion, a few words about your work in Zelenyy Svit, about the current problems of the association.

[Glazovoy] The chairman of ZS, Yu. Shervak, doctor of medical sciences and USSR people's deputy, has four assistants. A. Panov is responsible for organizational, financial and economic activities. Academician D. Grodzinskiy has taken upon himself scientific matters. Yu. Tkachenko, deals with questions of culture, and I am responsible for propaganda and ideology. However, our organization is extremely democratic, and the profoundly traditional division of responsibilities given above is subject to change.

Between sessions of the Green Council the secretariat of the association carries out all the essential functions. The role of the republic headquarters is primarily to coordinate actions; no one leads anybody in our organization. We help local organizations in each specific case by gaining publicity (if necessary) in the newspapers, by applying lobbying methods in parliament and by using existing contacts in the government, in the Academy of Sciences, etc.

As for me, aside from everything else, I am a member of the editorial board of our newspaper, ZELENYY SVIT. We publish twice a month with a circulation of 10,000. Three thousands rubles of profit, God knows, is not a lot of money, but we manage to stay afloat. We have something of a problem with premises. At present our fax machines and computers are scattered and "kept secret" in private apartments. There is nowhere to put them! Then finances... In general, we have enough money to pay for our immediate programs and to pay for the work of experts, but we are living mainly on contributions from private individuals as well as organizations. We do not collect anything from the "lower-level" organizations, nor do we have membership dues. We earn money from pins and posters. Incidentally, the price of a pin—two rubles—is the only form of dues that we have.



### Land Reclamation Planners Urged To Heed Effects on Local Conditions

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Second Edition p 3

[Interview granted to PRAVDA correspondent by Boris Stepanovich Maslov, VASKHNIL corresponding member and deputy director of the VNIIGiM [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Hydraulic Engineering and Reclamation imeni A.N. Kostyakov]: "Improving and Not Flooding; Is the Odious River Transfer 'Project of the Century' Dead?"]

[Text] Over the past 20 years alone more than 20 million hectares of land have been drained and eroded through the efforts of the former Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources so "zealously" that nearly one-third of them have become unusable. Any insight in this matter would be inconceivable without a courageous and honest realization of this fact. However, we should not pour ashes on our heads. Repentance means the restructuring of one's mind and deliberately taking another direction. The talk between PRAVDA's correspondent and B.S. Maslov, corresponding member of VASKHNIL and deputy director of the VNIIGiM imeni A.N. Kostyakov began precisely with acknowledging the need for such a level of interpretation of the errors which were made, thus giving the land reclamation workers an opportunity for a qualitatively new start.

[PRAVDA] Boris Stepanovich, judging by all available information, the "project of the century," the transfer of river waters is continuing to be promoted. Some zealous managers are impatient, once again, to "amaze the world."...

[Maslov] The endurance of this project is a tragedy for our sector. From the very beginning it caused irreparable harm to the renovation of the land, for it removed huge capital investments and the efforts of land reclamation workers from the building and reconstruction of irrigation systems and water conservation projects. The amount of reclamation in the country dropped sharply although the need for it is tremendous, particularly in the Russian Federation. In terms of the development of reclamation, the nonchernozem zone is behind the republics in the Soviet Baltic area by 30-40 years.

[PRAVDA] However, "reclamation," in its Latin sense, means "improvement" and not "flooding." Entire settlements and cemeteries in which our ancestors are buried, not suspecting that no rest will be granted to their dust, are being eliminated because of the widening of water reservoirs....

[Maslov] Features of this "great flow" are showing up here and there. This must be ended. More moisture does not mean in itself a better harvest. Surplus water brings salinity to the land and turns it into a swamp, thus destroying it.

As early as 60 years ago, Academician A.N. Kostyakov, the founder of Soviet land reclamation science, wrote that in Central Asia the mentality in water utilization is such that the amount of water supplied is greater by a factor of 2.5 than necessary. Yet a harvest can be doubled and tripled through efficient irrigation with the same amount of water resources. In order to bring order in this matter, the scientist suggested that payments be made for the water and that extensive promotion of progressive water-conserving irrigation methods be practiced.

Because of excessively generous watering, we have already removed from crop rotation millions of hectares of land and drained by one-half many lakes, rivers, and seas. In that same Central Asia, water consumption could be reduced by 40-50 percent which, incidentally, would largely resolve the problem of the Aral. No transfers would help unless we introduce in the southern irrigated land cotton and alfalfa crop rotation, which scientists have been recommending for decades. Alfalfa is the best land reclamation agent. Wherever there is alfalfa there is meat and milk and more cotton.

[PRAVDA] It is being said that narrow departmental interests of land reclamation workers have taken the upper hand, for they are being paid not for providing improved land ready for use, but on the basis of the amount of capital they have invested. But why is it that this "narrowness" has become greater than the state interests? We are losing even the pride of Russia, its symbol, the Volga, where 13 canals have been built and another six are under construction.

[Maslov] And what, one asks, will the land reclamation workers be doing if for this five-year period they are allocated tens of billions of rubles for capital investments? Whether in Antarctica or on Mars, armadas armed to the teeth will be digging canals.

[PRAVDA] I recently found out that if even a single additional hydroelectric power plant is being built in Krasnoyarsk Kray, its water reservoir could destroy the area inhabited by the Evenks. Russia no longer has any "spare" land, and we must stop its barbaric squandering.

[Maslov] For the time being, the reclamation sector has given up nothing but the former shingle of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, changing it into the Ministry of Water Construction Resources. This transformation appears like a mockery. The ministry was criticized for substandard building of reclamation systems. However, it was precisely such construction projects that became the main type of activities of the new ministry. Matters have not improved.

In order to counter the wave of criticism, the latest change of labels is being planned with the suggested creation of a concern which would replace the ministry. However, meanwhile the Union Ministry of Water Construction Resources, which is alive and well, is undertaking, without specialists on its staff, to lay gas pipelines



(many of which blow up because of substandard installation!), the building of embankments, ports, etc.

[PRAVDA] When a pie maker begins to make shoes we are in trouble....

[Maslov] Precisely! With such an approach, in addition to the already familiar "Chernobyls" and other monuments to negligence, the land reclamation workers will add a mass of other projects. The aspiration to do this is confirmed by the resolution of the Ministry of Water Construction Resources Collegium, dated 3 November 1989. This document instructs the ministry's subdivisions to provide "steady assistance in mastering the style, traditions, and professionalism of the sector in implementing the new type of construction output, such as road building in the nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR." Is it not excessively conceited to promote within the heart of Russia the "style" which was exposed clearly a long time ago in Central Asia and along the Volga?

Homo and humus are words with the same derivation. Both of them come from the Indo-European term for land. There was a time when land and man had the same meaning, for man had come from the earth and was part of the earth. Today the ruined land by the pseudo-land reclamation workers is being forcefully separated from man and frequently becomes hostile to him. This process resembles cancer or AIDS and an indifferent attitude will not stop it....

[PRAVDA] The professions of physician and reclamation workers are related. Clearly, the time has come for reclamation workers to give an oath like the Hippocratic Oath of the physicians.

[Maslov] What oath.... What we need are laws for the protection of nature, which would be effective. We must break the philistine instincts of the "cogs."

[PRAVDA] Nonetheless, to put the entire blame exclusively on the bureaucrats of the former Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and the philistines seems to me a simplification of the problem.

[Maslov] The decline of land reclamation is also related to many years of disrespect shown to the scientist. In 1966 the science of land reclamation was converted from VASKHNIL into a separate sector. It was separated from the other trends in the science of agriculture. Gradually (particularly after the ministry was taken over by P. Polad-zade) scientists became simply an object of ridicule. Meanwhile, in Saratov and Volgograd Oblast, where many hundreds of thousands of hectares are under irrigation, at the same time there was an intensive salinizing of the land. On a parallel basis, draining facilities had to be built on an area of some 100,000 hectares. But then, what kind of draining facilities, what parameters? In order to determine this, one needs experimental production sectors and systems. In all countries priority is being given to the construction of such facilities, but not in our country. Science makes demands,

while the ministry merely stamps resolutions which, as it were, remain simply pieces of paper. A total of 12 orders and resolutions of the collegium were promulgated on the building of experimental draining sectors along the Volga. Not one of them has been implemented.

[PRAVDA] If you had sounded the alarm....

[Maslov] We did! In July 1981 we, a group of scientists from various parts of the country, submitted to the CPSU Central Committee Agricultural Department, a report in which we noted with concern the low productivity of reclamation work. Our "cry from the heart" was essentially ignored.

Today there are in the country 35 million hectares of land with hydraulic land reclamation systems, which require constant supervision and maintenance. They must be repaired in order to operate for the planned length of time. However, the operational services are dragging their feet. Without proper care we risk to lose before their time thousands and thousands of hectares of renovated land.

It seems to me that in matters of shaping a new sectorial policy the recently created USSR Society of Land Reclamation Workers could do a great deal.

[PRAVDA] What is science recommending?

[Maslov] Today land reclamation scientists hold the unanimous opinion that each area and field needs its "personal" set of land reclamation measures (taking into consideration natural-ecological and economic features). For that reason reclamation must become, on the one hand, differentiated and, on the other, comprehensive. It also must be ecologically clean. The task has been set to develop and test new reclamation systems at the basic farms in the different natural zones of the country. To this effect, VASKHNIL is developing the "Food" scientific and technical program. Changing the forms of economic management in the countryside and the appearance of private farmers and lessees has predetermined the need to make corrections to the standard reclamation systems developed by the scientists.

It may sound incredible but it is a fact that so far there is no authority in our country in charge of the utilization and development of water resources. Is this not shortsightedness, to think last about what is vitally important, about the future of our very existence? In general, how is it possible to resolve land reclamation problems without dealing with water resources, without thinking about the ecology?

There is global experience. It is time to raise our sights from an overworked soil through hydraulic land reclamation to the good example of countries such as Great Britain, Hungary, and Finland, where a single ministry is in charge of both water resources and ecology.

We are neglecting our sole and unique habitat. There shall be no other. Although acknowledging in recent years many of our errors, we are limiting ourselves to the

semi-truth in terms of the ills of our native land, that same land without which there is neither bread nor comfort nor belief in the well-being of our children and grandchildren.

### Action Sought To 'Heal' Kalmykiya of Volga-Chogray Canal Project Damage

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[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent O. Shapovalov, Stavropol-Elista-Yashkul: "A Scar: Who Will Heal the Kalmyk Steppes From the Rip Opened By the Volga-Chogray Canal?"]

[Text] Did hydraulic construction worker Viktor Vasilyevich Ivanov think of eternity as he stood at the foot of the opened burial mound? How many people had roamed these lands—Sarmatians, Huns, Hazars, Polovtsy.... There was greatness and glory. Now, their leader had been dug up. An important comrade, let me point out, worth his weight in gold. Yet Ivanov felt just as powerful as the prince. The moment Ivanov, the chief of the PMK [Mobile Mechanized Column] would wave a white handkerchief, machinery and worker detachments would get into motion....

Destiny toyed with Ivanov. Last spring, Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov gathered construction and economic workers, politicians, and scientists involved in building the Volga-Chogray Canal for a serious discussion, the consequence of which was the decision to mothball the construction project.

Viktor Vasilyevich was given a new position and triumphantly assumed possession of a comfortable apartment and acquired a car without waiting for his turn. For that reason he was demoted and expelled from the CPSU. Soon afterwards, somehow unnoticeably, Ivanov vanished from Yashkul. Yet the memory of him, unless something is done, will endure through the centuries. The canal section, as much as 100 meters wide and 20 meters deep, which was dug by the PMK-57, was not destroyed even by an earthquake, for the digging was done in style.

### The Metamorphoses of the Ministry of Water Resources

The digging of the canal, one end of which stretched toward the Volga and the other to the Chogray water reservoir, was halted. Immediately afterwards, however, it became necessary to consider what to do with this huge 70-km long canal which was cutting through the autonomous republic from north to south? Ideas were suggested (such as turning it into a set of ponds for local irrigation purposes) and even projects (using it as a rowing canal, which would be no worse than the Krylatskiy). The only alternative which could be considered seriously in terms of conservation was the suggestion of the "greens," supported by the writer D. Kugultinov, to bury the canal and to restore the steppe to what it was

before the construction was undertaken. In Kalmykiya a dust storm can begin with one clump of pulled-out grass. The land reclamation workers had already maimed thousands of hectares.

Eighteen months passed. The construction workers removed all the equipment and soon the last workers will leave the base of the mechanized column. The result of the "conservation:" not a single square meter of pastureland was recultivated. The workers are leaving behind them a lunar landscape. One must be crazy to irrigate the steppe with water which has accumulated in the canal. Actually, there is already so much water in the canal that one could organize rowing competitions among schools along this ideally straight track. But before Yashkul can be proclaimed the rowing capital of the world we should ask: Who will pay for all this? The ministry has sunk in the Kalmyk sands and loam, with this project alone, more than 60 million rubles taken from your pocket and mine. The cost of the pastureland destroyed with the canal is assessed at yet another 20 million and the indirect damage is estimated at hundreds of millions.

The Chilgir Sovkhoz, in Yashkulskiy Rayon, is the first and, for the time being, the only of the victimized farms in the KASSR which is no longer appealing to the conscience of the land reclamation workers and is trying to talk the language of practical people. The minimal cost of the lost pastureland is estimated at 4.5 million rubles. Chilgir intends to demand the payment of this amount from the Stavropolvodmelioratsiya Association, with the help of the legal cooperative. The lawyers demand a fee of about 1 million, considering the difficulty of this case. There will be major difficulties. The state arbitration authority has acknowledged the validity of the claim. The rest is still up in the air. One can anticipate the stubbornness with which the reclamation workers will be defending themselves, for if Chilgir wins the case, a chain reaction of claims from other victims will follow.

It is worth cheering the Chilgir Steppe for such an initiative, the daring of which becomes particularly clear against the background of the total silence of the leadership of the autonomous republic. In his time, V. Zakharov, former first secretary of the Kalmyk CPSU Obkom, and today head of the agricultural department of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, was strongly in favor of the canal. To this day there are people in Kalmykiya who believe that the construction was stopped needlessly, for water is needed. The sovkhoz is right to demand satisfaction. But why is it necessary to plunge into debt the Stavropol reclamation workers or Uncle Petya who operated an excavator? Yes, he dug. However, his order was to dig at all cost, to dig despite the pessimistic forecasts of the scientists and despite common sense, orders which came by no means out of Stavropol. The Ministry of Water Resources and Gosagropom were vitally interested in the completion of the Volga-Chogray project which was part of the more grandiose plan of turning around the flow of northern rivers. The former received billions of rubles from the

Union budget for this canal. Meanwhile, taking water from the Volga would have inevitably led to reviving the idea of transferring the waters from the north of the country. The latter would have, as a result, a sharp increase in yields on irrigated sectors in Kalmykiya and in the eastern part of Stavropol Kray. Many people would have been awarded orders before the fields would become covered with a white layer of salt....

It is these two departments rather than the rank-and-file performers who should pay. However... the ministries no longer exist and their ministers have gone who knows where. The land reclamation workers, it appears, have an innate ability to jump out of a derailing train. The first metamorphosis involved the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, when Minister N. Vasilyev left the stage, and the name was changed to Ministry of Water Resources Construction. This did not make the ministry work more efficiently. Extracting from the blood circulation system of the state as much as 10 billion rubles annually, the land reclamation department did not supply the country with food but merely wasted millions of hectares of land. Having justifiably determined that the old personnel, even with the new label, would do the same type of work, the USSR Supreme Soviet did not approve P. Polad-zade as minister of water resources construction. In May of that year there was another twist. The reclamation workers announced to the country that they were closing down their ministry. To the amazement of the "greens" and the journalists, this was not followed by removing desks and chairs or auctioning off the property of the closed-down ministry. Immediately afterwards, the Vodstroy state concern was inaugurated, where all ministry officials, headed by P. Polad-zade, successfully moved. The functions of the concern are the same: budget financing. The only difference is that now the Supreme Soviet cannot interfere. The concern is no longer a matter for the deputies.

Therefore, Chilgir has no one to whom it could address its claim other than Uncle Petya, the excavator operator. Furthermore, in order to fill up the stinking canal, one would have to beg those who had ordered its digging. Furthermore, he would have to pay for it. The Vodstroy concern guarantees high-quality work! I have no doubt that the department or, I beg your pardon, the concern headed by P. Polad-zade will accept this project. In any case, for the time being there still is a chance of going back and... completing the canal and use more Volga water.

#### A Desert in Europe

The scientists are cautioning that Kalmykiya, as a settled territory, may vanish from the map of the country and the world as early as the end of this century. This once blossoming area will be buried under a layer of sand and dust. The desert is advancing by several kilometers annually, destroying as much as 50,000 hectares of steppe. The canal track has intensified this process.

"This is a terrifying sight," says V. Korshunov, deputy chairman of republic's Environmental Protection Committee. "We recently flew over the steppe. Along the track of the canal sand dunes had already formed and the entire land was scarred. The canal has become a trap for cattle and saiga. The number of the latter had been estimated at 1 million 50 years ago. Today it is estimated at 160,000. In the past three years the herd has not increased. The main threat to the population of such extremely rare animals is desertification.

This is not the only one, however. Yashkul hunter Vasily Ivanovich Glushchenko, who had lived for 50 years in the Kalmyk Steppe, described sadly the use to which the canal has been put by poachers. They chase the saiga herd with motorcycles into the toxic salty slush which does not freeze even in winter, at which point the slaughter of the helpless animals begins. The two-legged predators are interested neither in the meat nor the hide. All they are after are the horns.

This business developed in Kalmykiya relatively recently, when the miraculous power of a drug made from saiga horns became known. Procurement workers in the local state game farm pay as much as 90 rubles per kilogram of raw material. The cooperative farmers and the private businessmen purchase it for 120-150 rubles. In Moscow, where foreigners are very interested in this commodity, the price jumps to 270 rubles. Abroad saiga horns (the females have no horns) are worth \$500.

"The sight of this latest tragedy is indicated by flocks of eagles," Glushchenko says. "As you approach you can see carcasses with sawed-off horns."

If the saiga disappear the sheep will have no place to graze. The animals will be followed by the people who will flee the man-made desert. It will be at this point that, conveniently, the Vodstroy concern, the monopoly water transferer, will show up. The ministry's sirens promised to irrigate the steppe with the help of the waters of the Volga and thus stop the desert. Under circumstances in which people are thinking not in terms of decades but years and months, the old song could create the necessary impression. The cost of the canal in the latest (with a concrete lining) variant is close to 2 billion rubles. The moving of hundreds of thousands of people, whose life in the desert will become impossible, will cost a great deal more. I am afraid that this figure, followed by many zeros, will force the politicians to ignore the threat which the already rejected project entails: the 280 km separating the canal from the Volga will be thus dug.

Indeed, a canal filled with fresh water from the Volga, could postpone the catastrophe for a few years. But what then? It will be a desert nonetheless, the experts say, only in its worst variant: a saline desert. Unfortunately, politics is something in which occasionally the distant future is sacrificed for the sake of instant benefits. For the sake of a five-year postponement someone could quite likely invest 2 billion rubles.

### What Is To Be Done?

Above all, the canal must be buried. As to who should carry this project and how, this should be the decision of the Union government, for it is precisely with the blessings of the Council of Ministers that the implementation of this project was undertaken in the past.

Naturally, the question of "who is to blame?" is important. However, what is much more relevant today is "what is to be done?" I by no means think that gathered in the Vodstroy concern are exclusively died-in-the-wool executioners of nature who have gained their expertise in the former ministry. However, honest and thinking specialists should not be corrupted by financing the activities of the concern out of the state budget. Is it not an absurdity when within a department new "projects of the century" are being developed and implemented, while the state is generously paying for this free flight of the imagination? Vodstroy should not receive a single kopek without informing the peasant, the farmer when next to him a swamp is being drained or a canal being dug. He must be the customer, the master of the land. It is up to him to pay or not to pay, to punish or to forgive.

In the last century the Kalmyk ancestors raised more than 2 million head of cattle. The steppe was able to feed all of them and there was not even a hint of a desert. Under the Soviet system, undertaking to build canals and to plow virgin chernozem, the transformers of nature themselves launched the mechanism of desertification. This madness will not end before monopolism has been defeated. Therefore, Vodstroy should receive not a single kopek from the budget!

However they may be depicted, the land reclamation workers are not all that terrible and could indeed improve the steppe. However... last year's green wave about existing alternate projects by scientists has quieted down and no one mentions how to struggle with the first man-made desert in Europe. Meanwhile, the Kalmyk Steppe soil contains not only the best petroleum in the world but also huge reserves, entire lakes of fresh water. Extracting both would be simpler and less expensive than stringing a huge canal toward the Volga. But what is cheaper is not necessarily better for the ministry or for the concern.

It is still not too late to rescue Kalmykiya. Tomorrow the people of the steppe will join the ranks of refugees who are, as it were, flooding Russia.

Sunk in mud, going to the dead stagnant water, drinking it... bitter. Shepherds say that in the summer heat, drinking this saline water, the sheep go to join their own god. How much more will this bitterness for men and animals last?

### Ecology Committee Chairman Salykov on Aral Sea Situation

91WN0029A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA*  
in Russian No 37, 15 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with K. Salykov, chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Issues of the Ecology and Effective Utilization of Natural Resources by Vilor Niyazmatov, Uzbek SSR people's deputy: "The Sea Is Going"; date, place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Kakimbek Salykovich, the editors receive many letters in which the readers show particular alarm over the fate of the Aral Sea, the fate of those who live in this region. I would like to discuss with you the issues that concern them.

[Salykov] The situation in the Aral Sea region has gone practically beyond man's control. For the first time in the history of mankind, an entire sea is disappearing as a geographic feature. The Aral region has become an ecological disaster area. According to Goskomgridromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology] data, by comparison to 1961, in 1989 the water level had fallen by over 14 meters; the sea area has been reduced by one-third, and the total volume of water by 60 percent. The Water salinity has increased many fold. The fish have completely perished.

Up to 100 million metric tons of salt-dust waste are discharged from the dried sea bed; it is distributed over hundreds of kilometers. The climate of the Aral region is taking a serious turn for the worse. The absolute maximum daytime high temperature in summer is approaching 47 degrees Celsius, and in winter, as low as minus 17 degrees Celsius.

The sea is drying up quite intensively today. It sometimes happens that when there is a storm, the sky is covered with a solid black cloud, and there falls on the streets of cities such as Nukus, for example, a snow of sandy-salt grit. Acid rain falls, often as the rice and other grains are blossoming. Orchards and vineyards die; buildings and structures are ruined. The area of woods is being reduced by over 200 fold.

The Aral Sea is rapidly disappearing; in certain places the distance from the water to the old shoreline is 100 kilometers. The ground water level is lowered with the distancing of the sea; not only have lakes and rivers been reduced, but springs and nearby sources of underground water have disappeared.

All of this is accompanied by an expansion of the zone under the influence of intensive desertification. This is the reality of life: We lag with our measures, and nature takes its vengeance for her mistreatment, for the lagging expertise and the very poor ecological ethics of the people who stood at the helm of the economy, particularly during the time of stagnation.

The sanitation-epidemiological situation in the region has become most unfavorable; the health of the people is

deteriorating. A general clinical review in the Karakalpak area showed that over 60 percent of the population requires immediate treatment.

According to the findings of the most recent medical examinations, infant mortality per 1,000 live births is 51.9 percent; this figure nationwide is 22.2 percent. This is the truth. It is pitiful, demanding the same attention to the problems of the Aral Sea as has been paid the Chernobyl disaster.

[Correspondent] In the Karakalpak ASSR they were the first to finish the medical investigation of the entire population. What did this indicate?

[Salykov] Deviations in the state of people's health were manifested in almost 70 percent of the adult population, and in over 60 percent of the juvenile population... People are drinking bad water, there is a lack of sewerage, and population points lack amenities. Only 18 percent of the rural population uses piped water, and the remainder is forced to use water from open bodies of water and wells.

[Correspondent] We make frequent use of the concept the "Aral area." What territory does this encompass?

[Salykov] The Karakalpak ASSR and Kazakhstan's Kyzyl-Orda Oblast can be considered the center, but the overall territory is vast and expanding. Khorezm and Tashauz oblasts, as well as the three rayons of Uzbekistan's Bukhara Oblast should be considered the Aral area; in addition, three rayons of Kazakhstan's Aktyubinsk Oblast are demanding that their territorial status be included in the Aral area. I think that this demand is justified.

[Correspondent] The CPSU Central Committee and the country's Government have adopted a number of resolutions in recent years. It is that they have not yielded the needed effect?

[Salykov] Indeed, there was adopted in 1986 the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On measures for accelerating the economic and social development of the Karakalpak ASSR." This document came into being at the insistence of the Karakalpak obkom, and with the support of M.S. Gorbachev. We managed for the first time to tear away the curtain of shameful silence about the Aral catastrophe and tell the whole truth to the country.

Through this resolution, the attention of Moscow and Tashkent were most seriously turned toward the Karakalpak area. During those years, many of those guilty of the loss of the sea were still in their chairs, and their protectors were also still strong, and most importantly, there still presided the departmental dictatorship of Minvodka [USSR Ministry of Water Resources Construction], which financed, built, and accepted structures all by itself.

I recall a meeting with N. Vasilyev, then USSR minister of land reclamation and water resources. We handed him

a list of the major unfinished projects at the assimilated facilities and sovkhoses, under construction for up to 20 years, and even pointed out the facilities that existed on paper but not in reality. The minister promised to take measures, to help, and then complained to the Uzbek CP Central Committee, where former first secretary I.B. Usmankhodzhayev gave me a full lecturing, at first over the telephone, and then "discussed" me at the Central Committee buro. The Central Committee buro members of that company are all hale and hardy, and won't let you get a word in edgewise. Departmental dictatorship and the monopoly of Minvodka are exercised through allocations for capital construction. The minister was frightened that they would release less, and that was it. That is the kind of "levers" in operation.

We took the first steps toward saving the sea in the resolution I cited. I say that because the fundamental portion of the resolution was aimed at how to save people's lives. In fact, this was the very "first aid" for the people of the Karakalpak area. I will say openly that the resolution of a number of problems was dragged out. The Tuyamuinskoye farm of treatment facilities with water pipes to Nukus has practically been built, but with a year's delay. With a two-year delay, the construction of the Takhiyatashkiy water treatment and water collection facilities. The construction of the Kaparasskiy hydrohub as the receiving point for clean flood waters for drinking water collection is lagging. Even in 1990 we have shown this facility to representatives of the union and republic government. They are convinced of the work's failure, and, as they say, fundamental measures must be taken. Otherwise it will turn out that we will do a great job in providing water to the population of the Karakalpak ASSR and Khorezm Oblast, but we will supply them with water containing pesticides and other chemicals discharged into the river by the southern oblasts by those who live near the headwaters.

To put it concisely, the measures taken are being implemented poorly. But it was difficult to expect better, since the lack of feasibility was even built into this resolution of the USSR Government. There were no actual forces and resources. For several years, funds were solicited from Moscow departments on the basis of the notorious "share participation."

[Correspondent] A gloomy picture, but what way out is there; what is your committee proposing?

[Salykov] On 10 May 1990, our committee requested of the USSR Supreme Soviet that the problems associated with the desiccation of the Aral Sea be considered at the upcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet by way of monitoring the progress of the decisions made previously by the central organs.

The 27 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet decree ordered a Government commission, in conjunction with the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the involvement of foreign scientists and specialists provide for the development on a competitive basis of an idea to restore the

Aral Sea. It started on this only in 1990. Valuable time was lost. The fundamental measures have been threatened with disruption.

The "Aral" All-Union Scientific Coordinating Center is operating in Moscow. The Aral center for the region's ecological problems has been created in Nukus. A summation of all the work conducted is planned in Nukus in September, with foreign scientists invited.

[Correspondent] Don't we count too much on the power of the magic "center" in problem solving? How are they working on the issues of saving the Aral Sea in the provinces?

[Salykov] I am not an advocate of the "center's" single-version, arbitrary solutions. Nevertheless, the Aral catastrophe is not just the concern of those living in the region. It is necessary to involve the entire Union, all the minds of the planet. After all, it is a general tragedy.

To be fair, it must be said that the local leaders have become more concerned with Aral matters lately. For example, I appreciated the fact that the Aral Sea's problems were included among other important issues touched upon at a recent regional meeting of the leaders of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. I will say something else all the same: First of all, accurate information must be received.

The Aral Sea cannot be saved by the previous methods and decisions; we must work jointly. I would propose the creation of an intergovernmental coordinating council for Aral Sea problems for the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

[Correspondent] You speak of expertise in the approach to the problem of the Aral region. Please tell us, what is it you have in mind?

[Salykov] Many of our problems resulted from the low level of engineering expertise, a poor understanding of ecological ethics. And it must also be added that legal norms on conservation matters have not been operational in the country.

There must be full reliance upon science, rather than blind following of the dictatorship of the "masters" of the branches that to this day reiterate what the leaders of the era of stagnation promised. No one should dictate his "panacea" version; only collectively, through competitive selection can we find an idea for saving the sea and through Government decisions start concrete projects, and then go directly to the work.

[Correspondent] In general, is there hope for saving the Aral Sea?

[Salykov] There is hope for saving the Aral Sea. And however deeply I think about the problems of the Aral Sea, I am more and more inclined to come to the conclusion that the solution to this crisis-level problem should possibly be divided into two phases. The first of these is the preservation of the sea as a geographic entity

at least within the current parameters. This requires 25-30 cubic kilometers of water annually. I consider it important to move up the deadlines for giving the Aral Sea 21 cubic kilometers of water, previously planned for the year 2005. I believe that new approaches and the competition-based results of the search for an idea for saving the sea will find internal resources for the needs of this phase, not only for a volume of 21 cubic kilometers, but for the entire 25-30 cubic kilometers of water.

The second phase is the restoration of the sea to the 1960's level. This requires 60 cubic kilometers of water. This is a complex issue, but it must be solved. During this phase, the serious inclusion of external sources will be required, and scientists will say what these sources will be (though we have more than a few proposals on how to save the Aral Sea). We must take the most sensible solutions, ones that do not once again despoil nature somewhere else.

We have appealed to a UN organization entitled UNEP [United Nations Environment Program]. The UNEP leadership has agreed to include the problem of the Aral Sea in its program. For now, we have in hand the UNEP draft project of the program for assisting the USSR Government in developing an idea for saving the Aral Sea. We expect the arrival of its experts in mid-September. In late September-early October of this year, an international symposium on this problem will be held in Nukus.

From the editors:

The problems of the Aral Sea are not only ecological problems. They are also moral and spiritual problems. By saving the Aral Sea, we will save first and foremost all life in this land. In consideration of this, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA is undertaking the monitoring of the existing situation and developing a publication program under the heading "The Aral Sea." To implement this program, we invite the participation of our readers—scientists, writers, journalists, and cultural figures. In a word, anyone not indifferent to the pain of the Aral Sea.

#### **Turkmen Government Examines Aral Sea Impact on Tashauz Oblast**

91WN0121A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kuleshov: "Heated Debates in Tashauz"]

[Text] At its first out-of-town session in Tashauz, the republic's parliament, under the chairmanship of Turkmen President N. Niyazaov, considered the question of the ecological state of the territory along the Aral Sea and the measures to improve it.

The republic's parliament has not known previously such heated debates as those that accompanied the reported by O. Khodzhakov, chairman of the Tashauz

Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; I. Denisov, USSR Minister of Health; and A. Tsygankov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for Emergency Situations.

The question in the course of the session was raised point-blank: is there or is there not to be a population in Tashauz Oblast? "If, in the next ten years, no cardinal steps are taken to improve it, the people will have to move out of the oblast." Those words were heard at the session.

The bacterial contamination of the sources of drinking water in Tashauz Oblast exceed all the standards by a factor of more than 10. The chief source—the Amu-Darya, with its formerly tasty water—has been turned essentially into a runoff ditch today. There is just one cause—the hundreds of millions of cubic meters of unpurified runoff and drainage-collection water that is dumped into the river from interpublic collection systems. And so children and adults are becoming ill. "Recently conducted clinical treatment has revealed that 70 percent of the population in the oblast are suffering from various ailments. Among them, the hepatitis disease rate is especially high," V. Rashidov, chairman of the Tashauz Oblast Ispolkom, stated at the session.

"Has this question been the object of discussion by the members of the emergency commission even once?" deputy O. Ovezgeldyyev asked A. Tsygankov. "Because what we have here is not simply an emergency situation. What we have here is a crime against humanity, a kind of ecological genocide!"

The Supreme Soviet instructed the Committee on Ecology and the Protection of the Public's Health to modify, with a consideration of the discussion that occurred at the session, the draft of the decree governing the ecological condition of the territories alongside the Aral Sea in the republic and the measures to improve it.

### Handling of Railroad Toxic Spill in Kuybyshev Oblast Criticized

91WN0121B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
18 Nov 90 Union Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Zhigalov, Kuybyshev Oblast: "River of Benzene in Paper Banks: Report With Partiality"]

[Text] The poison that was spilled during a railroad accident has returned to the apartments of many residents of Togliatti with their drinking water.

The accident that happened at the Zhigulevskoye More station was one of the ordinary ones. A railroad car rolled down the classification hump and rammed a tank car containing benzene. Seventy-one tons of the poisonous and highly explosive liquid spread alongside of the tracks. All it could take was one dropped cigarette stub or one spark, and a wall of fire 200 meters high could burst into flames over the railroad junction. Thank

God, that didn't happen. The firemen quickly covered the benzene lake with foam. The railroad workers dumped onto the flames the mixture of sand and gravel that happened to be at hand.

That happened on Saturday. A report on the accident was given to the local rayon ispolkom. But the sanitation and environmental-protection services did not receive a report on the accident until Monday. It was not until then that people remembered the water-supply intake alongside the station. Readings taken by the sanitation physicians showed that the benzene concentrations in the drinking water exceeded the maximum admissible ones by a factor of 9! The water-supply intake was shut down.

The Safety Rules published by the USSR Ministry of Railroads state, concerning the group of substances that include benzene, "Dangerous when inhaled. Poisonous when swallowed. Possible fatal outcome if inhaled..."

What, then, was the concentration of benzene on the weekend, when the completely unsuspecting housewives were cooking soup and bathing their children? No one can say.

Even as I was preparing this report, I happened to hear for I don't know which time about the partialities shown by "those journalists" for dramatizing absolutely everything. But, actually, no one has ever got hot under the collar or exploded because we are like that. The inhabitants who drank the water containing the benzene did not have to go to the hospital to be treated for poisoning. So is it necessary to inform millions of people?

I am convinced that it is, indeed, necessary. If only because the accident at the Zhigulevskoye More station is as identical as two drops of benzene to dozens of other accidents on the railroad and on pipelines carrying various products. Seas of spilled petroleum products, and of the very same benzene (this is not the first time it has been spilled in Kuybyshev Oblast) get into the ground water and return to us through the faucets in our kitchens and bathrooms. Who will forecast the remote consequences for the health of the people who have used water with the poisonous admixtures dissolved in it? And, finally, who will answer, and how will they answer, for the pollution of the underground water?

All these questions that were projected onto the accident at Zhigulevskoye More, it would seem, give a general picture of the problems linked with eliminating the consequences of similar accidents. Is it possible today, a month after the accident, to breath a sigh of relief, because everything has passed? In order not to "dramatize" the situation, I would like to quote the findings of hydrologists: "...As of the moment when the benzene was spilled, the ambient temperature was lower than +5 degrees, and that enabled some of this substance to be held in the surface layer of soil in the form of a whitish crystalline mass. Subsequent rises in the ambient temperature, and also the rains, will lead to an increase in the pollution of the underground water..."



The possibility of the migration of the benzene to the Komsomolskiy and Fedorovski water intakes is the highest... It is impossible to preclude the probability that the benzene will break through to the Pribrezhnyy water intake. Therefore the benzene will keep the sanitation and epidemiological service in a state of tension for even longer.

It turns out that things have not passed by. It turns out that "these journalists" have by no means been dramatizing the situation.

Where, then, is the way out? Accidents on the railroad and in the product pipelines that involve spills of toxic substances are a sad but real inevitability. One wonders whether any of the individuals potentially guilty of polluting the underground water in the event of such accidents has ever thought of preventing this. The railroad workers haven't. In the instruction manual governing "the elimination of accident situations with dangerous types of freight, when they are being shipped by rail," recommendations for eliminating accidents with dangerous types of freight are given on almost 300 pages. In the list of the necessary actions, one constantly encounters the instructions "wash with water..." "wash off with a large amount of water..." It is as though the authors are unaware that everything that has been washed off will be absorbed by the soil and will enter the underground water.

The question of how to prevent various toxic substances from penetrating into the ground water in the event of accidents has also left the local firemen in a quandary. "All that we have is water and foam..."

But who is alarmed by this? The departmental interests do not extend farther than the official instructional manuals. It is more complicated to understand the position taken by the environmental-protection, sanitation, and legal-protection agencies. Because who, if not these agencies, is supposed to hold the polluters and ruiners of the environment accountable? But it turns out that their holding of them accountable does not extend, so to speak, deeper than the surface of the earth. Yes, the Kuybyshev Oblast Environmental-Protection Committee has sounded a loud alarm and has convoked a board, inviting the guilty individuals and the involved administrative levels. And, finally, it made assignments of who had to do what. But will that decision be carried out? I doubt it. Why? Because the committee itself, essentially speaking, to this very day, does not have any official or legal status. There is no statute, there are no laws to protect the environment in the republic. Moreover, can an oblast-rank committee oppose departments if it is supported by the local budget? So, for a month, the committee workers have been attempting to organize the scientific forecasting of the consequences of the benzene accident. They have been attempting to knock on various doors at plant laboratories, asking them to help analyze the soil at the accident site. They either refuse or impose such an exorbitant price that the committee

cannot afford it. They make telephone calls to Moscow. And the people there make promises...

It would appear that the railroad workers have not been refusing to pay the expenses linked with also eliminating the consequences of the accident, but it has turned out that there are no methodologies according to which it would be possible to compute the "underground" damage caused.

And what has the transportation procurator's office undertaken? For more than half a month it has been planning to bring a criminal case to court. But that case has not been brought yet.

But even if the criminal case is indeed brought to court, this does not mean in any way that the guilty individuals will be punished by court procedure. During the past year and a half, out of more than ten cases involving accidents that were transferred to the procurator's office, the court has not yet convened to deal with even one of them...

### **Perceived Plan by French Firm To Exploit Astrakhan Oil Alarms Public**

#### **Fears Outlined**

*91WN0040A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by Yu. Chuykov, chairman, Astrakhan Oblast Soviet of Peoples' Deputies Standing Commission on the Ecology and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources: "Attempt by Contract: French Oil Company Threatens Astrakhan Kray Environment"]

[Text] Advertisement is the engine of progress. We are gradually becoming accustomed to this, ceasing to be surprised and wide-eyed when we come upon the hectare-long names of foreign firms in the newspaper pages. But all the same, a recent series of advertisements in PRAVDA struck hard upon the nerves of thousands of Astrakhantsy. Under its "miracle-making" influence, telephones in the officials' reception rooms came alive, meetings began to roar, and inquiries took flight to the obkom, the oblispolkom and higher—to Moscow, the government of Russia and the country. It looks as if the magical advertisement for the French company ELF Aquitaine (which this article is about) has performed a dubious service. But—everything in order.

At first glance, there is nothing special about the advertisement's text. Statistics are quoted on the company's annual turnover and other financial indicators.

Eighty of the world's countries have trusted this company to carry out petroleum product exploration under their soil. Remarkable! And how can one not be pleased that ELF Aquitaine does not forget about people's health and the attractiveness of our women, contributing funds to more than 100 medical, perfume and other firms. So what is so bad? This is: this time, the object of the



company's interest is the Volga delta and the North Caspian. Let's read the text of the advertisement more carefully: "An historical date. On May 23, 1990 in Moscow, Mr. Nikitin, USSR Oil and Gas Ministry first deputy minister, and Mr. Le Floch-Prigent, president of the ELF Aquitaine company, signed the first large-scale agreement on oil exploration and processing in the USSR. On a territory measuring greater than 35 thousand square kilometers on the Volga delta, the USSR is opening its underground riches to a foreign oil partner for the first time."

It was these lines that upset the Astrakhantsy. They thought that the historical date was a completely different one—February 23, 1990, when a special session of the oblast Soviet announced that the entire territory of the oblast was an ecological disaster zone. In the resolutions of the session it was written that remedying the ecological situation would be impossible without basic changes in the national economic structure and the establishment of an ecological priority. But what does it matter to the Misters Nikitin, Salmanov and even more, to Le Floch-Prigent, that the environment is dying in a once rich and beautiful region, that people's health is worsening, and that the agriculture and fishing industries are on the brink of disaster due to the catastrophic pollution and destruction of the natural environment. What is being threatened are the delta lowlands, the territory and the waters of the Astrakhan State Biospheric Preserve and the wetlands. Incidentally, our country is responsible for these things according to international agreements. The session has appealed to the Supreme Soviet and to the USSR Council of Ministers with a request that they declare saving the Volga a national task, that they develop and finance a general government project to save it, and that they proclaim the North Caspian and the Lower Volga reserve zones.

And isn't the Soviet-French contract, which would hand over the last untouched corners of the Volga delta and the Caspian to the petroleum industry, the answer to this request?

Incidentally, it is exactly these places that the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan announced to be reserve zones, where only fishing and water transport would be developed. What happened to republic sovereignty? Where then is the people's right to administer the natural resources of their native land? We are being asked these kinds of questions by our deputies and our voters. And we don't know how to answer them. Because nobody asked for our approval, nobody listens to our decisions.

Besides, the Astrakhantsy, unlike the directors of the French firm, know that this is by no means the first time that the "USSR has opened its underground riches" to foreign firms. Only the best of Western technology was used, if one is to believe the directors of the Gazprom concern, in the construction and start-up of the Aksaray-skiy gas-refining complex. After three years of illegal operation, it was declared economically and ecologically

bankrupt. Astrakhantsy feel fear and hatred towards it. Informal ecological organizations in the oblast are threatening a public suit against the directors of the complex. The oblast procurator has appealed to the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies for approval to institute criminal proceedings against the general director of the Astrakhangazprom production association, who is a people's deputy. Of course, no public suit or criminal trial will solve all the ecological problems in one stroke. They will not solve them as long as everything in the country is decided somewhere there, at the top. And we here, "below", will be the ones who pay for it, still not knowing where we have the authority or not. And what kind of progress is an advertisement like this "driving forward"?

### Deputy Minister Refutes Claims

91WN0040B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 14 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by F. Salmanov, first deputy USSR minister of geology: "An Error Begets an Error"]

[Text] Respected editors! I would like to make some corrections in the article by Yu. Chuykov, "Attempt by Contract," which was published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA September 26, 1990. It talks about cooperative work with a French oil company that allegedly presents a threat to the environment of the Astrakhan kray. The material referred to was occasioned by the firm's July 14, 1990 publication in PRAVDA of advertising material that allowed an irritating lack of accuracy in reference to the geographical location of the region for the proposed projects.

In reality, an agreement was signed May 23, 1990 with the ELF Aquitaine company on basic principles for cooperation in the exploration, research and development of hydrocarbon deposits in regions that have been agreed upon in the Volgograd, Saratov and Aktyubinsk oblasts of the USSR.

The article provides the reader with disinformation, evoking a lot of talk about "squandering the underground riches of the Astrakhan Oblast" and that the state of the environment is getting worse, talk which will produce a negative effect on attempts to attract foreign firms to work on projects in the country as a whole. The region of operations for the company that has been formed does not concern the Astrakhan Oblast at all, and certainly poses no threat to its environment, as it is located in the northeastern part of the Volgograd Oblast all of 600-700 km from the Caspian Sea. The author should have figured out the geography of the region of operations before sending his article to the newspaper.

One of the elements of curing the country's economy is the attraction of foreign capital, of new environmentally clean technologies, of modern technical methods that are lacking in the USSR, in part through the creation of joint

(with foreign firms) enterprises. The concept referred to is a basic ingredient of all economic programs, including the RFSFR's.

One joint enterprise of this type is being formed on the basis of oil deposit exploration, research and development in the Volgograd, Saratov and Aktyubinsk oblasts of the USSR by the French firm ELF Aquitaine, the USSR Oil and Gas Ministry [Minneftegazprom] and the USSR Ministry of Geology [Mingeo]. The regions of operations were agreed upon with the local soviets, as well.

The region of operations differs greatly from the Astrakhan region in its economic conditions (specifically, in the content of hydrogen sulfide). A discovery of hydrocarbon deposits with a hydrogen sulfide content of up to 1 percent is predicted. Incidentally, at the Astrakhan gas refinery deposit, the sulfur content was greater than 20 percent.

At this time, the ministries are doing a lot of work towards preserving the environment. The attraction of foreign firms that are considered authorities all over the world on ecologically clean technologies will be of advantage not only for the region, but for the country as a whole.

A word of advice to the author—Comrade Chuykov, chairman of the Standing Commission on the Ecology. Before writing an article for a newspaper, in order to orient oneself correctly on the issue, it would have been necessary to consult with specialists. If this had been done, the question "what kind of progress is an advertisement like 'driving forward'" would never have been asked.

The newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA enjoys great authority among Soviet people. Its authority would be even greater if its published materials were verified. It is most unfortunate that the beloved newspaper has repeated the irritating lack of accuracy that was permitted in PRAVDA's advertising material.

#### **Chairman Outlines Purpose of Newly Formed Chernobyl Committee**

91WN0041A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
28 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with V.A. Gubanov, chairman of the Committee to Eliminate the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Accident by PRAVDA UKRAINY journalist A. Sokol, date and place not specified: "We Are Counting on Trust"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] At the state level the Union Governmental Commission has been concerned with the Chernobyl disaster for more than four years; it was established immediately after the disaster and consists of leaders who have worked on it intermittently, on a voluntary basis one should add. Recently a Committee to Eliminate the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Accident was finally

formed as part of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Emergency Situations. V.A. Gubanov was appointed to head it up. What is this new governmental body like? What are its duties?

[Sokol] Viktor Afanasyevich (Gubanov), a few words about yourself, please, about how your fate has been linked with Chernobyl.

[Gubanov] I am a physicist by training. I worked mainly in Kazakhstan, in the city of Shevchenko. I went there as a young specialist, became director of the atomic power plant and was chosen first secretary of the party gorkom. For the last two years I have worked for the USSR Ministry of the Atomic Energy Industry; I was responsible for nuclear and radiation safety, including safety in the Chernobyl zone.

[Sokol] The committee which you head has just been established; it is probably too early to talk about its work. What can be said about the tasks which are to be solved?

[Gubanov] The range of issues is broad, as is the problem itself. The committee's main concern is to work out state programs and monitor their fulfillment. I would like to single out as well its coordinating role. It will coordinate the actions of each and every organization—state, public and international—which is participating in the work to eliminate the aftereffects of the disaster. We are trying not to duplicate the existing governmental structures—we are looking for our own specific characteristics; we are defining our own style of work. I would like to say the following about its features.

We will make all major decisions in consultation with the affected Union republics. The question is how should this be done? Above all, through the Governmental Commission. It would seem that it has not outlived its usefulness; it needs to be retained, but with a change in composition. Here the Union republics must take their own places. Their leaders concerned with Chernobyl are deputy chairmen. Coordinated, jointly-adopted resolutions by this organ will determine the committee's policy. And the actions of the committee itself are to be taken in a similar way: with mandatory participation by the Union republics. It is proposed to establish an inter-republic council for inter-nationality cooperation.

We are counting on trust and confidence in the committee to play an important role its work. We take this factor into account when choosing personnel; we are looking for specialists who have a profound knowledge of their field and who are capable of becoming authoritative figures, whose opinions will carry weight with the victims of the disaster.

[Sokol] Tell us in more detail about the people working on the committee. Specifically, how many are there and what kind of training do they have?

[Gubanov] The number of committee members is small; there are 60 people. Its nucleus comes from the department concerned with Chernobyl problems of the USSR Council of Ministers Committee for Emergency Situations.

The committee has four departments for the following purposes: formulating and monitoring the fulfillment of state programs; scientific support; medicine; radiation safety and social problems; work with the public; coordinating international cooperation. The department in charge of formulating and monitoring the fulfillment of state programs will be closely linked with the republics. It is to have a sector which will be concerned as well with local problems. We must know what people are thinking, what concerns them. The remaining subdivisions are functional ones. The scientific support department, for example, will coordinate the efforts of institutes and scientific institutions, etc.

Each of the departments will be enclosed in specific structures in the republics. They, as is well known, are already in operation. The Ukrainian and Belorussian committees have state status. Russia's is being determined. It is clear there will be the same subdivision here as in the Union. We can see that differences have appeared at the very beginning. But I do not think that this factor is fundamental. What is important is that both the Union and republic-level committees take coordinated steps. Such actions are especially necessary when determining social benefits and compensation. Competition in this area is completely unacceptable.

As a result of the current uncertainty in economic relations between the regions and the center, financial support for urgent measures planned for 1991-1992 is a source of concern. All the republics must allot a portion of their profits for Chernobyl. It is necessary to share.

Since the conversation has touched on money, I will say one more thing. It is important that it be utilized efficiently. The program of urgent measures for 1991-1992 calls for the expenditure of more than 16 billion rubles. The amounts are enormous. The yield must be in proportion.

In the program under discussion the tasks are listed in an integrated fashion. Now they must be "interpreted" and made more specific. This especially concerns the work for 1991.

There is a proposal to have the 1991 plans examined by the appropriate expert councils. Let the specialists have their say at the beginning, let them judge how much the proposed measures will help with the realization of the program which has been set out. And then we shall make the final decision. The money must be channeled in the the best possible way.

[Sokol] Experts from USSR Gosplan, for example, have already examined these questions. I was present at one of these investigations—it was a difficult session. Due to the lack of criteria on which to determine the true state

of affairs, fruitless discussions developed. And the Gosplan policy is well known: a measure which is not sufficiently substantiated is excluded from the plan. And we are talking about the fate of thousands of people...

[Gubanov] A qualified expert commission on scientific programs is possible. As for criteria for living in the radiation-polluted territories—state ones!—they are being determined and will soon exist. It is essential to clarify this situation.

Under the program of urgent measures it has been determined what will be done by the Union ministries and agencies and what by the republic-level ones. The expert councils (with participation by representatives of the republics) will give their conclusions only through departmental plans. When they are accepted, the committee will monitor their fulfillment. We do not intend to subject the programs of the republics to any expert commissions. USSR Gosplan will consider them, and the Governmental Commission will give the final approval. The discussion, after all, is about billions; there must be organized forms for their distribution. The republics themselves will exercise supervision.

Two important documents on Chernobyl are being prepared at present. One of them concerns the criteria for residing in the affected regions. The state has not established the following: what level of pollution makes it dangerous to live there, thus requiring mandatory resettlement; the level at which one can leave voluntarily and receive compensation; what is required for those who remain, what kind of benefits are to be granted to them, given that there is no threat to their health. The document being prepared will dot all the i's. I emphasize: at the state level.

A parallel effort is centered on a law being drafted concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe. It will resolve many problems. Specifically, it will define the status of those affected. According to categories! Compensation and benefits will be established in accordance with the categories.

[Sokol] The Declaration Concerning State Sovereignty of the Ukraine proposes supremacy for the laws of the republic.

[Gubanov] One would hope that generally acceptable decisions are made. A single foundation and a shared approach are needed. And the source of support for all of this is science and only science.

The sociopolitical situation today is such that it is necessary to reflect, to distinguish genuine concern for the affected from exploitation of the circumstances and from pseudo-concern.

[Sokol] You have visited the 30-kilometer zone and its facilities, you have become acquainted with a region where people are living with radiation pollution. As chairman of the committee, what thoughts have occurred to you after all of this?

[Gubanov] I have become convinced once again of the complexity of the problem. It has a multitude of nuances, and they must be taken into consideration in each individual case. Our decisions must be considered ones. We simply cannot make mistakes.

### **Current Chernobyl Impact on Kiev Urban Area Detailed at Roundtable**

*91WN0041B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Sep 90 p 2*

[Roundtable discussion with Academician V.G. Baryakhtar, vice-president of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Academician D.M. Grodzinskiy, head of the Department of Biophysics and Radiobiology of the Institute of Cell Biology and Genetic Engineering of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences; L.V. Skripka, candidate of biological sciences, chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies on Problems Related to the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Disaster; V.M. Didychenko, head of the Main Administration for Health Care of the Kiev Gorispolkom, led by D. Kiyanskiy, date and place not specified: "Kiev: The Fifth Year After Chernobyl": first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] When the discussion turns to the inhabited areas of the republic which suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station], people usually remember the small cities and villages located in Kiev and Zhitomir oblasts, as well as in the areas which found themselves in the western or southern path of the disaster. And often they lose sight of the city of 3 million, which it is less than 100 kilometers away from the AES in a straight line. If one looks at the map of radiation pollution published in the newspapers, then it may seem as if all the unpleasantness ends at the boundaries of Kiev's northern rayons. Is that the case? What is the situation in the republic's capital today—four years after Chernobyl? This was the subject of a roundtable meeting organized by Ukrinform with the following participants: Academician V.G. Baryakhtar, vice-president of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences; Academician D.M. Grodzinskiy, head of the Department of Biophysics and Radiobiology of the Institute of Cell Biology and Genetic Engineering of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences; L.V. Skripka, candidate of biological sciences, chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies on Problems Related to the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Disaster; and V.M. Didychenko, head of the Main Administration for Health Care of the Kiev Gorispolkom.

[Kiyanskiy] In the first days after the Chernobyl accident, when the republic's health care leaders were persuading us that nothing terrible had happened, some Western information media called Kiev the "Soviet Hiroshima." Of course, this was a metaphor. Nonetheless, how closely did this correspond to reality?

[Grodzinskiy] In Kiev there was no blast, no mass radiation injury, and there were no enormous doses. Nonetheless, while the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained several tens of kilograms of nuclear material, the RBMK reactor contained 192 tons. During the explosion, according to estimates by specialists, 3.7 percent of the fuel was expelled, and it contained a great diversity of radionuclides. Another unfavorable factor was the isotope composition of the fission products. In the Japanese cities their total decay curve dropped to small values more sharply. In other words, in Chernobyl the decay is taking place much more slowly. Thus, in terms of the expelled radioactivity, the Chernobyl catastrophe exceeds Hiroshima by several orders of magnitude. But if we take the aftereffects which will appear over several decades, it is as great as the Japanese tragedy in terms of its influence on people's health.

[Kiyanskiy] Four years have passed since the Chernobyl AES disaster. Can any statistical conclusions be drawn regarding the influence of small doses of radiation (and are these doses so low?) on the health of Kiev residents? At one time the city's residents were being accused of "radiophobia." Who proved to be right: they or those who accused them of being faint-hearted?

[Didychenko] If "radiophobia" has been observed, I think that is only because in the first post-Chernobyl days Kiev residents were completely deprived of the necessary information. And lack of information and fear are cousins. Nor do we by any means know all the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe even today. Some will appear in 10-15 years, others significantly later. But I am firmly convinced of one thing: any dose of radiation is harmful for a human being. Today a majority of representatives from health care support the "nonthreshold" concept. However, the aftereffects are already being seen even now. I will cite some data, which have not yet been reported in the press. In comparison with 1985, the incidence of oncological diseases has increased 2.4 percent. That includes an 82.6 percent increase in thyroid tumors and 51.4 percent increase in oral cavity tumors. An increase in blood diseases among children has been noted, especially in the last two years. It is not difficult to understand how important it is to improve the dispensary service. Unfortunately, however, the city health care facilities do not have at their disposal the necessary resources (up-to-date genetic laboratories, hemo-analyzers, various kinds of ultra sound equipment).

[Grodzinskiy] Here one should also talk about the substantial reduction in the antiviral and anticancerogenic immunity of Kiev residents. In addition, Belorussian scientists think that damage to the thyroid gland sustained during those days of 1986 when a cloud of radioactive iodine passed over the city will have an effect on the growth of tumors.

[Skripka] I want to cite some data which until very recently were considered strictly secret. Due to the delay

in carrying out iodotherapy in Kiev, the load on residents' thyroids increased 15-fold in comparison with that of people who took the iodine preparations and stayed indoors, and two-fold in comparison with that of people who took these preparations but spent most of their time outdoors.

Recently our commission heard from a woman whose daughter had received—according to the model for one-time uptake of iodine into the thyroid—40 rems (roentgen equivalent man); the measurements were taken in late May and early June 1986, when the child had already been taken out of the city. And this means that in reality the dose may have been much greater. The little girl is now seriously ill. But what I want to emphasize is that at the time of the accident at the AES she did not live in Chernobyl, but in Kiev on Shchusev Street. We now have before us the problem of determining how many other such children there are in the city. They all need to be helped, and without delay.

Unfortunately, we have just as inadequate knowledge about the pollution of foodstuffs by radioactive iodine; we have only a poor idea of what kind of doses we may have received by eating them. The commission has data which provide evidence that a child up to the age of four who drank a liter of milk per day in May 1986 may have ingested with it 74 rems and 7.4 rems with 100 grams of green vegetables. It is true that these measurements were carried out in the 30-kilometer zone, but according to extremely reliable information, the level of iodine-131, for example, throughout Kiev was nearly 10-fold greater than it was in Pripyat, which can be explained by the vagaries of the wind.

Today it is well known that Kiev received fallout from those same radioactive substances (zirconium, niobium, cesium, barium, lanthanum, ruthenium and a whole series of others, including transuranium elements) as Prip'yat. Moreover, research carried out in the hospital of the UkSSR Committee for State Security has shown that a similar spectrum of substances (with the exception of uranium, for which no test was carried out) was also present in the blood of humans. At the same time, it is well known that rubidium, for example, may influence our psyche. In this connection the concept of radiophobia acquires a deeply clinical nature.

[Grodzinskiy] But when it was uttered by certain health care leaders in the republic it had an almost insulting edge to it. Moreover, a phobia is a nervous disorder, but by no means is it the faint-heartedness of which they accused the residents of Kiev and other cities of the Ukraine.

[Kiyanskiy] What is the source of the data on the amount of iodine and the list of radioactive substances from which the republic's capital received fallout?

[Skripka] They were presented by staff members at Institute of Nuclear Research of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences.

[Didychenko] Although the Kiev children received smaller doses of radiation to the thyroid than, for example, the children in the Polesskiy and Ivankovskiy rayons of Kiev Oblast or in the Ovruchskiy and Narodichskiy rayons in Zhitomir Oblast; nonetheless, the collective dose which they received is more than one third the radiation dose received by the thyroids of children in the eight rayons of the Ukraine which suffered the most from the Chernobyl accident (due to greater numbers). For this reason radiation-induced illnesses must be given particular attention by Kiev endocrinologists—both scientists and practitioners, and all the more because the residents of the city received definite doses of radiation with food products as well, especially in the first days after the Chernobyl catastrophe.

[V.G. Baryakhtar] As early as 30 April 1986 the Institute of Nuclear Research of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences assembled an emergency commission. At that time we understood that milk would be one of the main sources of radionuclide intake into the human body. Literally within several days the necessary equipment was prepared and installed at all four of the city's milk plants. And staff members from the Academy of Sciences—specialists in radiation physics—were on duty there constantly. For this reason I can state authoritatively: polluted food did not enter the diet of Kiev residents from these enterprises. Soon afterwards similar equipment began to operate at the bread plants and markets.

In addition, as early as May 1986 we had at our disposal a map of the pollution caused by radionuclides expelled from the reactor, and we took into account not only the presence of iodine, cesium and strontium, but other elements as well: the total accumulation was included in the calculation. As a result the UkSSR Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Health posed the question of whether to remove children from Kiev in the summer of 1986.

[Skripka] Nonetheless, food products are still being tested for cesium, and they do, after all, still contain strontium.

[Kiyanskiy] Is it technically possible to determine the presence of this element?

[Baryakhtar] It is much more difficult to carry out these kinds of analyses. Fortunately, during the accident significantly less strontium was expelled than might have been expected. For this reason less attention is also being devoted to it now. But I agree fully that it is essential to carry out research on strontium as well. The institutions of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences have developed sufficiently effective instruments for measuring pollution not only by gamma but also by beta radiation. As far back as a year and a half ago they were handed over to industrial enterprises for production but they are not being produced yet. Now a new generation of instruments has appeared, which make it possible to measure the radionuclide content of food products. And in general I am convinced that the level of radiation must be

monitored more rigorously. Instruments which measure accurately to  $10^{-8}$  are no longer good enough for us. The degree of pollution must be clearly determined to a level of  $10^{-9}$ . This is the same as shifting from scales which weigh in pounds to instruments which weigh in kilograms.

[Kiyanskiy] And what can be said about alpha particles? Did plutonium fall within the city boundaries?

[Baryakhtar] These kinds of particles, fortunately, are concentrated mainly in the five-kilometer zone (true, certain traces of them have been found in the 30-kilometer zone). Is there plutonium in Kiev? Unfortunately, yes. The question is only in what quantity. According to information which I have at my disposal, the concentrations of it which have been established here are not dangerous to health.

[Skripka] Recently a resident of the city came to our commission after discovering a source of radioactive radiation in his apartment—under the wallpaper. We sent the material scraped off the wall to the Institute of Nuclear Research of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences and learned that indeed it did contain a hot particle. This proves once again: while it is technically impossible to inspect all the apartments in this city of 3 million, it is essential to inspect as soon as possible the premises of buildings opened (or reopened after capital repairs) during the summer of 1986.

[Kiyanskiy] However, I would like to return to health care issues. How might the aftereffects of the Chernobyl disaster show up in the future?

[Didychenko] Unfortunately, I cannot say anything optimistic. Kiev residents need only the truth. And the truth is that we must be prepared for a definite increase in oncological diseases and blood diseases among children. However, there is as yet no integrated concept of possible changes in the health status of the city's residents. If one is being absolutely honest, neither I nor my colleagues know what effect the Chernobyl accident will have in two or three years. That is for the scientists to say. But in order to change substantially the financing of medicine Kiev needs to be declared a city which has suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

[Skripka] A session of the city's soviet of people's deputies appealed on this subject to the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the president of the country and even to the UN, but the question, alas, has not been resolved. Granting Kiev this status means the appropriation of very significant sums of money. We are talking here about billions of rubles. And the financial state of the country today leaves much to be desired.

[Baryakhtar] This kind of decision requires very serious substantiation. It is generally accepted throughout the world that during a lifetime a person may accumulate no more than seven rems, that is, 0.1 rem per year. However, from natural radon alone we accumulate 3-5 times more than that. But the radiation which Kiev residents receive annually due to Chernobyl is less than 0.1 rem.

I lived in the Donbass for 10 years. For every person there approximately a ton of harmful chemical substances is given off per year. In the face of this, the life span is significantly lower than the average for the Ukraine. Social justice would require that having declared Kiev an ecological disaster zone, the same would have to be done with regard to the Donbass, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog, etc. But after all, the western oblasts of the republic are also oversaturated with chemicals. I think that it was these considerations that lay at the heart of the decision by the UKSSR Supreme Soviet to declare the entire Ukraine to be an ecological disaster zone.

[Skripka] The fact that the Donbass and other regions of the republic are sick is not open to doubt. But let us make a precise diagnosis in each case. When talking about Kiev's illness, it is essential to determine what kind of radiation doses its residents received. According to the data available to us, one can talk about five-seven rems accumulated during 1986 alone, solely from internal irradiation, without taking into account alpha-decay or any external influence.

[Baryakhtar] According to my information the doses which Kiev residents received in 1986 were significantly less than those cited by L.V. Skripka.

[Kiyanskiy] What is the total dose accumulated as of today?

[Grodzinskiy] We will not resolve this question until we organize so-called retrospective dosimetry on a very serious basis. There are several methods which make it possible to establish past doses. One of them is radiospectroscopy of the tooth enamel. I am confident that our physicists could master it quite quickly. The cytogenic method is another, perhaps more accurate, way. It is being used in the FRG, in particular, to clarify what kind of dose was received by several citizens of that country, who left Kiev on 3 May 1986. The dose has proved to be higher than that which was recorded in our country on the basis of radiometric measurements.

[Baryakhtar] These methods, of course, are essential and it will not be difficult to master them at the institutes of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences. However, even without them we understand clearly that a very serious situation has developed. However, when making any given decision, we should weigh realistically what the republic has available today. With both hands I vote for all Kiev residents to be supplied with pure foodstuffs. But when there are not enough of them, the children, pregnant women and young people who will become mothers and fathers should be supplied first. We should tell the population honestly what we have available.

[Didychenko] I would like to add that the equipment in our genetic laboratories, including the one at the Kiev Scientific Research Institute of Pediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology, is out of date. Nor does the city have enough specific medicines, multivitamins or radioprotective products.

[Kiyanskiy] But the costs for this are not so great. Can the state not take them upon itself? After all, it is not the Kiev residents themselves who are guilty of the Chernobyl disaster.

[Didychenko] Why demand it from the state when there is a specific culprit? Minatomenergoprom (Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry) should long ago have repaid the debt to the city's health care services by giving it substantial financial assistance.

[Baryakhtar] At present the republic's government is considering a large program to produce entero-sorbents, which are necessary to draw harmful substances out of the body. A Kiev plant will produce them. An agreement to supply the raw materials has been signed with the Central Asian republics. We will receive the first batch of sorbents this year, and next year up to 100 tons of them will be produced.

[Grodzinskiy] Many of our diseases are linked to our self-induced state of vitamin deficiency; we have been afraid to buy fruits, vegetables and greens. At the same time the increased risk should be countered by including in foodstuffs those substances which are anticarcinogens and antimutagens. Moreover, they are well known to science. One would like to ask why has the Kiev Scientific Research Institute on Food Hygiene been silent up to now? Is it not time for it to speak up?

[Kiyanskiy] Kiev newspapers regularly publish maps of the city's radioactive pollution. But, unfortunately, they are too general and schematic. Is there any possibility of preparing more detailed maps, for example, maps which show individual city blocks?

[Baryakhtar] They already exist for cesium as well as strontium, and for various radioisotopes (unfortunately there are no maps for plutonium so far). Obviously it would be good to publish them in the form of a special atlas.

[Skripka] The Kirovgeologiya Production Association produces a gamma radiation survey of the city rayons. Its specialists do not determine what is contained in a specific place. They are interested only in its contours and elevations above the reference level. As of today 3,500 such points have been discovered, ranging from 0.5 to 20 curies per square kilometer. At present their radioactive decontamination is being carried out. But preliminary evaluations show that this will not be an easy job at all because the amounts of soil are simply enormous. Pollution maps have already been made for a number of rayons, the Percherskiy and Vatutinskiy rayons, for example, and they have been handed over to the civil defense headquarters. I think that now it is not a question of whether Kiev residents do or do not know exactly where these spots are located, it is more a matter of eliminating them soon as possible.

Many people ask when dosimeters will finally be for sale. But we propose making them available mainly for rent

and at low cost. Then everyone who takes an instrument for a week can carefully check his apartment, dacha or garden.

[Kiyanskiy] Man adapts equally quickly to both good and bad. This is probably why we are no longer upset when we see fish caught in the Kiev Sea for sale in the city, why we are not surprised that at the markets people have stopped measuring the pollution of vegetables and fruits. Of course, one can understand people. In four and a half years they have become dead tired.

[Baryakhtar] Yes, the attenuation factor may indeed play a bad joke on us. Beginning in 1988 the vigilance of various municipal services began to wane. Today, as never before, highly-skilled specialists are needed in the area of radiation monitoring. And we simply must train them in a very short time period. All the conditions for this are available in the republic's capital. We shall not forget for a minute that the danger remains, it is next door, you can touch it, as they say, with your hands.

### Seismic, Ecological Dangers at Dimitrovgrad Nuclear Waste Site

91WN0044A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 90  
Union Edition p 6

[Article from Ulyanovsk Oblast by M. Piskunov under the rubric "Returning to What Has Been Published": "The Mystery of the 'Nuclear Earthquakes'"]

[Text] Last summer, IZVESTIYA (No 230) reported on earth tremors of unknown origin that occurred in the Ulyanovsk Oblast city of Dimitrovgrad. Suspicion fell upon the site [poligon] for burying liquid radioactive waste in operation at the Scientific Research Institute for Nuclear Reactors (NIAR). IZVESTIYA proposed the creation of a commission, which would investigate the phenomenon. And lo, an interdepartmental commission visited the NIAR—one of the nuclear power industry's largest scientific research centers. This commission had been created in accordance with the mission of V. Doguzhiyev, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Commission for Extraordinary Situations. It was, first of all, to determine the cause of the earth tremors.

So, what did the commission determine? Fortunately, the subterranean shocks turned out to be unrelated to the burying of liquid radioactive waste (ZhRO) at the site. The interdepartmental commission stated: The cause of the seismic phenomena was detonations that were set off in the forested area to the west of Dimitrovgrad by the "Uralgeologiya" [Ural Geology] Association's (Bazhenovskiy) Geophysical Expedition. It is charged with performing shot-hole seismic sounding along the geodetic line from Tyumen to Krivoy Rog within the framework of the All-Union program for comprehensive investigation of the country's subsurfaces.

Indeed, the earth tremors and the detonations do coincide in time. Now, it would seem, one may breathe easily: The cause is clear. However, there have remained



several unknowns about this seemingly obvious fact. These continue to worry the population.

The detonations were set off quite near the large nuclear center (eight reactors are in operation there!), but its management did not even know about them. Why? Unfortunately, there is no answer to this question. After the commission's departure, I sought out the necessary documents, and convinced myself that the Ural geophysicists had acted in a "helter-skelter" manner. Either intentionally or by mistake, they mislocated wooded areas. A called-for point was located in an entirely different place—farther to the west by seven kilometers. And that is Melekesskiy Rayon territory. But there is still a difficulty in that the expedition's workers did not even have all of the necessary documents on the called-for points in that rayon. Thus, the oblast executive committee's decision on temporary allocation of the land for the geophysical work's performance was received considerably later—a month after the detonations. And the Ural geophysicists did not even apply to the internal affairs administration and the oblast mining engineering inspectorate for permits for Melekesskiy Rayon, although it is forbidden for them to transport or keep explosive substances without the former's permit and to conduct explosive operations without the latter's.

Furthermore, all is not clear either with the seismic effects that were caused by the detonations. Certainly, comparatively small charges were put into the shot holes—330 kilograms of TNT the first time and 420 the second time. However, the shocks were evident, not only in the forest, near the site of the detonations, but also in urban areas. According to specialists' estimates, the force of these was three to five felt-intensity steps [on the 12-step scale] and actually greater on the upper floors of buildings. What was the cause of this? The commission cited the heavy water saturation in the soil's upper layers due to the large amount of precipitation that had fallen. Nevertheless, there are loose ends. An extensive area—no smaller than 50 square kilometers—shook.

True, the commission, nonetheless, also took notice of a tectonic fault in its conclusion. In the opinion of scientists, the fault runs through Dimitrovgrad and alongside the NIIAR, and, in the opinion of others, its zone is at a distance from these. Nevertheless, the presence in these parts of a tectonic irregularity (be it even a supposed one) cannot but be alarming. Moreover, the pumping of liquid waste into subterranean places can also be a cause of earthquakes. Judging by the scientific literature, such phenomena have been observed in the United States and Japan, at oil fields in Siberia and the Bashkir ASSR, and in other places. Dimitrovgrad's situation is complicated by its being located in a step-5 felt-intensity zone and the fact that natural earthquakes have often occurred in the neighboring Tatar ASSR during recent years. That is why the interdepartmental commission came to the conclusion that it is essential to create constantly operating seismic and geodetic monitoring systems in the vicinity

of the NIIAR. And this recommendation is fully justified: Operating eight nuclear reactors without having a single seismic station nearby is an extremely dangerous business.

And now, about the NIIAR waste site itself. In talks with members of the commission, I managed to make it clear that Dimitrovgrad is the only place in the world where a burial area for liquid radioactive waste has turned out to be in limestones. Limestones, as is well-known, are favorable for the development of karst. Is not this phenomenon also evident at the NIIAR waste site? Is there a full guarantee of safety? Indeed, about 2 million cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste have already been pumped in by now, and the burial area becomes fuller every month with thousands of more cubic meters of waste.

Now, when this fact has become widely known to the city's residents, they have begun to sound the alarm insistently. And one can understand them. The wells, from which the drinking water for the city is taken, are located three kilometers from the waste site. A therapeutic spa, at which water from a depth of 600 meters is used, also is located comparatively nearby.

And what opinion does the interdepartmental commission have regarding the waste site's future operation? The commission's chief, V. Strakhov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute, said:

"The conducting of an ecological expert examination of this facility was not included in our task. However, we have noted in our conclusion that the waste site's operation may be continued...."

However, representatives of the local authorities and public ultimately insisted that this point be entered in the commission's final document: An ecological investigation of the waste site, the deep-pit burying of the waste, and adjacent regions is to be conducted in the first quarter of next year.

#### **Plan for Cherepovets Coking Plant Evokes Environmentalist Reaction**

*91WN0044B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 90  
Second Edition p 3*

[Article from Cherepovets and Vologda by P. Kuzmin, senior assistant to the Vologda Oblast Prosecuting Attorney, and G. Sazonov, PRAVDA correspondent, in the "Ecology: The Hot Spots" column: "Under a Cap of Smog"]

[Text] A few days ago, the Cherepovets Ecology Club urged its supporters to express their opinions regarding the construction of a new coke-oven battery. Let us try to find out to what extent the action of the "greens" [environmentalists] is justified.



Little Cherepovets was renowned among the old Russians as a fishing town—"Here you have pike-perch pie, sun-dried bream, and freshly salt-cured pike." But today.... Flying toward the city in an airplane, you see, long before its outlines are on the horizon, how a mushroom-shaped smog hides the sun—like the plume of a mighty explosion.

Can it be that everything will look different if you approach by railroad?

No, even the train does not change the picture. No matter from what side you approach Cherepovets, you will still find yourself in a forest of smokestacks—smokestacks of differing sizes and different heights, venting smoke of all imaginable color combinations. One recalls that singers and musicians, not very long ago at all, used to celebrate industrial beauty, setting it above the charm of fields and forests: "The open-hearth furnaces burn; both day and night they burn...."

The furnaces, of course, are burning even now, but, alas, they evoke, not delight, but rather—displeasure. Last year, the metallurgical combine discharged into the atmosphere, without cleaning, 584,000 metric tons of polluting substances, and among these, having toxic effects, were carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, and ammonia.... During the same year, the giant of industry poured 42 million cubic meters of polluted industrial effluents into surrounding bodies of water.

It is no secret that all violations are by no means noted. The monitoring services do not take air and water samples on their days off. And, during the night hours, in the striving for "production volume," the technology is not adhered to in the shops, and the cleaning systems are disconnected. The city often awakes as if from a drugged sleep. And, "for the combine's sake," its effect on the biosphere and, consequently, on people's lives is also felt in a surrounding area about 50 kilometers in radius. The question is before us: How is the situation to be improved without infringing on the interests of the metallurgists and practically all of the Soviet Union's machine-building enterprises along with them?

"At some time in the past, the planners made a big mistake in locating Cherepovets' industry," opines B. Limin, Vologda Oblast's chief public health physician. "The plant and the city were erected on essentially the same site. For over 20 years, 4.5 percent of all capital investment was spent on environmental protection. That is where the cause of the ecological neglect lies."

Some sort of "shock" was needed. An accident at the coke and coke chemicals production plant [koksokhim-proizvodstvo], which caused serious pollution of Rybinsk Reservoir and a sensation in the press, became that shock. Thanks to the persistence of workers in the prosecuting attorney's office [prokuratura], who pressed the investigation to completion, the former Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy [Minchermet] "generously" paid 19 million rubles out of the state's pocket to replenish fish stocks for the mismanagement and negligence. Except

for the former chief engineer of the coke and coke chemicals production plant [koksokhim] and the shop boss, who paid 5,000 rubles through the court, and were released from criminal accountability because of a pardon, not one of the department's executives suffered.

However, that terrible coke and coke chemicals production plant salvo on the Volga Basin did make some things change. Now, Director Yu. Lipukhin's working morning begins with ecology: Investigation of violations is made, and punishments are pronounced.... The combine laboratory's authority in environmental protection has been extended right up to the shutdown of plants that are causing danger.

"A program for environmental improvement has been prepared here," the director said.

In Cherepovets, hopes are pinned mainly on investments, limits, and contracts. And these are important, but are causes and effects not being confused in this case? Indeed, however perfect the catchment and sedimentation basins, it is hard to expect improvement unless a change in technology is made. In this country, for example, there is already experience in blowing the coal raw material into blast furnaces, which procedure sharply reduces emissions. However, the procedure is not yet being used in Cherepovets.

On the other hand, it is possible to ease the lives of thousands of people even today, without any sorts of costs or particular efforts. In the course of a year, according to the public health physicians' data, there occur about 40 to 45 bad days for the city. Adjust the programs for those days, reduce the work load on the plants—and you can cut down the pollution. There are other possibilities—the elementary observance of discipline at the plant, the turning on of all cleaning systems, and the presence of ecological standards, the development of which is within the capabilities of the combine's central laboratory, in the workplace. These alone, according to specialists' assertions, could help reduce emissions by 15 percent—by tens of thousands of metric tons.

At the end of 1989, the metallurgical combine's coke and coke chemicals production plant permitted a volley discharge of effluents containing oil products into the Sheksna River. These got into the Rybinsk Reservoir—near Baganikh Island the phenol and resin contents exceeded all norms. The oblast prosecuting attorney's office determined the cause of the mishap: unsatisfactory operation of the primary coke and chemical recovery shops. By means of arbitration, the prosecuting attorney's office fined the combine 193,000 rubles for the damage done. The criminal case was dropped. However, we wish to call attention to the following detail. It turns out that the discharge of condensate—saturated with toxic substances—into the sewer system is called for at ferrous metallurgy enterprises' gas plants by safety rules established by the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine

Supervision [Gosgortekhnadzor SSSR] and coordinated with the USSR State Construction Committee [Gosstroy SSSR].

Some time ago, a law on protecting the atmospheric air was passed. However, it turned out to be ineffectual. Why? The law was enforced in accordance with the economic and social development plans, and in these, as you know, top priority was by no means assigned to ecology.

The word "problem" shows up more often than others in Cherepovets citizens' vocabularies. Yes, there are problems enough in the city. However, the ecology problem holds sway over all. The people understand: Their own and their children's health, working ability, and, in the final analysis, well-being depend upon it. And what is taking place before their eyes? The residents are being resettled from Mir Street, which is quite near the combine, for example, but, at the same time, a swimming pool is being built and high-rise apartment houses for the "Ammofos" [Ammonium Phosphate] Association erected on that same street with the tacit approval of the party's city executive committee [gorispolkom]. Strange: With one hand the organ of Soviet power supports the ecology's betterment and, with the other, settles people next to the smoking stacks.

The city's authorities have not reached the point of solving environmental protection problems comprehensively. Then, too, there is the following aspect of the problem. The reconstruction of existing plants and the erection of new ones are often done without ecological expertise. The combine and city executives declare that the atmosphere in Cherepovets will improve and the bodies of water become cleaner approximately by the year 2000. We heard such promises 5, 10, and 15 years ago. However, they were not kept because rolling mill "2000" was erected, and the largest blast furnace in the country was built, and for that reason, they say, there was no time to pay attention to ecology. Just such a tendency also is in view for the immediate future. We make our judgment about this on the basis of the Cherepovets Metallurgical Combine's expansion plan prepared by the Leningrad State Institute for the Design of Metallurgical Plants [Lengipromez].

Here before us is the conclusion on the plan reached by Yu. Bazanov, chairman of the Vologda Oblast Environmental Protection Council. "The combine's expansion in recent years has been conducted without the development of a set of measures to protect the environment," he noted. "The addition of new capacities has not been linked to the shutdown of run-down and ecologically untrustworthy plants." The defective practice, however deplorable, continues. In the plan, it is intended to erect coke oven battery No 11, quite possibly the largest such battery in the country. Why such a big one? They say: There is a shortage of coke. Well then, build the sort that will eliminate the shortage. No, they have espoused the giant battery. Although world science and experience have proved that giant plants are unwieldy and have low

efficiency for the most part, the oblast environmental protection committee has given the "OK" to the new construction....

"There are no guarantees," admitted N. Okunev, chairman of the Cherepovets City Environmental Protection Committee, "that the new battery will not worsen the ecology, and, what is more, its construction has been started within city limits. In my opinion, the imbalance that they have been talking about for 20 years at the combine has been brought about by the combine and the Ministry of [ferrous] Metallurgy themselves. They built a gigantic rolling mill—let us have a gigantic blast furnace near it. This furnace eats up a lot of coke, and the coke ovens are not sufficient for it—build a giant coke oven battery...."

Besides the new battery, a large new sintering machinery complex and reconstruction of the oxygen-converter, cold-rolling, and curved-shapes shops are called for in the plan. This is additional and substantial environmental pollution. From what source is the improvement to be expected?

Production volumes are increasing at the combine, along with low-quality in metal rolling. Many systems in the shops are functioning at their limits. For months, they are not stopped for maintenance, which also creates a danger to the ecology. Finally, let us also remember that the metallurgists' introduction of new capacities will require new working hands, and where are these to be obtained? In the country [rural areas]? But the country is already dying....

In our discussion of the ecological situation in Cherepovets, big chemistry's enterprises remain unnoticed—two associations, "Ammofos" and "Azot" [Nitrogen]—but they also do their bit in worsening the atmosphere. "Ammofos" developed a justification for increasing the production of sulfuric and phosphoric acids, but it did not worry about reducing emissions of nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and other substances. Huge cinder pits, not far from the shops, are filled to the limit with production waste—pyrite cinders. Nobody has studied or is studying the effect of these on the groundwater, on the Sheksna's infrabed waters, and, ultimately, on the Volga.

The country needs metal, fertilizer, liquid nitrogen, etc. Not, however, at the price of destroying the environment and shortening the length of human life. Let us remember the rule: Better less, but better. The people expect a law from the parliament that will help to preserve the environment—the fountainhead of being. However, they themselves should not sit around doing nothing. Much can be done locally.

## Continuing Controversy Over Tashkent Metro System Contamination

### USSR Health Official Comments

91WN0039A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 36,  
Sep 90 p 22

[Interview with Deputy USSR Minister of Health Aleksandr Kondrusev by Irina Krasnopolskaya: "The Capital Metro: No Sensation Occurred, but the Danger Remains"]

[Text] On 28 August, the "Vremya" program on television carried a sensational report from Tashkent that certain kinds of microorganisms and microbes supposedly had been found in the city's metro, which are destroying the structure and poisoning people.

Moreover, Professor N. Dekhkankhodzhayeva announced that this microorganism—*patilomicos variolae*—is more dangerous than AIDS. Well, and if you consider that AIDS has the reputation of being the plague of the 20th Century, then—this microorganism is even more of a sensation. A sensation that alarmed all who heard the report on television, one which became instantly known practically to everyone. And what was the situation in fact? Is *patilomicos variolae* really more terrible than AIDS? With these questions, I went to the USSR Ministry of Health, to see Deputy Minister and Chief State Sanitary Physician of the USSR Aleksandr Kondrusev.

[Kondrusev] In fact, there was no basis for the sensational statements. And before moving on to the heart of the matter, I consider it necessary to say: We sometimes are misusing glasnost and, in a period that is so complex in our country from all points of view, especially in the republics, without thinking about the possible consequences, are rushing to make sensational statements. To stagger? To astound? To cause panic? Indeed, time is then needed in order to show that there are no grounds for the sensation. This, unfortunately, is what happened this time.

[Krasnopolskaya] But what, in fact, is happening? Are the employees of the Tashkent metro really becoming sick?

[Kondrusev] On 28 August, that is, the day after the report on the "Vremya" show, a discussion took place in the Uzbek Ministry of Health. It was established that the microorganism *patilomicos variolae* exists within our surrounding environment and not infrequently infects people who have no connection with work at the Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash metro stations in Tashkent. Of the 33 workers who have applied for medical assistance, this microorganism was detected only in four. There is no proof for the allegation of contamination by

this organism and it is not confirmed by clinical phenomena based on contamination by chemical substances. There is no basis for the presence of a "biological reactor", as the author of the "Vremya" interview program believes. The Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash stations are now closed.

[Krasnopolskaya] But this means there are harmful influences?

[Kondrusev] And indeed there are! Specialists have long been sounding the alarm concerning the situation at these stations. Indeed, back in 1988, train engineers complained about the appearance of unusual odors in the air of the metro, about feeling worse during working hours, about headaches, dizziness, sluggishness, nausea, dryness and a tickling in the throat, and so on. Those to whom they turned diagnosed serious poisoning.

The stations we are talking about have been a source of serious concern from when they were first opened in 1987. Back in December 1987, a special commission was organized at the request of the directors of the Tashkent metro system. It came to the conclusion that the main reason for the appearance of toxic materials in the tunnels was untreated industrial drainage from the Tashkent aviation production association imeni Chkalov (TAPOiCh). This plant was built more than 50 years ago. Treatment facilities are practically nonexistent at it. And indeed, there are electro-plating and anodic painting shops there. Reservoirs have been dug into the ground here containing solvents, fuel and lubrication materials, acids, and alkalis. Untreated waste waters are dumped into a channelized collector that runs by the Chkalovskaya station with a discharge water volume that is two- to three-fold greater than that permitted in the city's sewer system. The technical condition of the collector is beneath any criticism. In addition, fluids are leaking out of the in-ground reservoirs. Chromium-plating, hydro-ammonia cadmiumization, cyanic cadmiumization, nickel-plating, anodization, and chemical oxidation processes are being carried out in the electroplating and anodic painting shops at the TAPOiCh.

[Krasnopolskaya] And what?

[Kondrusev] In April 1989, the sanitary and epidemiology center issued a decree on "halting the operation of the Chkalovskaya station." The materials were transmitted to the transportation procuracy. The question was also discussed in the Uzbek Ministry of Health. Medical workers demanded a fundamental improvement in the ecological situation. However, as happens with us quite often, there has been no hurry to carry out these instructions. Therefore, from April to September 1989, more than 400 persons were registered as having reported to metro health points with one and the same complaint—weakness, dizziness, nausea, and the like.

The Tashkent metro system improved the ventilation system, cleaned out drainage gutters, reduced the working time of personnel at the station, and acquired

individual protective equipment. The sanitary and epidemiology station began to take regular samples of the air and of drainage waters. But all these were halfway measures. Therefore, the medical and sanitary service again posed the question of closing the Chkalovskaya station. In the beginning of September, city authorities decided to close the section of the line between the Tashselmash and the Chkalovskaya stations. The plant did something to improve the ecological situation. In short, in November they again opened the section of the road for train traffic. From November 1989 to January of this year, everything was more or less calm. The situation got worse in February, when the heavy snows and rains began. These waters, travelling through earth that has been seriously contaminated by technical substances over many years, began to penetrate the tunnels in many places and, along with them, to bring harmful substances into the metro environment. And again there were instances of poisoning...

Judge for yourself. Analysis of air quality test results at the Chkalovskaya station has showed that maximum one-time allowable concentrations have been exceeded 1.68-fold for hydrogen chloride, 2.3-fold for ammonia, 3.8-fold for nitrogen dioxide, and 3.3-fold for phenol. And there have been days when permissible concentrations of hydrogen sulfide have been exceeded by 10- to 15-fold...

Each such excess is sufficient to cause serious poisoning of the organism. What is also striking is human endurance. From the very beginning—from the planning of construction of stations in such close proximity to the TAPOIch—it has been obvious that people are being condemned to work under unacceptable conditions, that they will be doomed to illness.

And now it is necessary either to implement a very serious complex of measures to protect people or to close the stations. I understand that either one or the other of these will cost the state an enormous amount. But the health, the lives of people are even dearer. It is necessary to choose.

#### Officials Debate Cause

91WN0039B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 5 Sep 90 p 4

[Article by M. Alimov and V. Volodin: "A Sarcophagus Over the Metro"]

**Text Picket lines of alarmed residents of nearby microrayons have once again appeared next to the Chkalovskaya metro station in Tashkent, which was closed a year ago by the sanitary service.**

Medical workers noticed that something wrong was happening in the atmosphere of the station tunnels in the early spring of 1989, when heavy downpours of rain occurred: Engineers on the trains and attendants at the stations began to suffer from headaches, sleepiness, running eyes, nausea. Six engineers were hospitalized.

During study at the toxicology center, a 6- to 8-fold increase in the level of carbon monoxide was found in the blood of many. But (and this was the puzzle), no deviations from the norm were found in the air of the tunnels. It was only in the course of careful studies that they discovered high concentrations of hexavalent chrome, methane, hexane, propane... And their combination with the nitric oxides and hydrogen sulfide found in the atmosphere of the metro was producing a toxic effect. But how did the harmful gasses get into the tunnel? The answer was already being sought by a governmental commission.

Studies showed that, at a great depth, a sea of all possible kinds of petroleum products "splashes" alongside the Chkalovskaya station. Indeed, not far from the metro lines there is an aviation plant storage site for fuel and lubrication materials and acids, the cisterns of which have been noticeably leaking for many years. Moreover, the storage site did not have treatment facilities or a waste drainage system. And these began to pour out and harmful leaks through the joints of the concrete tunnel began to penetrate the metro, to break down, and to form toxic mixtures of gasses.

It is naive to say that the planners and builders of the metro did not know about the contamination of the soil around the new station. The workers who put up the Chkalovskaya station told correspondents how the soil here burst into flame from carelessly discarded matches. And no significance was given to this.

In order to rid the station of the gasses, three bore holes were drilled on the grounds of the aviation plant, through which pumps began to pump out the ground waters containing petroleum products. The fuel and lubrication materials and acid storage sites were removed. But spring came, heavy rains began again, and the situation was repeated. In the beginning of April of this year, the Chkalovskaya station and its neighbor, the Selmashskaya station, were closed by the line's sanitary service. The effected stations were fenced off from the remaining ones by a solid brick wall.

It would have been possible to put an end to the matter here, but... How can you brush aside the interview given to a Central Television correspondent by the director of the department of protozoic illnesses at the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health's medical parasitology scientific research institute imeni L. M. Isayev, Professor N. A. Dekhkankhodzhayeva, and by A. Stepanichenko, a scientist from Tashkent University? They declared for all to hear that a bioreactor is in operation beneath the Chkalovskaya station, the microbes of which are destroying the structure of the station and are giving birth to microorganisms which are "worse than AIDS." "I have expressed my point of view and am prepared to defend it everywhere," said Professor N. A. Dekhkankhodzhayeva. "I am convinced that microorganisms that we call *zavminella* exist at the Chkalovskaya metro station, which we have detected in the blood of three out of the 32 sick people who have turned to us. I will not go

into a detailed description of it, but will stress that the main danger of the microorganism lies in the fact that it penetrates and affects literally all organs and tissues and that, according to our data not only affects red corpuscles, leucocytes, monocytes, and cymphocytes [Kimfatsity], but also multiplies within them."

And here is the opinion of the chief of the Tashkent metro system, A. D. Mirdzhalilova:

"At the present time, intensive work is being carried out to localize the situation at the Chkalovskaya station. Two hundred thousand rubles have been allocated for insulating the joints in the tunnel, specialists from the Gidrospestry trust are building a sarcophagus over us so that water does not penetrate inside. We are removing contaminated soil. Work is being held up by the fact that the aviation plant is dragging out construction of treatment installations. A contract has been signed with the Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences concerning the carrying out of research operations. Its specialists have detected various kinds of microorganisms in the atmosphere of the tunnels; however these are not dangerous to health. In her interview on television Professor Dekh-kankhodzhayeva said that a bioreactor of some kind is destroying the structure of the metro. This is incorrect. According to the conclusions of a tunnel study commission from the Ministry of Railways (MPS), there have been no basic changes in the quality of construction."

Who is right and who is not, time will of course tell. But do we have the right today to waste this time on ambitious and empty arguments? Perhaps it would be wiser for all of us to join together and, most importantly, without mistakes, to solve all the secrets of the "ailment" of the two stations of the Tashkent metro system?

### Situation Detailed

91WN0039C Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 12 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by Andrey Semerkin: "The Chkalovskaya Station: No Passengers Are Getting On"]

[Text] "Don't be frightened, for God's sake, don't be frightened!"—these are the words of Hermann, from Pushkin's story, "The Queen of Spades" have been repeated for the last two weeks by ecologists, workers on the Tashkent metro, journalists... After the "Vremya" television show presented a program on the state of affairs at the Chkalovskaya station, telephones in organizations that have a direct or indirect relationship to the metro have not stopped ringing. Passengers, specialists, and journalists are calling, and all are demanding a precise answer: What is happening at Chkalovskaya?

And at Chkalovskaya all is normal. You do not believe it? But it really is. A paradox.

Our paper has more than once turned to this underground theme. We have openly informed our readers about everything that we knew ourselves. Let us briefly recall the course of events.

More than a year ago, the composition of the air in the metro tunnel in the vicinity of the Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash stations changed sharply. Instances of poisoning of train engineers and station workers were noted. A search for the sources of contamination was begun. The shadow of suspicion fell on all enterprises located in the vicinity of the Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash stations, including the Tashkent freight station. A commission established to study the situation carefully examined all versions.

It was established that the gasses which had poisoned the engineers are formed by microorganisms. However, it was unclear what is nourishing the bacteria which inhabit the area in the space outside the metro tunnel. It is fully possible that the fuel and lubricating materials storage area of the Tashkent aviation production association imeni Chkalov is supplying nourishment for the bacteria. Petroleum products are an entirely edible thing for bacteria, but it is not only a matter of petroleum.

At one time (many years ago), there was a small lake where the storage site is located. Old-time residents even say that fish were raised in it. Then they drained the lake and built the storage dump, and later also the station. If it were known what they used to fill the lake many years ago, it would be clear what is nourishing the bacteria. But the dead lake is silent.

There is still one more "hydro-puzzle." The nearest neighbor of the Chkalovskaya station is the small Karasu river. Why does the river bear specifically this name (black water)? There is the story that the ground waters in the vicinity of the Karasu even before construction of the metro contained some kind of mixture of compounds. This could also have an influence on the color of the water, and on the name of the river. At the present time, black water appears in test shafts dug above the station. Where does it come from? What does it consist of?

Let us examine who is "feeding" the bacteria: Is the filled-in lake "sending a greeting" from the world of nonexistence, or is the dump sharing its excess petroleum products, or is it the stream trying to justify its black name?

While the commission considered, the bacteria were living out their own full lives. From the side, this looked like the games of an evil spirit. In February of this year, the temperature of the ground waters in the region of the Chkalovskaya station suddenly rose to 57 degrees. And, at another time, the appearance of hydrogen was established in the water of a number of the bore holes—this coincided with underground tremors. However, specialists consider that bacteria are hardly capable of such "feats." Both surprises must have another, nonbacteriological nature.

Who knows how events would have developed if the Chkalovskaya station had been built at another point. But a fact remains a fact: The station is located in its ill-fated location, and this was not managed without the participation of the administrative system. In its time, the leadership of the aviation association succeeded in getting the station built specifically at the entrance of the TAPOiCh. With this goal, they say, visits were made to the very highest offices in the republic and the Union. It is known that such visits end with the most august instructions: how to build and where.

The history of our fatherland contains examples of when the mighty of this world have participated in the construction of railroads. In particular, the Petersburg-Moscow railroad in its time was laid following the tsar's route. The line, "selected" by the monarch, was weak from a technical point of view, but one did not argue with the tsar. Historical experience teaches us nothing and they put the Chkalovskaya station where directed—right on a stone pillow. They located it such that practically the flow of underground waters cannot pass either under or alongside the station but beats directly against the side of the underground station.

The tunnel, however, is dry—the bore holes to lower the water are working. They were at the station; they went down onto the line, prepared to pray: it is dry. Although the commission did not pronounce a final technical diagnosis, but certain measures were taken. As the deputy chairman of the republic's state committee for environmental protection, Vladimir Konyukhov, explained, irrespective of what the microorganisms are feeding on, the recommendations of the commission were carried out: they cleaned up the dump, the level of the ground waters was lowered. The result is that the situation has been normalized at Chkalovskaya and in its neighborhood. Today, there are no deviations from the norm in air quality but, as formerly, there are petroleum products in the water that is being pumped out of the wells.

Why then aren't the trains running? The commission is working on its final technical diagnosis. In this, it is being helped by specialists from the Krasnokholmskgeologiya and the Uzbekgidrogeologiya associations, scientists from Kiev (about 20 years ago there were bacteria in the Kiev metro that devoured... cast iron. The Kiev bacteria won out and have moved on to Tashkent to share their experience), chemists from Tashkent University, metro workers... Until a precise diagnosis is made, the metro will not operate on this section,

...The Chkalovskaya station. A platform without people. Footsteps in the silence. Abdusattar Makhkamov, the chief of the station. The station custodian. Or a stalker of the underworld? Every day he comes to a station where there is not a single passenger.

Not a sound is heard from the tunnel that leads off into the darkness. This section of the metro is cut off from the rest of then Tashkent underground world by a brick wall.

It was built between the Tashkent and the Tashselmash stations at the decision of the commission so that the gasses from Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash will not spread along the underground line. Now there are no gasses, but the wall continues to stand.

Our suggestion is that, when the wall is taken down (and such a time, of course, will come), the bricks not be chucked out. Let's send the fragments of the underground wall to those cities where they are getting ready to build metros. Let them learn there about the sad experience of Tashkent and never build a line either alongside dead lakes, above dumps that contain petroleum products, or near streams that have a dubious reputation. And, moreover, let them not listen to most august personages who are inclined toward instructions about railroads.

We hope that the Tashkent metro system will present one brick to our editors as well—as a reward for honest, objective illumination of the underground events. But it is not necessary to send souvenirs to the republic Ministry of Health: They do not deserve them. The commission for investigating the events at Chkalovskaya station appealed more than once to the Uzbek Ministry of Health with the request that it take part in this work, but did not find understanding. The Ministry of Health gives the appearance that underground affairs do not interest it very much and shifts all cares over to the railroad sanitary and epidemiology station.

"However the sanitary and epidemiology station is simply not a scientific research institution. The medical personnel of the station are doing everything that they can to study the medical aspects of the problem, but their efforts are small," considers Vladimir Konyukhov. "If medical scientists would carefully study the metro engineers who have become ill, then a precise medical diagnosis would help establish a precise technical diagnosis. And from a moral standpoint, it would be correct if the Ministry of Health would show special attention to those who have damaged their health at their place of work. Up until now, participation by the Ministry of Health in solving the problem has clearly been insufficient,"

**The editors of KOMSOMOLET S UZBEKISTAN officially appeal to the republic Ministry of Health: Several thousand of our readers live and work in Khamzinskiy Rayon in Tashkent, in the region of the Chkalovskaya and Tashselmash stations. Protecting their interests, and also the interests of the workers of the metro, we ask the Ministry to turn the most serious attention to study of the medical aspects of this ecological problem. People are waiting for help.**

Thorough medical study is necessary: The "Vremya" television program also talks about this. True, the version given by "Vremya", from the point of view of the commission, is only one of the hypotheses.

"The commission has already labored for a long time and makes no secret of its work," says Vladimir

Konyukhov. "But it is necessary to understand one point correctly here. Various, sometimes the most unexpected working hypotheses, are expressed at sessions of the commission. And the attitude toward them should be precisely that toward working hypotheses, which must be carefully verified, and then either accepted or rejected. Unfortunately, occasions occur when some member of the commission tries to present his own working hypothesis as a final conclusion of the commission. In this way, an incorrect view of the situation can develop, about its evaluation... We ask journalists who are covering this subject not to confuse hypotheses and conclusions."

In fact, conclusions are still in the future. And although the situation at the Chkalovskaya station, I stress, is normal, we are not in favor of opening the line until we are convinced of its total ecological safety. The commission is continuing its work. There is no basis for panic.

### Second Commission Begins Study

91WN0039D Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Yu. Kazachenko: "The Secret of the Chkalovskaya Station"]

[Text] A special commission of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health has begun its work. It is operating in parallel with a state commission that has already spent about a year studying the phenomenon of the Chkalovskaya station, which had to be closed in November of last year due to massive poisoning of metro workers and passengers.

"We decided to start from zero and take our own path," said the chief physician of the republic sanitary and epidemiology station, "but we do not reject contact with the state commission. Thus, today we can accept with all certainty its conclusion that the poisoning occurred not from a secret microorganism, but from a complex of toxic substances through the respiratory organs. Scientists from Tashkent, the Kiev Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology and Virology, the Ministry of Railroads' Moscow Scientific Research Institute for Railroad Hygiene, and other specialists working today on solving the puzzle of the Chkalovskaya station, have agreed to provide us with their data.

At the moment, the station and the tunnels leading to it have been reliably sealed off. Work on hermetically closing off dangerous sections is going on. The future will tell whether a "Chkalovskaya concrete sarcophagus" is needed.

### Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Continue Talks on Aluminum Plant Pollution

#### Tajik Official Comments

91WN0035A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 29 Aug 90 p 2

[Announcement by A.I. Subbotin, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Protecting the

Health of the People, Social Security, and Ecology, concerning an appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR]

[Text] Dear people's deputies! Allow me to report very briefly about the ecological situation in the area of action of the Tajik aluminum plant. As you know, starting with 1975 this enterprise began work in the Republic. It is one of the giants of the aluminum industry in the country, equipped with the most modern facilities. Its planned capacity exceeds 500,000 tons of aluminum per year.

At the present time the plant employs about 10,000 people. As its capacity snowballs, so are the problems related to releasing in the atmosphere aluminum production waste. Hydrogen fluoride, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur, carbon dioxide, benzopyrene, and other harmful admixtures in high concentrations are polluting the environment. The most worrisome are emissions of fluorine and its compounds. The predominant direction of the wind contributes to the blowing of such harmful admixtures over the territory of Surkhandarya Oblast in the Uzbek SSR.

Studies conducted by institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Ministry of Health, the ministries of health of the Tajik SSR and Uzbek SSR, the gosagroproms of the USSR and the Tajik SSR, and other institutions made it possible clearly to establish a differentiated negative influence of the plant's emissions on the soil cover, vegetation, and water. Particularly affected by the fluorine are the fruit-bearing and coniferous trees, grape leaves, mulberry leaves, pomegranates, and alfalfa. The frequency of chromosome aberrations in animals has been noted, which confirms the real threat to the heredity systems of mammals.

Medical-physiological studies of the health of the population in the area where the Tajik aluminum plant is located, in the Tajik and Uzbek SSRs, show a great difference of opinions and claims by scientists, for which reason they must be submitted to expert reviews.

I assume that, given this situation, the plant's leadership acted properly when, in order to establish certain basic standards related to fluorine and other features, it invited an expert group of ESKOS [Ecological Station for Environmental Control] from the nongovernmental Universal Laboratory organization. As Professor Borenboyn, the head of the expert group, promised, by October 1990 it will submit its report. At that point it will be possible to draw specific conclusions and refine plans for improving the ecological situation around the plant.

Currently a "Target Scientific-Technical Program for Reducing the Emission of Pollutants in the Environment to the Maximally Tolerated Levels by the Tajik Aluminum Plant" is being implemented. With a view to reducing the emission of pollutants in the atmosphere by the plant, work has been done to stabilize the technological system of the electrolyzers. The use of fluorine salts per 1 ton of aluminum declined by 29 percent between



1987 and 1989. The automatic elimination of anode effects in eight electrolysis plants has been installed and currently such installations are under way in the remaining plants. Work is being done to update and upgrade the efficiency of the screening of the electrolyzers, the application of an automated system for the supply of alumina, and the centralized supply of alumina and other measures.

The implementation of environmental protection measures at the Tajik aluminum plant made it possible, despite the increased production capacity, to reduce in 1990 the volume of emissions of hydrogen fluoride to 216 tons per year, compared to 1986, when emissions totaled 424 tons.

Steps are being taken to improve the social and sanitary situation in Tursunzadevskiy Rayon, Tajik SSR, and Sariosiyskiy Rayon, Uzbek SSR.

However, today you and I would not have read the emotional appeal addressed by the Uzbek people to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR had the ecological effect of the plant been normal.

The governments of our republics should submit a proposal on involving the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences in scientific studies to determine the influence of the plant's emissions on the bodies of women, children, and adolescents who live in the zone affected by such emissions. I believe that as of now we should consider mechanisms of compensations for the risk to the population living in this zone.

### Uzbek Official Comments

91WN0035B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 29 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by T. Alimov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR State Environmental Protection Committee concerning the appeal of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet to the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Dear friends and brothers!

Honored people's deputies of fraternal Tajikistan, dear Kakhor Makhkamovich!

Allow me, above all, to present to you, the people's deputies of Tajikistan, the sincere and warm feelings of respect and fraternal greetings of the people's deputies of Uzbekistan.

The historical destinies of our peoples have become so closely interwoven that the lives of the Tajik and Uzbek peoples, similar in terms of culture, language, and customs, are following the virtually same direction. We have common joys and sadness and identical objectives: to make our people happy.

Today, unfortunately, we must speak more not about our achievements but of the problems which are affecting the people ever more strongly, preventing us from living and developing normally.

One such problem on which the attention of the public and the leaders of our republics has been focused in recent years is the critical ecological situation which has developed in the areas surrounding the aluminum plant in Tursunzade.

What happened was that when the plant was being built the idea was that everything will be for the good of the people living here, and for the economic development of Tajikistan. However, in locating and determining the production capacity for aluminum, the designers made a major error by locating the plant regardless of the specific natural-weather conditions of the Gissar Valley.

It must be noted that the population and the environment feel the strongest effect of the emissions of the plant in summer, i.e., during the hottest time of year, when the self-cleaning role of the atmosphere has been reduced to naught, and when there is an accumulation of harmful substances in the active atmospheric stratum.

Although the greatest impact of the plant is in Sariosiyskiy Rayon, its influence is also felt in Denauskiy and Altynsaykiy Rayons.

Let us also note that in previous years the leadership of the former USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy and the management of the aluminum plant had underestimated the situation. Efforts had even been made on their part to deny the harmful impact of the plant on the environment and to ascribe all the misfortunes on the influence of pesticides and other factors and social conditions. For the sake of fairness let us note that of late both the plant and the ministry have not been denying the harmful influence of the plant and have taken certain steps to ensure its ecological safety.

Nonetheless, this huge production facility, its technology, and other factors do not allow the plant to reduce the volume of harmful emissions down to the required standards and to normalize the ecological situation. In 1990 atmospheric pollution has remained high.

It was only in 1990, on the insistence of USSR people's deputies and deputies of the Uzbek SSR that this problem was considered by the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy (8 February) and discussed on three occasions by the USSR Council of Ministers including deputy chairmen Comrades L.A. Voronin, V.K. Gusev, and V.Kh. Doguzhiyev. On each occasion the ministry and the plant director made promises that they would take steps to normalize the ecological situation. So far, however, they have been unsuccessful in doing so and the ecological situation remains tense.

This once again proves that without limiting the capacity and restructuring some of the installations the plant will



be unable to cope with the existing situation and that the harmful impact on the environment and the people will continue.

Naturally, one can understand the ministry's and the plant's leaderships, for this aluminum plant is the pride of the sector. Hundreds of millions of rubles of people's funds have been invested in it and the country needs that metal. We also realize the importance of the plant to the republic's economy. However, we must not at all costs, at the cost of the health of the population and the harm done to the national economy and the environment continue with the production of aluminum!

In addressing themselves to you, the people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet have pursued the single objective of achieving through joint efforts a normalizing of the ecological situation concerning the plant, for the sake of the two fraternal peoples living here and

creating for them normal survival conditions. We suggest that a joint deputy group be created to determine the future fate of the plant.

By the end of this year, with the help of scientists and specialists, the deputy group could formulate priority and long-term suggestions on restructuring part of the production facility. After discussion by the supreme soviets of our republics, it would be expedient to make these suggestions public.

Along with that, taking into consideration the extremely aggravated ecological and sociopolitical situation in the region, the leadership of the Tajik aluminum plant should implement the stipulations of the 30 November 1989 Union governmental commission, which notes that if the standards of maximal admissible emissions and maximally admissible concentrations are violated, all the necessary steps must be taken including limiting the plant's capacity.

### Komsomol Problems, Fate Discussed

91US0099A Moscow *SOBESEDNIK* in Russian No 41,  
Oct 90 p 6

[Article by Rustam Arifdzhanov: "The Komsomol: A Bulletin on Its State of Health"]

[Text]

#### Farewell to the Dinosaur

Have you noticed that not much at all is being written about the Komsomol these days? There is nothing strange about that—it is uninteresting to read about it.

Just three years ago it seemed that something was beginning to stir and seethe! It was then at the 20th Komsomol Congress that the Tyumen delegate Sergey Potapenko said something like the following from the rostrum: This is *our* (bearing in mind the analogy with the party congress of the same number), and unless something comes out of it, we will no longer be forgiven.

Alas, although after the Komsomol's 20th and, moreover, after its 21st Congress, a great deal began to change and continued to seethe and stir, the situation of the Komsomol grew worse and worse. What will happen to it and how has become more and more a matter of indifference.

It is analogous to a gravely ill, distant relative. While there is still hope, people are alarmed and disturbed; they seek out medications which will save him. But as soon as it becomes clear that everything is hopeless, they quietly forget. To be sure, they may inquire while busy with other matters: Well, how do things stand there? Is he still holding out? And people sigh, shake their heads, and resume their own hurried business.

If such a comparison seems inhumane and uncharitable to you, then I am willing to make an "adjustment." Let the misfortune happen not to a relative nor even to a neighbor, but simply let it be the dinosaurs who are dying. That is interesting in principle—why did this happen to them?—but, in general, it is a matter of indifference. By the way, I have done some specific reading about these ancient monsters, and one thing is clear: nobody has yet come up with a definitive or exhaustive answer to explain this sad event in our planet's history.

And that is why I dare to make the following political prognosis: *the Komsomol is doomed to disappear*. And I am taking on the difficult task of being—no, not the historian but more like the chronicler—of this departure from life. So that things may turn out differently than they did with the dinosaurs. They lived and lived, and nobody can remember how they died out. The task which I have chosen for myself is quite a lengthy one (well, even the dinosaurs did not die out right away). And the new rubric or column heading—let's make it "The Komsomol: A Bulletin on Its State of Health", all right?—is certainly not an attempt to have a laugh at its

expense nor to relish its agony. We will trace its departure not even with the coolly dispassionate view of a researcher, but rather as a compassionate fellow-sufferer. But there is no longer much that we can do to help now. Alas, it is a hopeless case.

And in today's remarks I would like to understand, for starters, just what kind of disease our "dinosaur" is suffering from. It is a terrible disease—one which, most likely, will have a fatal outcome—vertical centralism. In Moscow in a building located near the Nogin Square Metro Station, things were decided and strictly executed for all the obkoms, raykoms, and primary organizations, whether it was a matter of raising rabbits or delivering scrap metal. And the Komsomol members of the Far North would collect this scrap metal, but then not know where to put it. If they tried to haul it out of that remote, northern area with its taiga-type growth, the trouble was that only helicopters could fly in and land there. The scrap metal would be more expensive than the items to be made from it. But, of course, they collected it!

And such a rigid subordination to the central authorities simply diverted people from solving local problems. I recall an amusing incident in Baku during 1986. I had flown there for a few days, and I wanted to meet with an old friend of mine. At that time he was working as the secretary of one of the raykoms there. "You know," he said, "I won't be able to sit down and have a chat with you today, tomorrow, or even the day after tomorrow. I have to go to a restaurant." It seemed that the Komsomol leader of perestroika would have to spend three consecutive days in a restaurant. But things turned out to be simpler than that. In Baku an enormous restaurant had been singled out—it had seats for a thousand persons. But after the anti-alcohol ukase, they stopped serving alcoholic beverages there; and people stopped going there. And here came a commission from Moscow to check up on how young persons were spending their leisure time in the light of the struggle against drunkenness. During the time that this commission was working here my friend had to organize a youth group to conduct some cultural-type leisure time. In the evenings hundreds of Komsomol members laboriously and ponderously depicted their sober recreation. The commission departed satisfied.

I do not know why it was necessary to send people to check up on Azerbaijan, which even prior to this, drank very little. But the central authorities had adopted a decision, and it filtered down through the chain of command to the modest-sized raykom where my friend was working.

Or take another example. During the days when the 27th CPSU Congress was in operation a many-thousand-person-strong All-Union Komsomol Shock Detachment was formed and named after this very congress. Thousands of persons were slated to work in Western Siberia, the Urals, and in the Soviet Far East. The authorities approached Olga Surkova, one of the

youngest delegates to this party congress, with an assignment: to become the commander of this new outfit. "But why," Olga wondered very logically. "Someone is working on the Amur, someone else in Magnitogorsk, and I am working in Nizhnevartovsk; why do we need a commander?" But the genetic codes of the centralists had their own kind of logic: if you have an organization, a detachment, you need a commander, a commissar—and that's the way it's supposed to be. Olga refused, and they found another person. All his work boiled down to was awarding a lad the detachment's red banner at the appropriate ceremony. It is difficult to say where it is now. The fact that this detachment ceased to exist right after people dispersed to their various construction sites is a fact of the above-mentioned disease.

People simply did not want to notice this disease. Serious-minded political scientists—Djilas, Garodi, Fischer, Kolakowski, Amendol, Haveman (the list could be continued) declared the following: "the transformation of bureaucratic communism into democratic communism lies through doing away with the apparatus of mass organizations, including youth organizations, and creating opposition 'self-acting' or 'independent' groups." They were branded as renegades of Marxism. Centralization of the youth movement is a characteristic trait of all nondemocratic regimes; this thought was shared by the observations of Western political scientists. And it was during this period that Brezhnev was meeting with the leaders of the youth organizations in the socialist countries. But what kind of "nondemocracy" was there in these countries? The most democratic democracy in the world!

Our Soviet approach was in sharp contrast to the mass of contradictory public youth organizations, scouts' groups, and private camps. Moreover, we always viewed all this diversity as a "cover" or "mask" of the evil bourgeois, who had supposedly specially created such a mosaic in order to better and more conveniently deceive young persons and control them for the benefit of his own unprogressive system.

Is this a thing of the past? Have we been cured? Come on now! Even now we are afraid of decentralization as if it were a fire. The following thesis has been set forth: suppose we dissolve the Komsomol; but who then would protect the interests of young people? Especially when we will have a market-type economy, and especially when young people will be the first to suffer.

In my opinion, the young people of Uralmash, if necessary, will protect their own interests even without the Komsomol Central Committee. It seems to me that young miners will find and are finding their own methods of protection without consulting very much with the Leninist Komsomol. Pardon me, but it is also awkward to hear the thesis that the Komsomol is a present-day protector of young people on a nationwide scale. It is the same story with the unadopted Law on Young Persons (the issue of its necessity is another topic)—a vivid example of the Komsomol's legislative

opportunities or possibilities. By the way, just out of curiosity, I asked several secretaries of the Union-republic Komsomol central committees about their appraisal of the activity engaged in by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs. "The devil only knows what they engage in there!" was the typical response. I did not undertake to question rank-and-file Komsomol members "under its protection." After all, I do not want them to regard me as a fool. These remarks are being written on the eve of the Plenary Session of the Komsomol Central Committee. And so I will allow myself to make the following prognosis: the main thing at this plenum will be the issue of decentralizing property, to put it more simply—its division. I do not know where it will be placed on the planned agenda—perhaps third—but there will have to be a fight over money, movable and nonmovable property. There are no longer merely territorial, but also ideological lines of demarcation between entities of the Komsomol. Commonly shared property unites and allows the central authorities to maintain the "vertical." By the way, this also hinders the Komsomol Central Committee from distributing everything. According to preliminary though unofficial data, the central authorities intend to reserve 20 percent of the funds for themselves. That is, the Kazakh Komsomol, together with its obkoms, raykoms, and primary organizations, will obtain 6 percent, the Ukraine—12 percent, and enormous Russia—about 40 percent. But the central authorities, to be more precise, their apparatus, will obtain one-fifth, i.e., 20 percent. For what purpose? Well, for the All-Union programs. They will keep the money for themselves if only to somehow maintain the "central heights." Is it possible that they fail to understand that this is what is specifically ruining the organization? In such cases it has become accepted to speak quite bluntly: the patient will not be cured. It would be simpler to distribute the funds to the various entities, and if money is needed for All-Union projects, the republics could deduct it if they wanted to. Only of such a distribution takes place, the death of the "All-Union" organization would immediately ensue. But it will not give up; this 100-ton dinosaur—with its small head and huge, unraisable body—will creep along, dragging its tons along with it. Because it wants to live.

By itself alone, this diagnosis—"vertical centralism"—under the conditions of a society which is becoming democratic—is already fatal. But, as was also the case with the former leaders of our state and party, the Komsomol has many other diseases.

No less terrible is "political controlism." A truth which people were frightened to speak just a few years ago is the following: a normal, ordinary person is remote from politics, i.e., he is apolitical. We conducted a sociological poll of SOBESEDNIK's readers, and its results confirmed that this is so. Our readers are more interested in humor and sex; for them social problems, i.e., those of everyday living are important.

The Komsomol was founded in order to inculcate a communistic outlook on the world. That is, a rather small group of young persons entered upon the path of struggling for a revolutionary restructuring of society. But it resulted in everything being turned into a formalized, passive-type organization with tens of millions of members. The doctrine which had been revolutionary at a certain stage became a conservative ideology. I do not deny the presence of conservatives among the youth, but should it be almost everybody?

Horns, drums, councils of volunteer guards, parades, Komsomol meetings, leaders, Leninist examinations, Komsomol-Youth collectives, references, and a great deal else served as an enforced politization of young persons in accordance with the program of our state "religion."

The least favorite subject for Pre-Revolutionary gymnasium students was theology, whereas among Soviet students it is scientific communism. There is a great similarity here. A young person by nature does not accept dogmas and stereotypes; he is sickened by what is obsolete, and he wants something new. The "rigid program" of the Komsomol, its stance of defending a society which is supposedly "developing" but which, in fact, is marking time—all this was aimed at bridling these strivings. And in contrast to the programs of free associations of foreign youths, the Komsomol's program served non-revolutionary goals, to put it mildly. The older comrades compelled the younger generation to fit the same pattern as themselves. This was true even in a literal sense. Remember the appearance of recent Komsomol leaders—an austere suit, necktie, and short haircut?

Young persons have changed narrow trousers for bell-bottom ones, long hair for short haircuts with bangs [?], whereas the Komsomol has zealously struggled against all these things.... And so it is no surprise that young persons have not accepted the Komsomol as their own organization, and they view it as a brigade of overseers. As soon as the opportunity to flee from the overseers manifested itself, they did not fail to let this opportunity pass.

Now about those dinosaurs. There is a version that they perished just because they were large and clumsy. The Frenchman P. Gelard [?] has set forth the following principle: "The more expanded is the composition of a youth organization, the lower is its morale." A handful of Komsomol members immediately after the Civil War indeed devoted all their energies to this organization. With the increase in the numbers, along with certain individuals who linked their own vital interests to social

activity, apolitical young persons could not fail to appear. Numerical "fattening" became a sign of "growing up," of forgetting about lofty ideological and moral principles.

I suppose (and, perhaps, I am even consciously exaggerating the figure) that a million young persons are to be found in this country who would be ready to deprive themselves of things or make sacrifices for the sake of building communism. But 30 million, who would give up the chance to better their own lives for the sake of a great goal—that is hardly to be believed.

Shall we end on this note? We have specified three diseases from which this organization is suffering: vertical structure, political controls on young persons, and excessive mass or size. The outcome of each of them is fatal. But the Komsomol has a lot of other diseases, about which we will write next time. But even these three mentioned above are enough to confirm the prognosis that this organism will not survive.

As to the prospects for the immediate future, we talked about them for quite a long time with the above-mentioned Tyumen delegate to the Komsomol's 20th Congress—Sergey Potapenko—who is now secretary of the Russian Komsomol Central Committee. Our prognosis looks like this. There can no longer be any talk of an All-Union Komsomol. At best, there could be a voluntary association of separate organizations. Nor is an organization with a unified ideology viable. More likely, we need an "umbrella" for the broadest possible spectrum of youth movements. These changes are so inevitable that within a short time we need to convoke a Komsomol Congress. It is completely probable that it would be the last one. The Plenary Session of the Komsomol Central Committee which will take place in a few days will not put a halt to the movement along the inexorable path to the Komsomol's self-liquidation.

But this is no cause for grief or sorrow. The dinosaurs survived and flourished throughout the entire Mesozoic Era. This era is even called the Age of the Reptiles. And then the climate changed, and the Cenozoic Era ensued; this encompasses our own, modern times. And the dominion of the reptiles on the earth came to an end. What is so terrible about that?

**Rustam Arifdzhonov.**

*We have something more to add to these remarks. Immediately following the plenary session of the Komsomol Central Committee we must inform our readers about the state of health of our diseased Komsomol. Therefore, we will end as follows:*

**To Be Continued**